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Summary
In this thesis, we consider three economic models with a continuum of agents: large
games with traits, conditional exact law of large numbers and dynamic directed
random matching.
In many economic environments in society, an individual’s action has a negligible
e↵ect on aggregate summary of the actions of all other individuals. A continuum of
agents, modelled by an atomless measure space, is assumed as it is “the most natural
model” for capturing the numerical negligibility of an individual in an economy.
Chapter 1 demonstrates the class of atomless spaces that accurately models the
space of players in a large game which represents an idealized limit of a sequence
of finite-player games. Through two examples, we show that arbitrary atomless
probability spaces, in particular, the Lebesgue unit interval, may not be appropriate
to model the space of players of an idealized limit. This inappropriateness hinges on
the fact there is a convergent sequence of exact pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the
sequence of finite-player games, while the idealized limit game of the sequence does
not have any equilibrium. Instead, a saturated probability space is shown to be not
only su cient but also necessary, to model the space of players in any idealized
limit.
A stochastic model with a continuum of economic agents often involves shocks
at both macro and micro levels. This can be formalized by a continuum of con-
ditionally independent random variables given the macro level shocks. Based on
the framework of a Fubini extension, the results on the exact law of large numbers
and its converse for a continuum of independent random variables in Sun (2006) are
extended to the setting with conditional independence given general macro states
in Chapter 2. It also follows from Hammond and Sun (2008) that the conditional
vi
Summary vii
independence assumption is generally satisfied. As an illustrative application, it is
shown that any ex ante e cient allocation in an asymmetric information economy
with general aggregate uncertainty has a (utility) equivalent allocation that is in-
centive compatible, which generalizes the corresponding results in Sun and Yannelis
(2007) to the case with infinitely many states.
Models of economies with independent random matching among a continuum
population are extensive. In Chapter 3, we demonstrate the existence of a contin-
uum of agents conducting dynamic directed random searches for counterparties, and
characterize the implications. Agents’ types are shown to be independent discrete-
time Markov processes that incorporate the e↵ects of random matching, with the po-
tential for enduring partnerships that may have randomly timed break-ups. Agents’
types also randomly mutate over time. The random match-induced type changes
for paired agents are potentially correlated. The multi-period cross-sectional distri-
bution of types in such a discrete-time dynamic system is deterministic, because of
the exact law of large numbers. The results provide a mathematical foundation for




In many economic environments in society, an individual’s action has a negligible
e↵ect on aggregate summary of the actions of all other individuals. A continuum of
agents, modelled by an atomless measure space, is assumed to be “the most natural
model” for capturing the numerical negligibility of an individual in an economy.
Furthermore, models with continuum agent space are usually mathematically more
tractable than models with large but finite agent space, since the latter often involve
complicated combinatorial arguments and asymptotic analysis.
Another advantage of continuum agent space is that one is allowed to apply the
exact law of large numbers, which has been widely used in the economic literature.
Under the independence assumption, economists and geneticists have implicitly or
explicitly assumed the almost-sure constant cross-sectional type distribution. Such
a law of large numbers dramatically simplifies the analysis. Based on the framework
of a Fubini extension, the mathematical foundation of exact law of large numbers
has been built in Sun (2006).
In this thesis, we consider three economic models with continuum agent space:
large games with traits, conditional exact law of large numbers and dynamic directed
random matching.
1.1 Large Games With Traits
A large economy, with an atomless probability space to model the space of agents,
is a good proxy to large finite economies.1 In particular, a large economy can be
1See Anderson (1978) for the approximate core equivalence result in large finite economies;
Also see Sun and Nicholas (2007) on the study of compatibility of e ciency and incentives in the
1
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treated as an idealized limit of a converging sequence of large finite economies.2
Therefore, besides the existence of equilibria in a large economy itself, another im-
portant question to ask is whether the limit of a converging sequence of equilibria in
a converging sequence of finite economies is an equilibrium in the idealized limit of
the finite economies. Normally, a positive answer to such a question can be obtained
under the general conditions of various environments.
However, in general the answer is not always positive. In Chapter 2 , we provide
a set of counterexamples which challenge the claim, and its underlying intuition,
concerning the relation between finite-player environments and their idealized con-
tinuum limits. To be sure, Examples 1 and 2 in Khan et al. (2013) have demonstrated
a discrepancy between a continuum game and its finite analogies: the non-existence
of equilibria in the continuum game and the existence of equilibria in its finite coun-
terparts. But in their framework, the continuum game cannot be the idealized limit
of finite games.3 Within a framework similar to that presented in Khan et al. (2013),
we present two examples that involve job-seeking opportunities in two cities: the
game with the Lebesgue unit interval as its space of players in Example 1 is shown
to be the idealized limit of a sequence of finite-player games in Example 2. In both
examples, all players prefer to live in a city where they have less (aggregated) pres-
sure, where the pressure is caused by those players with higher abilities who choose
the same city. Furthermore, the common action set only contains two elements and
players’ payo↵s are continuous on the product of the action set and the set of soci-
etal responses. Surprisingly, it is shown that there does not exist any pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in the idealized limit, whereas the sequence of finite-player games
has a converging sequence of exact pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
large economy and McLean and Postlewaite (2002, 2006) for the approximated cases in large finite
economies.
2We follow the convention and say that a sequence of finite economies converges to a large
economy with a continuum of agents if the induced distributions of the players’ characteristics in
finite economies converges weakly to the induced distribution of characteristics in the limit game;
e.g. Hildenbrand (1974).
3As the convergence of games refer to the weak convergence of distributions of characteristics
(e.g. Footnotes 2), the convergence of games with di↵erent trait distributions cannot even be asked
meaningfully in the framework of Khan et al. (2013). More specifically, as a player’s characteristics
contain both trait and payo↵, and therefore players’ payo↵s in all games must share the same
domain. To allow payo↵s to have the same domain, all games must share the same distribution
of traits as the distribution of traits is used to construct payo↵s in Khan et al. (2013). Hence,
when the limit game has an atomless distribution of traits, there cannot exist a sequence of finite-
player games converging to it. Unlike Khan et al. (2013), we do not impose the assumption that
the marginal distribution of the space of societal responses on traits is the exogenously given
distribution of traits; see the discussion after Definition 1.
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The counterexamples make it clear that an arbitrary atomless probability space,
in particular such as the Lebesgue unit interval, may not be appropriate for mod-
elling the space of players in an idealized limit game. Hence, one has to impose
some additional assumptions on the space of players. This kind of richer measure
structure is the so-called saturated probability space, which has recently contributed
to the study of large games.4 Based on the two examples, we show that the satu-
rated assumption of the space of players on the idealized limit is not only su cient,
but also necessary, under fairly general conditions, to guarantee that the limit of a
converging sequence of exact equilibria of finite-player games is also an equilibrium
in their idealized limit game. This therefore complements the study of large games
in Khan et al. (2013).
1.2 Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers
As noted in Hammond and Sun (2008), macroeconomic risks are the common ran-
dom shocks that influence a significant portion of the population while reality sug-
gests that these are supplemented by risks at the individual level that influence
a negligible portion of the population. This can be formalized by a process with
a continuum of conditionally independent random variables, given the macro level
shocks. However, it is shown in Proposition 4 of Hammond and Sun (2008) that
a standard joint measurability condition on the process of a continuum of random
variables will imply the non-existence of individual level uncertainty. To resolve
the non-compatibility of joint measurability with individual level uncertainty in our
setting, we adopt the framework of a Fubini extension,5 as used in Sun (2006) for
studying a continuum of independent random variables.
It is shown in Theorem 2.8 of Sun (2006) that a process measurable in a Fubini
extension is essentially pairwise independent if and only if it satisfies the property
of coalitional aggregate certainty in the sense that the sample distributions, based
on any non-negligible collection of random variables, are essentially constant.6 It
means that the exact law of large numbers and its converse hold in the framework
of a Fubini extension. When there are only finitely many macro states, it is clear
4Besides Keisler and Sun (2009), see Khan et al. (2013) for a discussion and bibliographic details
therein.
5A Fubini extension is an extension of the usual product probability space that retains the
Fubini property for iterated integrals. For a formal definition, see Definition 2.2 in Sun (2006) and
Definition 12 below.
6Theorem 7.6 of Sun (1998) contains the same result stated for a special type of Fubini extensions
– the Loeb product spaces.
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that such results are still valid in the conditional setting; see Corollary 2.11 in Sun
(2006). A main purpose of Chapter 3 is to show the validity of the conditional
exact law of large numbers and its converse for the case with infinitely many macro
states. In particular, we show in Theorem 2 that if a process f has essentially
pairwise independent random variables conditioned on a countably generated  -
algebra C of events in the sample space,7 then the sample distribution essentially
equals the average regular conditional distribution of the random variables given C.
Furthermore, Theorem 3 shows the converse version of the (coalitional) conditional
exact law of large numbers.
The next question asks how strong the independence assumption conditioned
on a countably generated  -algebra is. For any process f measurable in a Fubini
extension, it is obvious that it has event-wise measurable conditional probabilities.8
Then Theorem 1 of Hammond and Sun (2008) shows the existence of a countably
generated  -algebra C such that the process f has essentially pairwise conditionally
independent random variables given C. Hence, as noted formally in Lemma 4 in
Chapter 3, our assumption of conditional independence in Theorem 2 is satisfied in
general. Furthermore, basic intuition suggests that the macro shocks should reflect
the uncertainty at the collective level in some appropriate sense. Theorem 4 in
Chapter 3 provides some justification to this intuition by showing that the macro
states can be identified with aggregate uncertainty via coalitions. In particular,
the  -algebra being conditioned on can be taken as the  -algebra generated by
the sample distributions over all the coalitions. Theorem 2 of Hammond and Sun
(2003) shows the equivalence of essential pairwise exchangeability and essential i.i.d.
conditioned on some countably generated  -algebra. Under the framework of a
Fubini extension, we show in Proposition 3 the equivalence of essential pairwise
exchangeability and essential i.i.d. conditioned on the sample distributions.
It is well known that there is a conflict between incentive compatibility and
e ciency in a finite-agent asymmetric information economy (see, for example, Gly-
copantis and Yannelis (2005) p. vi, Example 0.1]). One would expect that such
a conflict could be resolved in a large economy where individual agents have no
monopoly power on information. This intuition has been formalized in the liter-
ature; see, for example, McLean and Postlewaite (2002), McLean and Postlewaite
7As noted in (Billingsley, 1995, Example 20.1, p. 270), a countably generated  -algebra can be
generated by a random variable taking values in [0, 1].
8For the definition of event-wise measurable conditional probabilities, see Definition 4 of Ham-
mond and Sun (2008).
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(2003) and McLean and Postlewaite (2005) for a large but finite economy, Sun and
Yannelis (2007) and Sun and Yannelis (2008) for an economy with a continuum of
agents. In particular, Sun and Yannelis (2007) considers an asymmetric information
economy, where the agents have negligible information in the sense that the private
signals of almost every individual can influence only a negligible group of agents
and the individual agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent con-
ditioned on finitely many macro states. It is shown in Sun and Yannelis (2007) that
any ex ante e cient allocation in such an economy has a (utility) equivalent allo-
cation that is incentive compatible. As noted in the above paragraph, conditional
independence with possibly infinitely many macro states is generally satisfied. Thus,
it is natural to ask whether the result on the consistency of incentive compatibility
and ex ante e ciency in Sun and Yannelis (2007) still holds when there are infinitely
many macro states. By applying the conditional exact law of large numbers in our
Theorem 2, the desired consistency result is shown in Theorem 5 below.
1.3 Dynamic Directed Random Matching
The economics literature is replete with models that assume independent random
matching among a continuum population of agents. Previous work (Du e and Sun
(2007) and Du e and Sun (2012)) provides a construction of discrete-time Markov
independent dynamical systems with random mutation, and with type changes in-
duced by partial or full bilateral random matching. It was assumed in this prior
work that when a given agent is matched, the paired agent is drawn uniformly from
the population of other agents to be matched. A consequence is that the probability
that the paired agent is of a given type is equal to the fraction of that type in the
matched population.
In reality and in a large part of the research literature, however, agents are
naturally motivated to focus their searches toward those types of counterparties
that o↵er greater gains from interaction, or toward those types that are less costly
to find. There has been no demonstration of a model of independent directed random
matching supporting the common appeal to a law of large numbers, by which the
realized quantity of matches of a given pair of types is supposed to be equal to the
corresponding expected quantity.
Thus, it is valuable to provide rigorous foundations for independent random
matching that is “directed,” in the sense that the probability qkl that an agent of
type k is matched to an agent of type l can vary with the respective types k and
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l, from some type space S. We first show, in Theorem 6, the existence of directed
random matching in which counterparty types are independent across agents. It
follows from the exact law of large numbers that the proportion of type-k agents
matched with type-l agents is almost surely pkqkl, where pk is the proportion of
type-k agents in the population. By allowing the matching probabilities {qkl}k,l2S
to depend on the underlying cross-sectional type distribution p, we also encompass
the “matching-function” approach that has frequently been applied in the labor
literature (for example, Petrongolo and C. Pissarides (2001)).
In reality and in an extensive literature, once a pair of agents is matched, they
may stay matched without immediate break-up of the partnership. Typical examples
include the relationships between employer and employee, or between agents that
take time to bargain over their terms of trade.9 In order to model this, we introduce
a per-period break-up probability ✓kl for matches between agents of types k and l.
We also allow for matches that persist for a deterministic amount of time, which
can depend on the types k and l of the matched agents.
Dynamic directed random matching with or without enduring partnerships is
motivated by many applications, including Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993)
in monetary theory, Andolfatto (1996), Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) and Hall
(2005) in labor economics, and Du e, Manso, and Malamud (2014) in financial
economics. In Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993), agents are more likely
to be matched to agents of their own type than to agents of other types, even
controlling for the quantities of the types. In Andolfatto (1996), Haan, Ramey and
Watson (2000) and Hall (2005), the matching functions are non-linear with respect
to the underlying populations of di↵erent types, and the employed workers may keep
their jobs for multiple periods. In Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), matching in
equilibrium can be non-steady-state. In Du e, Manso, and Malamud (2014), agents
in a financial market direct their searches based on the relative informativeness of
di↵erent types of trading counterparties. This is a small sample of the research that
has relied by assumption on the existence of a dynamic random matching model with
directed search probabilities or with non-linear matching functions. The results of
Chapter 4 provide for the existence of such models.
9See, for example, Andolfatto (1996), Cho and Matsui (2013), Diamond (1982), Flinn
(2006),Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), Hall (2005), Hosios (1990), Merz (1999), Merz (1995),
Mortensen (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (1985), Shimer (2005), Shi and
Wen (1999), Tsoy (2014), and Yashiv (2000).
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1.4 Organization
The results in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are based on the papers Qiao and Yu (2014),
Qiao, Sun and Zhang (2014) and Du e, Qiao and Sun (2014) respectively.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 demonstrates the class of atomless
spaces that accurately models the space of players in a large game which represents
an idealized limit of a sequence of finite-player games. In Chapter 3, we extend
the results on the exact law of large numbers and its converse for a continuum of
independent random variables in Sun (2006) to the setting with conditional indepen-
dence given general macro states. In Chapter 4, a rigorous foundation of dynamic
directed random matching is provided.
Chapter2
On the Space of Players in Idealized Limit
Games
2.1 Introduction
In many economic environments in society, an individual’s action has a negligible
e↵ect on the aggregate summary of the actions of all other individuals. A con-
tinuum of agents, modelled by an atomless measure space, is assumed to be “the
most natural model” (e.g. Aumann (1964)) for capturing the numerical negligibility
of an individual in an economy. An atomless probability space is now also stan-
dard for modelling the space of players in a societal context where each player is
strategically negligible in the theory of large (non-cooperative) strategic games. By
assuming that a player’s payo↵ depends on a statistical summary of societal actions
as well as on his or her individual action, the theory of large games is now well
established.1 The social identity literature emphasizes the importance of including
the traits of players—be they biological or socio-economic—into the notion of player
interdependence (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton (2000)). To address this issue in large
games, a comprehensive and analytically tractable framework has recently been of-
fered in Khan et al. (2013), in which the payo↵s of players depend on their own
actions and societal responses which include not only a societal action summary but
also on an underlying summary of traits.
A large economy, with an atomless probability space to model the space of agents,
is a good proxy to large finite economies.2 In particular, a large economy can be
1See the survey by Khan and Sun (2002) on the existence of equilibria, and Jara-Moroni (2012)
on rationalizability in large games.
2See Anderson (1978) for the approximate core equivalence result in large finite economies;
8
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treated as an idealized limit of a converging sequence of large finite economies.3
Therefore, besides the existence of equilibria in a large economy itself, another im-
portant question to ask is whether a convergent sequence of equilibria in a convergent
sequence of finite economies converges to an equilibrium in the idealized limit of the
finite economies. Normally, a positive answer to such a question can be obtained
under the general conditions of various environments—for example, pure exchange
economies as in Hildenbrand and Mertens (1972), strategic market games as in
Dubey et al. (1980), and large strategic games as in Green (1984), among many
others.
However, in general the answer is not always positive. In this chapter, we pro-
vide a set of counterexamples which challenge the claim, and its underling intuition,
concerning the relation between finite-player environments and their idealized con-
tinuum limits. To be sure, Examples 1 and 2 in Khan et al. (2013) have demonstrated
a discrepancy between a continuum game and its finite analogues: the non-existence
of equilibria in the continuum game and the existence of equilibria in its finite coun-
terparts. But in their framework, the continuum game cannot be the idealized limit
of finite games.4 Within a framework similar to that presented in Khan et al. (2013),
we present two examples that involve job-seeking opportunities in two cities: the
game with the Lebesgue unit interval as its space of players in Example 1 is shown
to be the idealized limit of a sequence of finite-player games in Example 2. In both
examples, all players prefer to live in a city where they have less (aggregated) pres-
sure, where the pressure is caused by those players with higher abilities who choose
the same city. Furthermore, the common action set only contains two elements and
Also see Sun and Nicholas (2007) on the study of compatibility of e ciency and incentives in the
large economy and McLean and Postlewaite (2002, 2006) for the approximated cases in large finite
economies.
3We follow the convention and say that a sequence of finite economies converges to a large
economy with a continuum of agents if the induced distributions of the players’ characteristics in
finite economies converges weakly to the induced distribution of characteristics in the limit game;
e.g. Hildenbrand (1974).
4As the convergence of games refers to the weak convergence of distributions of characteristics
(e.g. Footnote 3), the convergence of games with di↵erent trait distributions cannot even be asked
meaningfully in the framework of Khan et al. (2013). More specifically, as a player’s characteristics
contain both trait and payo↵, in order to have a convergent sequence of games, players’ payo↵s
in all games in the sequence must share the same domain. And thus, all games must share the
same distribution of traits as the distribution of traits is used to construct payo↵s of a large game
in Khan et al. (2013). Hence, when the limit game has an atomless distribution of traits, there
cannot exist any sequence of finite-player games converging to it. Unlike Khan et al. (2013), we
do not impose the assumption that the marginal distribution of the space of societal responses on
traits is the exogenously given distribution of traits; see the discussion after Definition 1.
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players’ payo↵s are continuous on the product of the action set and the set of soci-
etal responses. Surprisingly, it is shown that there does not exist any pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in the idealized limit, whereas the sequence of finite-player games
has a converging sequence of exact pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first set of examples in the context of
large games with traits to show a dissonance that pertains specifically to the rele-
vance of the closed-graph property between finite-player games and their idealized
limit. As the thrust of large lies in skirting the di culties of the non-existence
of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in finite-player games, such examples cast serious
doubt on whether an atomless probability space is a worthy mathematical object
to model the space of players in a large game as the idealized limit of finite-player
games. However, does this exclude us from using an atomless probability space, as
is done in the literature, to model players in the idealized limit of finite-player cases?
The counterexamples make it clear that an arbitrary atomless probability space, in
particular such as the Lebesgue unit interval, may not be appropriate for modelling
the space of players in an idealized limit game. Hence, one has to impose some ad-
ditional assumptions on the space of players. This kind of richer measure structure
is the so-called saturated probability space, which has recently contributed to the
study of large games.5 Based on the counterexamples, we show that the saturated
assumption of the space of players on the idealized limit is not only su cient, but
also necessary, under fairly general conditions, to resolve the discrepancy in terms
of existence of equilibria between the finite limiting and idealized continuum limit
games. This therefore complements the study of large games in Khan et al. (2013).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the basic
model. In Section 2.3, we present one example on the non-existence of Nash equilib-
ria in a large game, and show in another example the existence of exact pure-strategy
Nash equilibria in each finite-player game in a sequence of discretized games which
converges to the large game in the first example. Section 2.4 presents the main
result that addresses the issue of what is the right class of atomless spaces to model
the space of players in the idealized limit of a sequence of finite-player games. All
the proofs are relegated to Section 2.5.
The results in this chapter are based on Qiao and Yu (2014).
5Besides Keisler and Sun (2009), see Khan et al. (2013) for a discussion and bibliographic details
therein.
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2.2 The Model
Given the need for a rich space of player characteristics, which consist not only of
payo↵s but also traits, the large game framework in this chapter contains three basic
objects: (i) an atomless probability space (I, I, ) representing the space of players,
(ii) a compact metric space A representing a common action space, (iii) a complete
and separable metrizable (Polish) space T representing the space of player traits.
With these three elements, a large game and its pure-strategy Nash equilibria
are built up as follows: LetM(T⇥A) be the space of Borel probability distributions
on T ⇥ A. The space of payo↵s is thus defined as V
(A,T )
, the space of all bounded
continuous functions on the product space A⇥M(T⇥A), with its sup-norm topology
and the resulting Borel  -algebra. The space of players’ characteristics is defined as
the product T ⇥ V
(A,T )
such that each player’s characteristics consist of two parts:
trait and payo↵. Formally, a large game and its equilibrium are defined as follows:
Definition 1. A large game is a measurable function G from I to T ⇥ V
(A,T )
. A
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G is a measurable function f : I  ! A, such that
for  -almost all i 2 I,
vi(f(i),    (↵, f) 1)   vi
 
a,    (↵, f) 1  for all a 2 A,
with vi abbreviated for G2(i), and ↵ abbreviated for G1, where Gk is the projection
of G on its kth-coordinate, k = 1, 2.
Comparing this configuration to the game considered in Khan et al. (2013),
the advantage of our model is that it does not restrict the domain of the payo↵
functions to a subspace which depends on an exogenous parameter. Using our
notation, let ⇢ =     ↵ 1 and M⇢(T ⇥ A) the subspace of M(T ⇥ A), such that
for any ⌧ 2 M⇢(T ⇥ A), its marginal probability on T , ⌧T = ⇢. The space of
players’ payo↵s in Khan et al. (2013) is given by V
(A,T,⇢)
, the space of all continuous
functions on the product space (A⇥M⇢(T⇥A)) with its sup-norm topology and the
resulting Borel  -algebra. Clearly, the domain of all payo↵ functions in such a game
is restricted to be (A ⇥M⇢(T ⇥ A)), and thus the exogenous given ⇢ is essential
to build up payo↵s. This is a rather serious restriction as it precludes comparative
statics among di↵erent environments where trait distributions di↵er. In particular,
it prevents one from considering the convergence of games with di↵erent induced
distribution on traits; see Footnote 4.
In contrast, as in this chapter we allow the space of payo↵s to be defined on
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a larger domain so that the notion of “externality” embraces all distributions on
T ⇥ A, we permit the consideration of a meaningful convergent sequence of games
when the induced distributions of traits in all games are not identical. We could
therefore investigate whether there exists an equilibrium in the idealized limit of
a sequence of finite-player games such that the equilibrium is the the limit of a
converging sequence of equilibria of finite games as the numbers of players increases.
We next present an interesting set of examples.
2.3 The Basic Counterexamples
This section is configured around the set of two decisive counterexamples discussed
in the introduction that show that an arbitrary atomless space may not be an
appropriate way to model the space of players in an idealized large game. And so
the basic goal of this chapter is laid out: to furnish a solution that uses an atomless
probability space to model the space of players, fully overcoming this dissonance
between the finite-limiting and the idealized continuum-limit versions.
We first consider the following game that concerns seeking employment oppor-
tunities in two cities: H(anover) and T(oledo). We show that such a game, based
on the Lebesgue agent space, is a large game as defined in Definition 1. Remark-
ably, even though the common action set contains only two elements, it has no
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Example 1. Let the space of players be the Lebesgue unit interval (L,L, `), the
space of traits T 0 be the unit interval [0, 1] and the common action space A0 be
{H,T}, representing two cities which o↵er the same quality and quantity of em-
ployment opportunities. Let ↵0 be the identity mapping on [0, 1]. Suppose that
trait is a measurement for ability: a player with trait t 2 T 0 has 1  t level of ability.
For any a 2 A0 and ⌧ 2M(T 0 ⇥ A0), let the payo↵ function for player i be




The payo↵s simply represent that a player with a higher level of ability will bring
pressure to find a job on the player with a lower level of ability and the amount
of pressure is determined by the di↵erence between the levels; in other words, a
player with trait j who has higher ability than player with trait i, (i.e. j < i), will
contribute  [(1 j) (1 i)] = j i to the utility of a player with trait i. Obviously,
the optimal strategy for any player is to live in the city with less pressure.
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Let G0 be a function such that for all i 2 L, G0(i) = (↵0(i), v0i ), where ↵0(i) and
v0i are specified as above. It is clear that G0 is a measurable function from (L,L, `)
to T 0 ⇥ V(T 0,A0), i.e., a large game as defined in Definition 1. The following claim is
on the existence of Nash equilibria in G0.
Claim 1. There does not exist any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in G0 as defined
above.
The detailed proof is given in Section 2.5. Here we only provide a brief sketch
of the proof. Supose instead that f 0 is a Nash equilibrium of G0. Let Z : L  ! R
be a function such that Z(i) =  v0i (H, ⌧f0) + v0i (T, ⌧f0) for all i 2 L where ⌧f0 =
l(↵0, f 0) 1. By the structure of payo↵s, we can show that Z(i) 6⌘ 0 cannot be true.
At the same time, it can also be shown that Z(i) ⌘ 0 cannot hold either. This is
impossible, and therefore there does not exist any equilibrium of G0.
Next, we present a discretized version of the above example.6 The interesting
part of the next example lies in the fact that it provides a sequence of finite-player
games, each of which has an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, while, surpris-
ingly, the idealized limit of such a sequence is shown to be G0 in Example 1—a large
game without any equilibrium.
Example 2. For any fixed n 2 N, let In =
 
k
2n : k = 0, 1, . . . , 2
n   1 to represent
the set of players. Let  n be the counting measure on In, i.e.,  n(i) =
1
2n for every
i 2 In. Let ↵n : In  ! T 0 be such that player i’s trait ↵n(i) = i+ 12n+1 for all i 2 In.




(t  i)1[0,i)⇥{a}(t, x) d⌧
for any a 2 A0 and ⌧ 2M(T 0 ⇥ A0). It is easy to see that vn(i)(·, ·) is continuous
for all i 2 In, and vn(i)(·, ·) is identically zero when i = 0.
Define Gn : In  ! T ⇥ V(A0,T0) as Gn(i) = (↵n(i), vn(i)) for all i 2 In. It is clear
that Gn is a finite-player game. Let f ⇤n : In  ! A0 be such that
f ⇤n(i) =




2n ) where k is even between 0 and 2
n
2   1
T for i 2 [ k22n , (k+1)
2
2n ) where k is odd between 0 and 2
n
2   1.
6In Khan et al. (2013), there is also a discretized version of a large game in which finite-
player games possess equilibria while the large game does not have any equilibrium. However,
the convergence of games with di↵erent distributions of traits cannot be formulated therein; see
Footnote 4.
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Now allowing n to vary, we have a sequence of finite games, {Gn} and a sequence of
pure-strategy profiles {f ⇤n}. The next claim shows that {Gn} converges to the large
game G0 in Example 1, and each element of the sequence has an exact pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium.
Claim 2. For all n 2 N, f ⇤n is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Gn. Furthermore,
{Gn} converges7 to G0 and {f ⇤n} converges.
We have now established that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist in
a large game, even though the action space contains only two elements, as shown in
Example 1. What is more interesting is that we could also have a sequence of finite-
player games in Example 2, each of which has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
while the idealized limit of the sequence is the large game G0 in Example 1 without
any equilibrium. We will next turn to the resolution of this discrepancy in terms of
existence of equilibria between the (finite) limiting and idealized (continuum) limit
games.
2.4 The Main Result
Since one of the rationales for studying continuum player games is that their pure-
strategy equilibria approximate mixed-strategy equilibria of large but finite-player
games without pure-strategy equilibria, the dissonance between Example 1 and Ex-
ample 2 casts doubts about the viability of an atomless measure space of players
as a good approximation of large but finite player games. As we shall show soon,
it is simply not enough to use any arbitrary atomless space to model the space of
players. To resolve such a dissonance, we need the following notion of a saturated
probability space.
Definition 2. A probability space is said to be almost-countably generated if its
 -algebra can be generated by a countable number of subsets together with the null
sets; otherwise, it is not almost-countably generated. A probability space (I, I, )
is saturated if it is nowhere almost-countably generated, in the sense that, for any
subset S 2 I with  (S) > 0, the restricted probability space (S, IS, S) is not
almost-countably generated, where IS := {S\S 0 : S 0 2 I} and  S is the probability
measure re-scaled from the restriction of   to IS.
7We follow the convention and refer to the convergence of measurable functions (i.e., games and
equilibria) as the induced weak convergence in distribution; see Footnote 3.
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From the above definition, it is clear that a saturated probability space is atom-
less. Now, to allow finite-player games such as those in Example 2 and games with
player space containing atoms in the model with traits, we modify Definition 1 as
follows:
Definition 3. Let a probability space (I¯ , I¯,  ¯) be the space of players. A game with
traits is a measurable function G¯ from I¯ to T⇥V
(A,T )
. Let ↵¯(i) ⌘ G¯1(i) and v¯i ⌘ G¯2(i)
for each i 2 I, where G¯k is the projection of G¯ on its kth-coordinate, k = 1, 2. A
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium8 of G¯ is a measurable function f : I¯  ! A, such that
for  ¯-almost all i 2 I,
v¯i(f(i),  ¯   (↵¯, f) 1)   v¯i
 
a,  ¯   (↵¯, (a, f i)) 1
 
for all a 2 A,
where (a, f i) : I¯  ! A is a mapping defined by (a, f i) (j) = a if j = i and
(a, f i) (j) = f(j) otherwise.
If a sequence of finite-player games
n




converges to a large game G : (I, I, )  ! T ⇥ V
(A,T )
, we say that G is the idealized
limit of Gn. If a large game G is the idealized limit of some sequence of finite-player
games with traits {Gn}, and each Gn has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium fn such
that {fn} converges, but G has no equilibrium, we say that G is a perverse idealized
limit. Furthermore, we say that G is a proper idealized limit if it is not perverse.
We next define a notion of hemi-continuity in a large game to provide a su cient
condition for the game to be proper as an idealized limit of finite-player games.
Definition 4. The equilibrium correspondence of a large game G has the weak
closed-graph property if the following holds: if {Gn} is a sequence of finite-player
games with traits with idealized limit G, and if {fn} is a sequence whose distributions
converge with weak limit ⌫ where fn is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Gn for
each n, then there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G such that  f 1 = ⌫.
The weak closed-graph property is weaker than the closed-graph property defined
in Definition 3 of Khan et al. (2013) in that it only requires the convergent sequence
of games to be finite-player games. For comparison, we reproduce (Khan et al.,
2013, Definition 3) as below:
8Clearly, a game with traits with an atomless player space is a large game as defined in Defini-
tion 1 and the equilibria conditions of such a game in Definition 3 and Definition 1 are equivalent
as well.
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Definition 5. The equilibrium correspondence of a large game G has the closed-
graph property if the following holds: if {Gn} is a sequence of games with traits that
converges to G, and if {fn} is a sequence whose distributions converge with weak
limit ⌫ where fn is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Gn for each n, then there
exists a Nash equilibrium9 f of G such that  f 1 = ⌫.
It has been established in (Khan et al., 2013, Theorem 3) that saturated player
spaces yield the closed-graph property, and hence, the weak closed-graph property.
However, the necessity of saturation to the closed-graph property is established in
(Khan et al., 2013, Theorem 4) through a large game G : I  ! V
(A,T ,⇢) where ⇢ is
atomless. Hence, only continuum-player games can converge to the idealized limit
in their set-up. Such a set-up does not allow one to connect finite-player games with
their idealized limit; also see Footnote 4. Thus, the characterization of saturated
spaces in terms of the connection between finite-player games and their idealized
limit has been an open question for some time. We are now ready to present our
main result to fill this gap.
Theorem 1. The following are equivalent:
(i) (I, I, ) is saturated.
(ii) If G is a large game having player space (I, I, ), then its equilibrium corre-
spondence has the closed-graph property.
(iii) If G is a large game having player space (I, I, ), then its equilibrium cor-
respondence has the weak closed-graph property.
(iv) If G is a large game having player space (I, I, ), then G is a proper idealized
limit.
This provides an a rmative answer to the question asked in the introduction: the
space of players of the idealized limit game being modelled as a saturated probability
space is su cient; and it is also necessary to ensure that any convergent sequence of
equilibria of a convergent sequence of finite-player games converges to an equilibrium
of in the idealized limit. We can now conclude that a saturated space is the only
appropriate class of atomless probability spaces to model the space of players in an
9It is known that corresponding to any distribution on a Polish space, for any atomless proba-
bility space, there exists a random variable on that space that induces the given distribution; see
(Keisler and Sun, 2009, Lemma 2.1 (ii)) for example. As the space of players (I, I, ) in a large
game G is atomless, for any action distribution ⌧ 2 M(A), there exists a strategy profile f of G
such that  f 1 = ⌧ . Thus, if a large game G does not have the closed-graph equilibrium, there
still exists a strategy profile of G such that its distribution is ⌫ in Definition 5. However, no such
profile can be a Nash equilibrium of G.
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idealized continuum-limit in general. Such a result strengthens the characterization
of saturated spaces in large games in Khan et al. (2013).
2.5 Proofs
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose that there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
f 0 in G0. Let Z : L  ! R be a function such that for all i 2 L, Z(i) =
 v0i (H, ⌧f0) + v0i (T, ⌧f0), where ⌧f0 = `   (↵0, f 0) 1. We next show that there will
be a contradiction.
Towards this end, let F : L  ! {1, 1} be a function such that for all i 2 L,
F (i) =
8<:1 if f 0(i) = H, 1 if f 0(i) = T.
For any i 2 L, It is clear that F (i) =  1 if Z(i) > 0 and F (i) = 1 if Z(i) < 0.











(i  t)1[0,i)⇥{1}(t, F (t))dt 
Z 1
0









We have used the change of variables theorem and the fact that the Lebesgue integral
and the Riemann integral of any Riemann integrable function coincide in [0, 1]. Now,









0 F (t)dt is clearly continuous on [0, 1], its anti-derivative Z is
continuous and di↵erentiable on [0, 1]. Furthermore, it is easy to check Z(0) = 0
and dZ(0)di = 0.
We now show that Z(i) 6⌘ 0 cannot hold: Suppose to the contrast that Z(i) 6⌘ 0.
Then there exists some i⇤ 2 L such that Z(i⇤) 6= 0. Without loss of generality, let
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Z(i⇤) > 0. Let (i0, i1) be the largest interval in L that contains i⇤ such that Z(i) > 0










F (t)dt+ i0   i
for any i 2 (i0, i1). As the derivative of Z(i) is a linear polynomial on (i0, i1), Z(i)
must be a quadratic polynomial on this interval. This implies that Z is a parabola
on (i0, i1). Suppose that
dZ(i0)
di = c. It is clear c > 0. As Z is continuous and
di↵erentiable, there exists some i 1 such that Z(i 1) = Z(i0) = 0 and Z(i) < 0 on









F (t)dt+ i  i 1
for any i 2 (i 1, i0). This is to say, Z is also a parabola on (i 1, i0). By the fact that
the figure of a parabola is symmetrical with the axe of symmetry, the derivatives of
a parabola at two zero points are opposite numbers. Therefore, dZ(i0)di = c implies
that dZ(i 1)di =  c. Repeating this iteration, for any j 2 L that satisfies j  i⇤ and
Z(j) = 0, we have dZ(j)di = c or  c. However, this is in contradiction with the fact
that Z(0) = 0 while dZ(0)di = 0.
Therefore, Z(i) ⌘ 0. But this is not true either: If Z(i) ⌘ 0, then dZ(i)di ⌘ 0.
This implies that
R i
0 F (t)di = 0 for all i 2 [0, 1]. As B(L), the Borel  -algebra on L
can be generated by {[0, i] : i 2 [0, 1]}, it is clear that RE F (i)di = 0 for any E 2 B.
Meanwhile, as the space of players of G0 is the Lebesgue unit interval (L,L, l), and
the Lebesgue  -algebra L = {E [N : E 2 B and N is l-null set}, we have thatZ
H
F (i)dl = 0 for any H 2 L.
Hence, F (i) = 0 for l-almost all i 2 L. This contradicts the fact that the range of
F is {1, 1}.
We have now shown that neither Z(i) ⌘ 0 nor Z(i) 6⌘ 0 can hold on L. This is
impossible. So, there does not exist any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in G0.
Proof of Claim 2: Fix n 2 N. To show that f ⇤n is a Nash equilibrium of Gn, we
first show that for i 2 [ k22n , (k+1)
2
2n ) where k is even between 0 and 2
n
2   1, City H
is the best response for player i if all other player j plays f ⇤n(j). For a 2 A0, let
⌧ ⇤i (a) =  n   (↵n, (a, (f ⇤n) i)) 1. This is the induced measure on traits and actions
when player i plays action a while all other players play strategies specified in the
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strategy profile f ⇤. Note that for all i 2 In, given any a 2 A0 and any measurable
function fn from In to A0 satisfying fn(i) = a,
vn(i)
 

















Fix any even number k between 0 and 2
n
2   1. Because of the equation above, we
have that for any player i 2 [ (2m)22n , (2m+1)
2
2n ) with m = k/2,
vn(i)(H, ⌧
⇤












i (T)) =  ⌃m 1p=0 (i 
(2p+ 1)2
2n+1













[ 22ni2 + 2n(8m2 + 4m  1)i  (16m4 + 16m3   4m2   4m)],









 (i)   0} is a convex set. Furthermore, it is easy to see that  ( (2m)22n ) = 4m and
 ( (2m+1)
2 1




2n ), we have that
 (i)   0. Therefore, H is a best response for all i 2 [ (2m)22n , (2m+1)
2 1
2n ). Similarly,
we can also prove that T is a best response for player i 2 [ (2m+1)22n , (2m+2)
2 1
2n ). As
k = 2m is an arbitrarily chosen even number from [0, 2n/2   1], it is now clear that
f ⇤n is a Nash equilibrium of Gn.
Now allow n to vary. We next show that Gn converges to G0, i.e., { n   (Gn) 1)}
converges weakly to `   (G0) 1 in M(T 0 ⇥ V
(A0,T0)
). Towards this end, choose an
arbitrary bounded continuous function h : T 0 ⇥ V
(A0,T0)
 ! R. It is su cient to
show that Z
h(t, v)d n   (Gn) 1 !
Z
h(t, v)d`   (G0) 1,




































Since vni = v
0
i and h is an arbitrary bounded continuous read-valued function on
T 0 ⇥ V
(A0,T0)
, it is now easy to see that {Gn} converges weakly to G0.
Finally we show that {f ⇤n} converges weakly in distribution. By the definition of
f ⇤n, it is easy to check that
  n ([0, 1) \ (f ⇤n) 1(H))







Hence,  n   (f ⇤n) 1 converges weakly to the uniform distribution on A0. The proof
is complete.
Proof of Theorem 1: It has been shown in (Khan et al., 2013, Theorem 3) that
(i) implies (ii). Furthermore, it is clear that (ii) implies (iii) and (iii) implies (iv).
We only need to show that (iv) implies (i). Towards this end, we need to show a
sequence of finite-player games whose sequence of equilibria converge and which itself
converges to a large game based on a non-saturated player space (I, I, ) without
any equilibrium. We establish this in the following two Lemmas. Throughout their
proofs, we follow the notation G0 ⌘ (↵0, v0) : L  ! T 0 ⇥ V
(A0,T0)
, Gn ⌘ (↵n, vn) :
(In, n)  ! T 0 ⇥ V(A0,T0) and f ⇤n : In  ! A0 as those in Examples 1 and 2.
Lemma 1. If an atomless probability space (I, I, ) is not saturated, then there
exists a large game Gb : (I, I, )  ! T b⇥V
(A,Tb)
that does not have Nash equilibrium,
where A = A0, T b = [0, b] for some b > 1 and   (Gb1) 1 is some atomless distribution
on [0, b].
Proof: If (I, I, ) is not saturated, then there is a set C 2 I with  (C) =  , 0 <   <
1 such that (C, IC , C) is countably generated, where IC = {E 2 I, E ✓ C} and
 C(E) =  (E)/  for all E 2 IC . As a consequence of the well-known Maharam’s
theorem, see, the proof of (Keisler and Sun, 2009, Theorem 3.7) for example, there
exists a measurable mapping   : C  ! L such that   induces an isomorphism
from the measure algebra of (C, IC , C) to the measure algebra of (L,L, l). Now,
let b = 2     and T b = [0, b]. As it is clear that  (I \ C) = 1    , there exists
a measurable function  0 : I \ C  ! (1, b], such that for any Borel set B in (1, b],
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     0 1(B) = l(B). We now construct a function ↵b from I to T b as follows:
↵b(i) =
8<: (i) for i 2 C 0(i) for i 2 I \ C.
It is clear that ↵b is measurable. By construction,     (↵b) 1 is atomless on [0, b].
Furthermore,     (↵b) 1([0, 1]) =   and     (↵b) 1((1, b]) = 1  . Now, for all a 2 A
and for all ⌧ 2M(T b ⇥ A), let
vbi (a, ⌧) =
8<: 
R
T⇥A( (i)  t)1[0, (i))⇥{a}(t, x)d⌧ for i 2 C
( 1)1+1H(a) for i 2 I \ C.
Let Gb(i) = (↵b(i), vbi ) for all i 2 I. It is clear that Gb is a measurable function
from I to T b ⇥ V
(A,Tb)
, and thus, a large game that satisfies all assumptions in the
statement of Lemma 1.
We now show that there does not exist any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
such a game. Suppose that Gb has a Nash equilibrium f b : I  ! A. It is obvious
that for  -almost all i 2 I \ C, f b(i) = H, and for  -almost all i 2 C,
vbi
 
f b(i),    (↵b, f b) 1    vbi  a,    (↵b, f b) 1  for all a 2 A.




( (i) t)1[0, (i))⇥{fb(i)}(t, x)d  (↵b, f b) 1    
Z
T⇥A
( (i) t)1[0, (i))⇥{a}(t, x)d  (↵b, f b) 1.




( (i) t)1[0, (i))⇥{fb(i)}(t, x)d  (↵b, f b) 1    
Z
T 0⇥A
( (i) t)1[0, (i))⇥{a}(t, x)d  (↵, f ⇤) 1.
Furthermore, for i 2 C, it can be shown that there exists a Borel measurable
function g such that f b(i) = g( (i)) for  -almost all i 2 C; see for example, the
proof of (Khan et al., 2013, Lemma 2). Therefore, dividing both sides of the above
inequality by   and normalizing, we have for  -almost all i 2 C,
v0 (i)
 
g ( (i)) , C   ( , g ( (i))) 1    v0 (i)  a, C ( , g ( (i))) 1  for all a 2 A.
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  1⌘   v0j ⇣a, l  ↵0, g  1⌘ for all a 2 A.
This contradicts Claim 1 which says such a function g cannot exist, and therefore,
the proof is complete.
Lemma 2. There is a sequence of finite-player games {Gbn : (Ibn, bn)  ! T b⇥V(A,Tb)}
with traits converging to the large game Gb ⌘ (↵b, vb) in Lemma 1, where each Gbn
has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium f bn and {f bn} converges weakly in distribution.
Proof : We shall give  ,  ,  C and Gb ⌘ (↵b, vb) the same meaning in the proof
of Lemma 1. Fix n 2 N. We first construct a finite-player game with traits Gbn
that has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Let In1 = In and I
n
2 = {1 +  m2n : m =




and rewrite Ibn as {ij : j = 1, · · · , 2n + Mn} such that ij < ij+1 as well for all
1  j < 2n +Mn   1. Let  bn be a probability measure on Ibn such that
 bn(ij) =
8<:  2n for j = 1, · · · , 2n +Mn   1 
2n + en for j = 2
n +Mn.
where en = b  (1 +  Mn2n )(  0). Let ↵bn : Inb  ! T b be a function such that
↵nb (i) =
8<:↵n(i) if i 2 In1i if i 2 In2 .
Now, let vnb : I
n
b  ! V(A,Tb) be a function such that for all a 2 A and ⌧ 2M(T b⇥A)
vbn(i)(a, ⌧) =
8<:vn(i)(a, ⌧) if i 2 In1( 1)1+1H(a) if i 2 In2 .
Let Gbn(i) = (↵bn(i), vbn(i)) for all i 2 Ibn. It is clear that Gbn is a finite-player game
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with traits. Now let f bn : I
b
n  ! A be such that
f bn(i) =
8<:f ⇤n(i) for i 2 InH otherwise.
By similar arguments to proofs of Claim 2 and Lemma 1, one can show that f bn is
indeed a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of Gbn.
Now, allowing n to vary, one can appeal to an argument similar to the proof of
Claim 2 to show that {f bn} converges weakly. Hence, we only need to show that
{Gbn} converges to Gb. Towards this end, choose an arbitrary bounded continuous
function ⌘ : T b ⇥ V
(A,Tb)
 ! R. It is su cient to show thatZ
⌘(t, v)d bn   (Gbn) 1 !
Z
⌘(t, v)d b   (Gb) 1.
Let v¯(a, ⌧) ⌘ ( 1)1+1H(a). Then by the bounded convergence theorem and the



















Next observe that vb is the composite of v0 and ↵b for i 2 C. Then as  bn(i) =   n(i)






































⌘(t, v)d b   (Gb) 1.
Chapter3
Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers
and Asymmetric Information Economies
with Aggregate Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
As noted in Hammond and Sun (2008), macroeconomic risks are the common ran-
dom shocks that influence a significant portion of the population while reality sug-
gests that these are supplemented by risks at the individual level that influence
a negligible portion of the population. This can be formalized by a process with
a continuum of conditionally independent random variables, given the macro level
shocks. However, it is shown in Proposition 4 of Hammond and Sun (2008) that
a standard joint measurability condition on the process of a continuum of random
variables will imply the non-existence of individual level uncertainty. To resolve
the non-compatibility of joint measurability with individual level uncertainty in our
setting, we adopt the framework of a Fubini extension,1 as used in Sun (2006) for
studying a continuum of independent random variables.
It is shown in Theorem 2.8 of Sun (2006) that a process measurable in a Fubini
extension is essentially pairwise independent if and only if it satisfies the property
of coalitional aggregate certainty in the sense that the sample distributions, based
on any non-negligible collection of random variables, are essentially constant.2 It
1A Fubini extension is an extension of the usual product probability space that retains the
Fubini property for iterated integrals. For a formal definition, see Definition 2.2 in Sun (2006) and
Definition 6 below.
2Theorem 7.6 of Sun (1998) contains the same result stated for a special type of Fubini extensions
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means that the exact law of large numbers and its converse hold in the framework
of a Fubini extension. When there are only finitely many macro states, it is clear
that such results are still valid in the conditional setting; see Corollary 2.11 in Sun
(2006). A main purpose of this chapter is to show the validity of the conditional
exact law of large numbers and its converse for the case with infinitely many macro
states. In particular, we show in Theorem 2 that if a process f has essentially
pairwise independent random variables conditioned on a countably generated  -
algebra C of events in the sample space,3 then the sample distribution essentially
equals the average regular conditional distribution of the random variables given C.
Furthermore, Theorem 3 shows the converse version of the (coalitional) conditional
exact law of large numbers.
The next question asks how strong the independence assumption conditioned
on a countably generated  -algebra is. For any process f measurable in a Fubini
extension, it is obvious that it has event-wise measurable conditional probabilities.4
Then Theorem 1 of Hammond and Sun (2008) shows the existence of a countably
generated  -algebra C such that the process f has essentially pairwise condition-
ally independent random variables given C. Hence, as noted formally in Lemma
4 below, our assumption of conditional independence in Theorem 2 is satisfied in
general. Furthermore, basic intuition suggests that the macro shocks should reflect
the uncertainty at the collective level in some appropriate sense. Theorem 4 below
provides some justification to this intuition by showing that the macro states can
be identified with aggregate uncertainty via coalitions. In particular, the  -algebra
being conditioned on can be taken as the  -algebra generated by the sample distri-
butions over all the coalitions. Theorem 2 of Hammond and Sun (2003) shows the
equivalence of essential pairwise exchangeability and essential i.i.d. conditioned on
some countably generated  -algebra. Under the framework of a Fubini extension,
we show in Proposition 3 the equivalence of essential pairwise exchangeability and
essential i.i.d. conditioned on the sample distributions.
It is well-known that there is a conflict between incentive compatibility and
e ciency in a finite-agent asymmetric information economy (see, for example, Gly-
copantis and Yannelis (2005) p. vi, Example 0.1]). One would expect that such
a conflict could be resolved in a large economy where individual agents have no
– the Loeb product spaces.
3As noted in (Billingsley, 1995, Example 20.1, p. 270), a countably generated  -algebra can be
generated by a random variable taking values in [0, 1].
4For the definition of event-wise measurable conditional probabilities, see Definition 4 of Ham-
mond and Sun (2008).
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monopoly power on information. This intuition has been formalized in the liter-
ature; see, for example, McLean and Postlewaite (2002), McLean and Postlewaite
(2003) and McLean and Postlewaite (2005) for a large but finite economy, Sun and
Yannelis (2007) and Sun and Yannelis (2008) for an economy with a continuum of
agents. In particular, Sun and Yannelis (2007) considers an asymmetric information
economy, where the agents have negligible information in the sense that the private
signals of almost every individual can influence only a negligible group of agents
and the individual agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent con-
ditioned on finitely many macro states. It is shown in Sun and Yannelis (2007) that
any ex ante e cient allocation in such an economy has a (utility) equivalent allo-
cation that is incentive compatible. As noted in the above paragraph, conditional
independence with possibly infinitely many macro states is generally satisfied. Thus,
it is natural to ask whether the result on the consistency of incentive compatibility
and ex ante e ciency in Sun and Yannelis (2007) still holds when there are infinitely
many macro states. By applying the conditional exact law of large numbers in our
Theorem 2, the desired consistency result is shown in Theorem 5 below.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the con-
ditional exact law of large numbers and its converse, and various related results.
Section 3.3 considers the incentive compatibility problem in an asymmetric infor-
mation economy with general aggregate uncertainty. All the proofs are given in
Section 3.4.
The results in this chapter are based on Qiao, Sun and Zhang (2014).
3.2 Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers and its Con-
verse
3.2.1 Basic Definitions
Let (I, I, ) be a complete atomless probability space5, which will be the index space
for the random variables in a process. Let (⌦,F , P ) be the sample probability space
of the random variables in a process. In applications, the index space often repre-
sents the space of economic agents while the sample space models all the uncertainty
associated with the agents. As noted in the introduction, we will use a process with
a continuum of conditionally independent random variables to model both macroe-
conomic risks and individual level uncertainty. To resolve the non-compatibility of
5We use the convention that all probability spaces are countably additive and complete.
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joint measurability with individual level uncertainty,6 the framework of a Fubini
extension will be used as introduced in Sun (2006). Below is a formal definition of
a Fubini extension as in Definition 2.2 in Sun (2006).
Definition 6. A probability space (I⇥⌦,W , Q) extending the usual product space
(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⌦ F ,  ⌦ P ) is said to be a Fubini extension of the usual product (I ⇥
⌦, I ⌦ F , ⌦ P ) if for any real-valued Q-integrable function f on (I ⇥ ⌦,W),
(1) the two functions fi and f! are integrable, respectively, on (⌦,F , P ) for  -

















To reflect the fact that the probability space (I⇥⌦,W , Q) has (I, I, ) and (⌦,F , P )
as its marginal spaces, as required by the Fubini property, it will be denoted by
(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ).
Below we provide a formal definition of a process with conditionally uncorre-
lated/independent random variables based on a Fubini extension.
Definition 7. Let (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) be a Fubini extension, C be a countably
generated sub- -algebra of F ,8 and X a complete separable metrizable topological
space (i.e. a Polish space) with the Borel  -algebra B. Let M(X) be the space of
Borel probability measures on X.
(1) Two real-valued square integrable random variables   and  from (⌦,F , P )
to R are said to be conditionally uncorrelated given C if, the conditional ex-
pectations satisfy9
E(  |C) = E( |C)E( |C). (3.1)
6Proposition 4 of Hammond and Sun (2008) shows that a standard joint measurability condition
on the process of a continuum of random variables will imply the non-existence of individual level
uncertainty.
7In the sequel, we shall often use subscripts to denote some variable of a function that is viewed
as a parameter in a particular context.
8Whenever necessary, we assume that a sub- -algebra of F is always strongly complete in the
sense that it contains all the P -null sets in F .
9We adopt the convention that two random variables on (⌦,F , P ) are said to be equal if their
values on ⌦ are equal except on a P -null set. Thus, Equation (3.1) holds for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦.
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(2) A real-valued square integrable process f on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) is said to
be essentially conditionally uncorrelated given C if, for  -almost all i1 2 I, the
random variable fi1 is conditionally uncorrelated with fi2 given C for  -almost
all i2 2 I.
(3) Two random variables   and  from (⌦,F , P ) to X are said to be condition-
ally independent given C if, for any Borel sets B1, B2 2 B, the conditional
probabilities satisfy
P (  1(B1) \   1(B2)|C) = P (  1(B1)|C)P (  1(B2)|C). (3.2)
(4) A process f from (I ⇥⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥ P ) to X is said to be essentially pairwise
conditionally independent given C if, for  -almost all i1 2 I, the random
variables fi1 and fi2 are conditionally independent given C for  -almost all
i2 2 I.10
The following remark indicates the existence of non-trivial processes in a Fubini
extension that have essentially pairwise independent random variables conditioned
on any fixed countably generated  -algebra of events.
Remark 1. A Fubini extension (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) is said to be rich if there exists
an essentially pairwise independent process h from (I ⇥⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥P ) to the unit
interval [0, 1] such that for  -almost i 2 I, the distribution of the random variable
hi is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. It is shown in Proposition 5.3 of Sun (2006)
that one can construct processes on a rich Fubini extension with essentially pairwise
independent random variables taking any given variety of distributions. (Sun, 1998,
Theorem 6.2) proves that any general atomless Loeb product space is a rich Fubini
extension. (Sun, 2006, Proposition 5.6) provides another construction of a rich
Fubini extension with the unit interval [0, 1] as the agent space and an extended
continuum product probability space as the sample space. The main results of Sun
and Zhang (2009) and Podczeck (2010) show respectively that the agent space can be
taken as an extended Lebesgue unit interval or a general saturated probability space.11
Let g be a process from a rich Fubini extension (I ⇥⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥P ) to R such that
10Theorem 1 of Hammond and Sun (2006) shows that essential pairwise conditional independence
is equivalent to its finite or infinite multivariate versions.
11As noted in (Wang and Zhang, 2012, Corollary 1), (Podczeck, 2010, Theorem 1) and (Sun,
2006, Theorem 4.2) imply a characterization of saturation through rich Fubini extension. For some
recent applications of saturated probability spaces, see, for example, Sun and Zhang (2013) and
Yu (2014).
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the random variables gi, i 2 I are essentially pairwise independent. Let C be a
countably generated sub- -algebra of F ; assume that it is generated by a real-valued
random variable ✓ on (⌦,F , P ). As in Remark 1 of Hammond and Sun (2008),
let f be the process from I ⇥ ⌦ to R2 such that f(i,!) = (✓(!), g(i,!)) for each
(i,!) 2 I ⇥⌦. Then f is measurable in the Fubini extension (I ⇥⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥ P ).
By Proposition 3 in Hammond and Sun (2006), the random variables gi(·), i 2 I are
also essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C; so too are the random
variables fi(·), i 2 I.
3.2.2 An Antecedent Result
The following exact law of large numbers is Proposition 2.5 in Sun (2006).12 It shows
that the sample means of a real-valued square integrable process with essentially
uncorrelated random variables in a Fubini extension are essentially constant.
Proposition 1. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on a Fubini exten-
sion (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ). If the random variables fi are essentially uncorrelated,
then for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, then the sample mean Ef! =
R
I f!d  is the same as
the mean of the process Ef =
R
I⇥⌦ fd ⇥ P .
Let f 0 be a real-valued square integrable process on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) such
that the random variables f 0i are essentially orthogonal with common mean zero.





for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦.
Now let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P )
such that the random variables fi are essentially conditionally uncorrelated given
a countably generated sub- -algebra C of F . Let g be the conditional expectation
E(f |I⌦C). It is easy to show that for  -almost all i 2 I, gi = E(fi|C) (see Lemma 5
in Section 3.4). Define a process f 0 on (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) by letting f 0 = f g. It is
easy to check that the random variables f 0i are essentially orthogonal with common
mean zero. The following is thus an obvious corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ).
If f is essentially conditionally uncorrelated given a countably generated sub- -
algebra C of F , then for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, RI f!(i)d  = RI E(f |I ⌦ C)d .
12Theorem 3.8 of Sun (1998) contains the same result stated for the Loeb product spaces.
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3.2.3 Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers
Theorem 5.2 of Sun (1998) and Theorem 2.8 of Sun (2006) present an exact law
of large numbers in terms of sample distributions. It shows that essential pairwise
independence is su cient for the sample distributions to be essentially constant.
Let C be a countably generated sub- -algebra of F . We shall work with essentially
pairwise independent processes conditioned on C. As noted in Corollary 2.11 in Sun
(2006), if C is generated by a finite (or countable) partition of ⌦, the exact law of
large numbers in terms of sample distributions still holds, conditioned on each event
in the partition. However, if C is not generated by a countable partition, then we
can not derive the conditional exact law of large numbers by Theorem 2.8 of Sun
(2006) directly. The purpose of this subsection is to present the conditional exact
law of large numbers in the general setting.
Recall that we use a process f with conditionally independent random variables
given C to model both macroeconomic risks and individual level uncertainty, where C
represents the macro states. In the following definition, we introduce a terminology
to describe the cancelation of individual uncertainty via aggregation.
Definition 8. Let f be a process from (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) to a Polish space X, C a
countably generated sub- -algebra of F , and µ a regular conditional distribution of f
given I ⌦ C. The process f is said to have no individual uncertainty in aggregation
given C if  f 1! =
R
I µi!d  holds for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, where
R
I µi!d  is the
random Borel probability measure ⇢ on X defined by ⇢(B) =
R
I µi!(B)d  for any
Borel set B in X.
Let f , C and µ be the same as in the above definition. The following lemma
shows that µ provides the regular conditional distributions of the individual random
variables in a measurable way.
Lemma 3. Let f be a process from (I ⇥⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥ P ) to a Polish space X, C a
countably generated sub- -algebra of F , and µ a regular conditional distribution of
f given I ⌦ C. Then, for  -almost all i 2 I, µi is a regular conditional distribution
of fi given C.
We are now ready to state formally a general version of the conditional exact
law of large numbers in terms of sample distributions.
Theorem 2. Let f be a process from (I ⇥⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥P ) to a Polish space X. If
f is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, then f has no individual
uncertainty in aggregation given C.
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If a real-valued process f is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given
C, then we can weaken the square integrability assumption on f in Corollary 1 to
an integrability assumption on f , which generalizes Corollary 2.10 of Sun (2006) to
the conditional setting.
Corollary 2. Let f be a real-valued integrable process on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ).
If f is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, then for P -almost all
! 2 ⌦, RI f!(i)d  = RI E(f |I ⌦ C)d .
3.2.4 Converse Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers
It is easy to see that for a real-valued square integrable process f on a Fubini
extension, the property of essentially constant sample means can not guarantee the
essential uncorrelatedness for the random variables. However, part of Theorem 2.6
in Sun (2006) (and part of Theorem 4.6 in Sun (1998)) presents a converse version of
the exact law of large numbers in the sense that f must be essentially uncorrelated
if the coalitional sample means are essentially constant. The following proposition
is an analog of that result in the conditional setting.
Proposition 2. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥
F , ⇥P ). If for any A 2 I, RA f!(t)d (t) = RA E(f |I ⌦ C)d  holds for P -almost all
! 2 ⌦, then f is essentially conditionally uncorrelated given C.
Similarly, Theorem 2.8 in Sun (2006) (and part of Theorem 7.6 of Sun (1998))
obtains the converse exact law of large numbers in terms of sample distributions in
the sense that a process on a Fubini extension must be essentially pairwise inde-
pendent if the coalitional sample distributions are essentially constant. To present
the converse version of the conditional exact law of large numbers in Theorem 2, we
need the following definition first.
Definition 9. Let f be a process from (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) to a Polish space X, C a
countably generated sub- -algebra of F , and µ a regular conditional distribution of
f given I ⌦ C. The process f is said to have no coalitional individual uncertainty in
aggregation given C if for any A 2 I, and for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦,  ((fA! ) 1(B)) =R
A µi!(B)d  holds for any Borel set B in X, where f
A is the restriction of f on
A⇥ ⌦.
Next we state a converse version of the conditional exact law of large numbers
in terms of sample distributions.
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Theorem 3. Let f be a process from (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) to a Polish space X. If f
has no coalitional individual uncertainty in aggregation given C, then f is essentially
pairwise conditionally independent given C.
3.2.5 Coalitional Aggregate Uncertainty
As indicated in the statements of Theorems 2 and 3, the assumption of conditional
independence given a countably generated  -algebra plays a key role for the validity
of the conditional exact law of large numbers. An immediate question concerns
the restrictiveness of such an assumption when imposed on a general process from
a Fubini extension to a Polish space. To answer this question, we need to use
Theorem 1 of Hammond and Sun (2008) which provides a general characterization
for a process (not necessarily measurable in a Fubini extension) to have such a
structure involving conditional independence.13
Let f be a process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) to a Polish space X, F an event
in F , and B a Borel set in B. Then, the set f 1(B) is I ⇥ F -measurable, so is
the set D = f 1(B) \ (I ⇥ F ). The Fubini property implies that for  -almost all
i 2 I, the section Di is F -measurable, and the function P (Di) = P (F \ f 1i (B))
is I-measurable. This latter property is called event-wise measurable conditional
probabilities in Definition 4 in Hammond and Sun (2008). The following lemma
is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 of Hammond and Sun (2008), which
means that our assumption of conditional independence in Theorem 2 is satisfied in
general.
Lemma 4. Let f be a process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) to a Polish space X.
Then, there is a countably generated  -algebra C such that for  -almost all i1 2 I,
fi1 and fi2 are conditionally independent given C for  -almost all i2 2 I.
Let f be a process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) to a Polish space X, which has
essentially pairwise conditionally independent random variables given a countably
generated  -algebra C. When f is used to model both macroeconomic risks and
individual level uncertainty, the individual uncertainty is reflected by the random
variables fi for individual agents i 2 I while C represents (the information reflected
by) the macro states. One can also consider the uncertainty through aggregation
at the coalitional level. Let Cf be the  -algebra generated by the sample distri-
butions on all the coalitions plus the P -null sets. That is, Cf is generated by the
13Theorem 1 of Hammond and Sun (2008) also indicates that the macro states could be identified
via Monte Carlo simulations.
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F -measurable mappings  { (fA! ) 1(B) : A 2 I, B 2 B}  together with the P -null
sets. Thus, Cf reflects all the uncertainty at the aggregate level. By applying
Theorem 2 to any given coalition A with  (A) > 0, it is clear that  (fA! )
 1(B) is
C-measurable for any B 2 B, and hence Cf is always a sub- -algebra of C. The fol-
lowing theorem shows that the macro states can be identified with such coalitional
aggregate uncertainty. It also implies that Cf is the smallest sub- -algebra of F such
that f has the conditional independence structure based on such a sub- -algebra of
F .
Theorem 4. Let f be a process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) to a Polish space X.
Then the  -algebra Cf for the coalitional aggregate uncertainty has the following
properties.
(1) The  -algebra Cf is countably generated.
(2) The process f has no coalitional individual uncertainty in aggregation given
Cf .
(3) The process f has essentially pairwise conditionally independent random vari-
ables given Cf .
3.2.6 Exchangeability
Theorem 4 above shows that the macro states can be identified with the coalitional
aggregate uncertainty. We shall show that for the special case of an essentially
pairwise exchangeable process, the macro states can be identified with the aggregate
uncertainty associated only with the grand coalition I. We first recall some basic
definitions as in Hammond and Sun (2003) and Hammond and Sun (2008).
Definition 10. Let f be a process from (I ⇥⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥P ) to a Polish space X.
(1) The process f is said to be essentially pairwise exchangeable if there exists
a Borel probability measure ⇡ on (X ⇥ X,B ⌦ B) such that for  -almost all
i1 2 I, one has
P (f 1i1 (B1) \ f 1i2 (B2)) = ⇡(B1 ⇥ B2) = ⇡(B2 ⇥ B1)
for  -almost all i2 2 I, and for all B1, B2 2 B.
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(2) Let C be a countably generated sub- -algebra of F , and let µ be a C-measurable
mapping from ⌦ to M(X). The process f is said to be essentially i.i.d. con-
ditioned on C if f is essentially conditionally independent given C, and for
 -almost all i 2 I, the C-measurable mapping ! 7! µ! is a regular conditional
distribution P (f 1i |C) of the random variable fi.
Theorem 2 of Hammond and Sun (2003) and Proposition 7 of Hammond and
Sun (2008) shows the equivalence of essential pairwise exchangeability and essential
i.i.d. conditioned on some countably generated  -algebra. Under the framework
of a Fubini extension, the following proposition shows the equivalence of essential
pairwise exchangeability and essential i.i.d. conditioned on the sample distributions,
which is a continuum analog of de Finetti’s Theorem in terms conditioning on a
random empirical distribution function as in Equations (2.4) and (2.7) of (Kingman,
1978, p. 186).
Proposition 3. Let f be a process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) to a Polish space
X. Then f is essentially pairwise exchangeable if and only if f is essentially i.i.d.
conditioned on the  -algebra generated by the mapping  f 1! from ⌦ to M(X).
3.3 Ex ante e ciency and incentive compatibility
3.3.1 The information structure
We follow the information structure as used in Sun and Yannelis (2007) and Sun
and Yannelis (2008) except that we use a general state space S here instead of a
finite state space S in Sun and Yannelis (2007) and Sun and Yannelis (2008). Fix an
atomless probability space (I, I, ) representing the space of economic agents. Let
T 0 = {q1, q2, . . . , qL} be the space of all the possible signals (types) for individual
agents, and  0 the space of probability measures on T 0. Let (T, T , P T ) be a prob-
ability space that models the uncertainty associated with the private signal profiles
for all the agents. In particular, T is a space of functions from I to T 0.14 Thus,
t 2 T , as a function from I to T 0, represents a private signal profile for all agents
in I. For agent i 2 I, t(i) (also denoted by ti) is the private signal of agent i while
t i the restriction of the signal profile t to the set I \ {i} of agents di↵erent from
i; let T i be the set of all such t i. For simplicity, we shall assume that (T, T ) has
14In the literature, one usually assumes that di↵erent agents have possibly di↵erent sets of signals
and require that the agents take all their own signals with positive probability. For notational
simplicity, we choose to work with a common set T 0 of signals, but allow zero probability for some
of the redundant signals. There is no loss of generality in this latter approach.
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a product structure so that T is a product of T i and T 0, while T is the product
algebra of the power set T 0 on T 0 with a  -algebra T i on T i. For t 2 T and
t0i 2 T 0, we shall adopt the usual notation (t i, t0i) to denote the signal profile whose
value is t0i for agent i, and the same as t for other agents.
Let S be a complete separable metric space of true (or macro) states of nature
(with its Borel  -algebra denoted by S), which influence the utilities of all the agents,
but are not known to the agents. Let (⌦,F , P ) be a probability space representing
all the uncertainty on the true states as well as on the signals for all the agents,
where (⌦,F) is the product measurable space (S ⇥ T,S ⌦ T ). Let P S and P T be
the marginal probability measures of P respectively on (S,S) and on (T, T ). Let
s˜ and t˜i, i 2 I be the respective projection mappings from ⌦ to S and from ⌦ to
T 0 with t˜i(s, t) = ti.15 Denote by C the sub- -algebra of F generated by s˜ and the
P -null sets. Let (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) be a Fubini extension.
For i 2 I, let ⌧i be the signal distribution of agent i on the space T 0,16 and
P S⇥T i(·|ti) the conditional probability measure on the product measurable space
(S ⇥ T i,S ⌦ T i) when the signal of agent i is ti 2 T 0. If ⌧i({ti}) > 0, then it is
clear that for D 2 S ⌦ T i, P S⇥T i(D|ti) = P (D ⇥ {ti})/⌧i({ti}).
Let f be the private signal process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) to T 0 such that
f(i,!) = t˜i(!), f! is I-measurable for each ! 2 ⌦, and f is essentially pairwise
conditionally independent given C.17 Let µ be a regular conditional distribution
of f , given I ⌦ C. As noted in Lemma 3, for  -almost all i 2 I, µi is a regular
conditional distribution of fi given C. Let µ¯ be the agents’ average conditional
signal distribution
R
I µid (i). Then, the Fubini property implies that µ¯ is a C-
measurable mapping from ⌦ to  0. We shall impose the non-triviality assumption
on the process f in the sense that the sub- -algebra of F generated by µ¯ and the
P -null sets is the same as C. It means that the agents’ average conditional signal
distribution carries as much information as the true states.
3.3.2 The large private information economy
We consider a large asymmetric information economy with its information structure
as described in Subsection 3.3.1. In this economy, agents i 2 I are informed with
15t˜i can also be viewed as a projection from T to T 0.
16For q 2 T 0, ⌧i({q}) is the probability P (t˜i = q).
17For simplicity, here we only work with the private signal process f instead of the more general
idiosyncratic signal process as defined in Definition 4 of Sun and Yannelis (2007). There is no
problem to use exactly the same proof to generalize our result in Theorem 5 to the more general
setting.
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their private signals ti 2 T 0 but not the true states, and they can have contingent
consumptions based on the signal profiles t 2 T announced by all the agents. De-
cisions are made at the ex ante level. The common consumption set is the positive
orthant Rm+ . In the sequel, we shall state several assumptions on the economy.
A1. The utility function of each agent depends on her consumption x 2 Rm+ and
the true state s 2 S but not on the private signals of the agents in the economy.
Thus, we can let u be a function from I ⇥ Rm+ ⇥ S to R+ such that for any given
i 2 I, u(i, x, s) is the utility of agent i at consumption bundle x 2 Rm+ and true state
s 2 S. For any given x 2 Rm+ , u(i, x, s) is I ⌦ S-measurable in (i, s) 2 I ⇥ S. Let
c, d 2 R+ be two constants. For any given (i, s) 2 I ⇥ S, u(i, x, s), (also denoted by
u(i,s)(x)), is continuous and monotonic in x 2 Rm+ , and dominated by ckxk + d for
any x 2 Rm+ , where k · k is the Euclidean norm.18
A2. For any given (i, s) 2 I ⇥S, u(i, x, s), (also denoted by u(i,s)(x)) is concave
in x 2 Rm+ .
A20. For any given (i, s) 2 I ⇥ S, u(i, x, s) is strictly concave in x 2 Rm+ .
A3. Let e be a  -integrable function from I to Rm+ with e(i) as the initial en-
dowment of agent i.19
We shall now consider an economy where the agents are informed with their
signals but not the true state. Formally, the collection Ep = {(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥
P ), u, e, f, s˜} is called a Private Information Economy.
The space of consumption plans for the economy Ep is the space L1(P T ,Rm+ ) of
integrable functions from (T, T , P T ) to Rm+ , which is infinite dimensional. Fix an




u(i, z(t), s)dP (3.3)
be the ex ante expected utility of agent i for the consumption plan z.20
Definition 11. (1) An allocation for the economy Ep is an integrable function xp
from (I ⇥ T, I ⇥ T , ⇥P T ) to Rm+ ; agent i’s consumption plan is xp(i, ·) (also
denoted by xpi ).
18The utility function u(i, ·, s) is monotonic if for any x, y 2 Rm+ with x  y and x 6= y,
u(i, x, s) < u(i, y, s).
19Since the true state s 2 S is not known to the agents, the agents’ endowments cannot depend
on s. However, as in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) and Sun and Yannelis (2007), here we also
assume that the endowments do not depend on the private signals of agents.
20By assumption A1, there are constants c, d 2 R+ such that for any given (i, s) 2 I ⇥ S,
u(i, x, s)  ckxk + d for any x 2 Rm+ , which guarantees that
R
⌦ u(i, z(t), s)dP is finite for each
agent i 2 I.
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(2) An allocation xp is feasible if for P T -almost all t 2 T , RI xp(i, t)d (i) =R
I e(i)d (i).
(3) A feasible allocation xp is said to be ex ante e cient if there does not exist a
feasible allocation yp such that for  -almost all i 2 I, Upi (ypi ) > Upi (xpi ).
(4) Two allocations xp and yp are said to be utility equivalent if Upi (x
p





for  -almost all i 2 I.
(5) Two allocations xp and yp are said to be essentially equivalent if for  -almost
all i 2 I, xpi (t) = yp(t) for P T -almost all t 2 T .














be the interim expected utility of agent i when she receives private signal ti
but mis-reports as t0i. The allocation x
p is said to be incentive compatible if
 -almost all i 2 I,
Ui(x
p
i , ti|ti)   Ui(xpi , t0i|ti)
holds for all the non-redundant signals ti, t0i 2 T 0 of agent i (i.e., ⌧i({ti}) > 0
and ⌧i({t0i}) > 0).
(7) A feasible allocation xp is said to be an ex ante Walrasian allocation (ex ante
competitive equilibrium allocation) if there is a bounded measurable price
function p from (T, T ) to Rm+ \ {0} such that for  -almost all i 2 I, xp(i) is a
maximal element in the budget set⇢
z 2 L1(P T ,Rm+ ) :
Z
T
p(t) · z(t)dP T 
Z
T







under the expected utility function Upi (·).
(8) A coalition A (i.e., a set in I with  (A) > 0) is said to ex ante block an
allocation xp in Ep if there exists an allocation yp such that RA yp(i, t)d (i) =R
A e(i)d (i) for P
T -almost all t 2 T , and for  -almost all i 2 A, Upi (yp(i)) >
Upi (x
p(i)).21 A feasible allocation xp is said to be in the ex ante core of Ep, or
21One can also only define the allocation yp on A ⇥ T instead of I ⇥ T . However, there is no
loss of generality since one can always extend a function defined on A ⇥ T to I ⇥ T to keep its
integrability.
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simply an ex ante core allocation in Ep, if there is no coalition that ex ante
blocks xp.
We are now ready to state two results on the general consistency between ex
ante e ciency and incentive compatibility.
Theorem 5. (1) Under assumptionsA1, A2, A3, for any ex ante e cient allocation
xp, there is an incentive compatible, ex ante e cient allocation yp that is utility
equivalent to xp.
(2) Under assumptions A1, A20, A3, for any ex ante e cient allocation xp,
there is an incentive compatible, ex ante e cient allocation yp that is essentially
equivalent to xp.
It is obvious that any ex ante core allocation is ex ante e cient. It is also easy to
check that any ex ante Walrasian allocation is ex ante e cient. Hence the following
two corollaries are clear consequences of Theorem 5.
Corollary 3. (1) Under assumptions A1, A2, A3, for any ex ante core alloca-
tion xp, there is an incentive compatible, ex ante core allocation yp that is utility
equivalent to xp.
(2) Under assumptions A1, A20, A3, for any ex ante core allocation xp, there
is an incentive compatible, ex ante core allocation yp that is essentially equivalent
to xp.
Corollary 4. (1) Under assumptions A1, A2, A3, for any ex ante Walrasian
allocation xp, there is an incentive compatible, ex ante Walrasian allocation yp that
is utility equivalent to xp.
(2) Under assumptions A1, A20, A3, for any ex ante Walrasian allocation xp,
there is an incentive compatible, ex ante Walrasian allocation yp that is essentially
equivalent to xp.
3.4 Proofs
3.4.1 Proofs of the results in Subsection 3.2.3
In Corollary 1, we work with E(f |I ⌦ C) to state a version of the conditional exact
law of large numbers. The following lemma shows that E(f |I ⌦ C) provides the
conditional expectations of individual random variables in a measurable way.
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Lemma 5. Let f be a real-valued integrable process on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥ P ), C a
countably generated sub- -algebra of F , and g = E(f |I ⌦ C). Then, for  -almost
all i 2 I, the conditional expectation E(fi|C) = gi.
Proof: Fix any C 2 C. By the definition of conditional expectation, the identityZ Z
A⇥C











Thus, for any C 2 C, we have RC(fi(!)  gi(!))dP = 0 for  -almost all i 2 I.
Take a countable sub-collection {Cn}1n=1 of C such that it generates C and is
closed under finite intersections. The previous paragraph shows that for each n   1,R
Cn
(fi   gi)dP = 0 holds for all i 2 In with  (In) = 1. Let I0 =
T1
n=1In. Then
 (I0) = 1, and for each i 2 I0,
R
Cn
(fi   gi)dP = 0 for each n   1. Since the Cn’s
form a ⇡-system, the well-known ⇡     theorem22 implies that for each i 2 I0,R
C(fi   gi)dP = 0 for all C 2 C.
By the classical Fubini theorem, there is A0 ✓ I with  (A0) = 1 such that gi is
C-measurable for each i 2 A0. Let A1 = I0 \ A0. Then  (A1) = 1, and for each
i 2 A1, gi is C-measurable, and
R
C fi dP =
R
C gi dP for all C 2 C. Hence, for each
i 2 A1, E(fi|C) = gi.
Proof of Lemma 3: By the Fubini property, we know that for  -almost all i 2 I,
µi is C-measurable. Let {On}n 1 be a countable base of open sets in X which is
closed under finite intersections. Then, by Corollary 2 on (Chow and Teicher, 1997,
p. 227), we have for each n   1,




By Lemma 5, there exists a set I0 2 I with  (I0) = 1 such that for any i 2 I0, µi is
C-measurable, and P  f 1i (On)|C  = E(1On(fi)|C) = µi(!)(On) for all n   1. This
implies that for any i 2 I0, µi is a regular conditional distribution of the random
variable fi given C.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let µ be a regular conditional distribution of f given I⌦C.
22See, for example, Theorem 3.2 in p42 of Billingsley (1995).
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Let {On}n 1 be a countable base of open sets in X which is closed under finite
intersections. Then, for each n   1, we have
E(1On(f)|I ⌦ C)(i,!) =
Z
X
1On(x)dµ(i,!)(x) = µ(i,!)(On). (3.5)
By the conditional independence assumption, we know that for each n   1, for
 -almost all i1 2 I,
P (f 1i1 (On) \ f 1i2 (On)|C) = P (f 1i1 (On)|C) · P (f 1i2 (On)|C)
holds for  -almost all i2 2 I. Thus, for any given n   1, the random variables in the
process 1On(f) are essentially uncorrelated conditioned on C. It then follows from








holds for all n   1. Therefore,  f 1! =
R
I µ!(i)d  for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. That is,
f has no individual uncertainty in aggregation given C.
3.4.2 Proofs of the results in Subsection 3.2.4
For a given real-valued integrable process f on a Fubini extension (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥
P ), and a countably generated  -algebra C of events, one can take the conditional
expectations of f given I ⌦ C and I ⌦ F respectively. The following lemma char-
acterizes when the two conditional expectations are equal.
Lemma 6. Let f be a real-valued integrable process on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ), C
a countably generated sub- -algebra of F , g = E(f |I ⌦ C) and h⇤ = E(f |I ⌦ F).
Then the following are equivalent.
(1) For any fixed A 2 I, RA f!(i)d  = RA E(f |I ⌦ C)d  for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦.
(2) h⇤ = g.
(3) h⇤i is C-measurable for  -almost all i 2 I.
Proof: First consider (2) =) (1). Assume (2), i.e., h⇤ = h, and fix any A 2 I.
Then, for any F 2 F , we haveZ Z
A⇥F
f d ⇥ P =
Z Z
A⇥F















which implies that for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, RA f!d  = RA g!d .
Next, assume that (1) holds, i.e., for any fixed A 2 I, RA f!d  = RA g!d  holds
for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. For any F 2 F , RF RA f!d  dP = RF RA h!d  dP. Thus,RR
A⇥F E(f |I ⌦F)d ⇥P =
RR
A⇥F g d ⌦P . By the ⇡    theorem, h⇤ = g, i.e., (2)
holds.
(2) =) (3) follows from the classical Fubini theorem.
It remains to show (3) =) (2). Assume (3). It is clear that E(h⇤|I ⌦ C) = g.
By Lemma 5, we have for  -almost all i 2 I, E(h⇤i |C) = hi. Since h⇤i is C-measurable
for  -almost all i 2 I, we have h⇤i = gi for  -almost all i 2 I. Applying the Fubini
















which implies (2) by the ⇡     theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that for any fixed A 2 I, RA f!(i)d  =R
A E(f |I ⌦ C)d  for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. Let g = E(f |I ⌦ C) and h⇤ = E(f |I ⌦ F).
Lemma 6 implies that g = h⇤. Since E(f h⇤|I⌦F) = 0, we have E(f g|I⌦F) = 0.
Let ↵ be any real-valued square integrable random variable on (⌦,F , P ). We
have E((f g)↵|I⌦F) = 0. Taking the conditional expectation further on I⌦C, we
obtain E((f   g)↵|I ⌦ C) = 0. It follows from Lemma 5 that E((fi  gi)↵|C) = 0 for
 -almost all i 2 I. Hence, by applying Lemma 5 again, we obtain that ↵ and fi are
conditionally uncorrelated given C for  -almost all i 2 I. To show f is essentially
conditionally uncorrelated given C, we just need to fix ↵ = fi0 for  -almost all i0 2 I.
Lemma 7. Let f and f 0 be any real-valued square integrable processes on (I⇥⌦, I⇥
F , ⇥P ), and C a countably generated sub- -algebra of F . Suppose E(f |I⌦F) = 0.
Then we have for  -almost all i1 2 I, E(f 0i1fi2 |C) = 0 for  -almost all i2 2 I.
Proof: For  -almost all i1 2 I, f 0i1 is square integrable on (⌦,F , P ); fix such an
i1 2 I. By taking ↵ = f 0i1 and g = 0 as in the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain that
E(f 0i1fi2 |C) = 0 for  -almost all i2 2 I.
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Proof of Theorem 3: Let µ be a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⌦ C
and {On}n 1 be a countable base of open sets in X which is closed under finite
intersections. Fix n   1, for any A 2 I, the assumption of no coalitional individual
uncertainty in aggregation implies that for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦,  ((fA! ) 1(On)) =R





E(1f 1! (On)(i)|I ⌦ C)d . (3.6)
Let fn(i,!) = 1f 1(On)(i,!) and g
n = E(1f 1(On)|I ⌦ C)). By Equation (3.6) and
Lemma 6, we have E(fn|I ⌦F) = gn, which means E(fn   gn|I ⌦F) = 0. For any
givenm   1, Lemma 7 implies that for  -almost all i1 2 I, E
⇣
1f 1i1 (Om)
!) · [fni2   gni2 ]|C
⌘
=
0 for  -almost all i2 2 I. This means that for  -almost all i1 2 I,
P (f 1i1 (Om) \ f 1i2 (On)|C) = P (f 1i1 (Om)|C)P (f 1i2 (On)|C)
holds for  -almost all i2 2 I. By grouping countably many null sets together as in
the proof of Theorem 2.8 of Sun (2006), we can obtain that for  -almost all i1 2 I,
P (f 1i1 (Om) \ f 1i2 (On)|C) = P (f 1i1 (Om)|C)P (f 1i2 (On)|C)
holds  -almost all i2 2 I, and for all m,n   1. By Theorem 1 of (Chow and Teicher,
1997, p. 230), fi1 and fi2 are essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C.
3.4.3 Proofs of the results in Subsections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6
To prove Theorem 4, we shall first work with a real-valued square integrable process
f on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ), and consider an analog of Theorem 4 in the setting of
coalitional sample means. Let Cf0 be the  -algebra generated by the F -measurable
mappings {RA f!(i)d  : A 2 I} together with the P -null sets. The following propo-
sition presents some properties about Cf0 .
Proposition 4. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥
F , ⇥ P ). Then we have following properties.
(1) The  -algebra Cf0 is countably generated.
(2) For any A 2 I, RA f!(i)d  = RA E(f |I ⌦ Cf0 )d  for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦.
(3) The process f is essentially conditionally uncorrelated given Cf0 .
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Proof: By Lemma 4, there exists a countably generated  -algebra C such that f is
essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C. Hence, f is also essentially
conditionally uncorrelated given C. Without loss of generality, we work with the
strong completion of such a countably generated  -algebra. Fix any A 2 I. Then
Corollary 1 implies that
R
A f!d  is C-measurable. By the arbitrary choices of A, we
obtain that Cf0 ✓ C. This means that (1) holds.

























A E(f |I ⌦ Cf0 )d , which means that (ii) holds.
(iii) follows from Proposition 2.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let f be a process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) to a Polish
space X. As above Lemma 4 implies the existence of a countably generated  -
algebra C such that for  -almost all i1 2 I, fi1 and fi2 are conditionally independent
given C for  -almost all i2 2 I. Without loss of generality, we work with the strong
completion of such a countably generated  -algebra. Fix any A 2 I. Then Theorem






is C-measurable. By the arbitrary
choices of A and B, we obtain that Cf ✓ C. This means that (1) holds.
Let µ be a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⌦ Cf . Fix any A 2 I.
For any B 2 B,    (f!) 1 (B)  is Cf -measurable. By the same idea as in the proof







A µi!(B)d . Thus (2)
holds.
(3) follows from Theorem 3 and parts (1) and (2) of this theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that f is essentially pairwise exchangeable.
Proposition 7 of Hammond and Sun (2008) shows the existence of a F -measurable
mapping µ from ⌦ to M(X) such that f is essential i.i.d. conditioned on the
countably generated  -algebra C generated by µ, and µ is a regular conditional
distribution of fi given C for  -almost i 2 I.
Let µ0 be a regular conditional distribution of f given I⌦C. By Lemma 3, µ0i is a
regular conditional distribution of fi given C for  -almost i 2 I. Hence, for  -almost





I µ!d  = µ!. Therefore, C is generated by the sample distribution  f 1! .
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3.4.4 Proof of Theorem 5
(1) Let xp be any ex ante e cient allocation. For any ! 2 ⌦, denote the realized
signal distribution  f 1! by  (!); thus   is a F measurable mapping from ⌦ to  0.
Note that the definition of the signal process f does not depend on s 2 S, and hence
 f 1! can also be viewed as a T -measurable function from T to  0. By Theorem 2,
we have  (!) =  f 1! = µ¯(!) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. The non-triviality assumption
implies that the sub- -algebra of F generated by   and the P -null sets is the same
as C, which implies that there is a Borel measurable function   from  0 to S such
that for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, s˜(!) =  ( (!)).
For any i 2 I and ! = (s, t) 2 ⌦, let x¯p(i,!) = xp(i, t). We shall use ⇢ to
denote the regular conditional distribution  ⇥ P ((x¯p) 1|I ⌦ C) of x¯p given I ⌦ C.
Then there exists a I ⇥ S-measurable function ⌫ from I ⇥ S to M(R+M) such that
⇢(i,!) = ⌫(i, s˜(!)) for  ⌦P -almost all (i,!) 2 I⇥⌦. Let ↵ be the I⇥S-measurable
mapping from I ⇥ S to Rm+ defined by ↵(i, s) =
R
Rm+
x d⌫(i, s). Thus, we have for
 ⌦ P -almost all (i,!) 2 I ⇥ ⌦,






x d⌫(i, s˜(!)) = ↵(i, s˜(!)) = ↵(i,  ( (!))).
Since   can be viewed as a T -measurable function from T to  0, ↵(i,  ( (t)))
defines a I ⌦ T -measurable function from I ⇥ T to Rm+ . For each (i, t) 2 I ⇥
T , let yp(i, t) = ↵(i,  ( (t))). It is clear that yp is I ⌦ T -measurable and hence
I ⇥ T -measurable. For   ⌦ P -almost all (i,!) 2 I ⇥ ⌦, y¯p(i,!) = yp(i, (t˜(!))) =
↵(i,  ( (!))) = E(x¯p|I ⌦ C). By Lemma 5, we obtain that for  -almost all i 2 I,
y¯pi (!) = E (x¯
p








yp(i, t˜(!))d ⌦ P =
Z
I⇥C















By the arbitrary choice of C 2 C, we obtain that RI yp(i, t˜(!))d  = RI e(i)d  for
P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. Hence RI yp(i, t)d  = RI e(i)d  for P T -almost all t 2 T , which
means that yp is a feasible allocation in Ep.
Next we show that the allocation yp is incentive compatible. Since no single
agent could change the realized signal distribution, it is obvious that for any i 2 I,
 (t i, ti) =  (t i, t0i) for all t i 2 T i and all ti, t0i 2 T 0. Hence, for  -almost all
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Therefore, the allocation yp is incentive compatible.
For i 2 I, ! = (s, t) 2 ⌦, let v(i,!) = u(i, xpi (t), s). Then, we have




It follows from Lemma 5 that for  -almost all i 2 I, E(vi|C) = E(v|I ⇥ C). Since
u(i, ·, s) is concave, Jensen’s inequality (see Lemma 3.5 in (Kallenberg, 2002, p. 49))



































i , s˜(!))dP = Ui(y
p
i ). (3.8)
Let di = Ui(y
p




























u(i, 0,  ( (t)))dP Td . (3.9)
Then, there exists  1 > 0 and a I ⇥ T measurable set D0 ✓ A ⇥ T such that
 ⇥P T (D0) >  1 and for any (i, t) 2 D0, yp(i, t) 6= 0 on D0. Thus there exists   > 0,
k 2 {1, . . . ,m} and D ✓ D0 such that   ⇥ P T (D) >   and the k-th component of
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yp(i, t) >   for any (i, t) 2 D. Let ek be the vector in Rm+ which is one at the k-th
component and zero otherwise. Without loss of generality, we can assume  (Dt) < 1
for any t 2 T . For w 2 [0,  ], let
y˜p(i, t, w) =
8<:yp(i, t)  wek if (i, t) 2 Dyp(i, t) if (i, t) /2 D,
and  (i) = {w : w 2 [0,  ] and Ui(y˜p(i,w)) 2 [Ui(ypi )  14di, Ui(ypi )]}. It is clear that for
any fixed i 2 I, Ui(y˜p(i,w)) is continuous and decreasing in w 2 [0,  ], and for any fixed
w 2 [0,  ], Ui(y˜p(i,w)) is I-measurable i 2 I. Then,   is a compact valued measurable
correspondence. For i 2 A, if w is positive and small enough, the continuity Ui(y˜p(i,w))
implies that w 2  (i). Let  (i) = maxw2 (i)w. Then  (i) > 0 for any i 2 A. Define
an allocation
zp(i, t) =
8<:yp(i, t)   (i)ek if (i, t) 2 Dyp(i, t) + RDt  (i)d 1  (Dt) ek if (i, t) /2 D.
It is clear that the allocation zp is feasible.
Fix any i 2 A. It is easy to see for any t 2 T , zp(i, t)   y˜(i, t, (i)) and
Ui(y˜(i, (i)))   Ui(ypi )  14di > Ui(ypi )  di = Ui(xpi ); then Ui(zpi ) > Ui(xpi ).
Next, consider i /2 A. Then (i, t) /2 D for any t 2 T , and thus zpi (t) = xpi (t) +R
Dt
 (i)d 
1  (Dt) ek. Let D
T = {t :  (Dt) > 0}; then  (DT ) > 0. For any t 2 DT , Dt is
a subset of A with  (Dt) > 0, which implies that
R
Dt
 (i)d  > 0; hence, zpi (t) >
xpi (t). For any t /2 DT , we have  (Dt) = 0, which means that zpi (t) = ypi (t). The
monotonicity assumption on the utility function ui implies that Ui(z
p





i ) > Ui(x
p
i ) for  -almost all i 2 I, which contradicts the ex ante
e ciency of xp. Thus,  (A) = 0. By (3.8), xp and yp are utility equivalent.
(2) The result in part (1) says that Ui(y
p
i ) = Ui(x
p
i ) for  -almost all i 2 I. The
the inequality in (3.8) becomes an equality for  -almost all i 2 I. Assumption 20
requires ui to be strictly concave in the consumption variable x 2 Rm+ . Thus, a strict
version of Jensens inequality implies that for  ⇥P -almost all (i,!) 2 I ⇥⌦, ⇢(i,!)
is the Dirac measure  R
Rm+




For any j 2 {1, . . . ,m} and x 2 Rm+ , let  j(x) = pxj. Then, we have
E ( j(xpi )|C)) =
Z
Rm+





=  j(E(xpi |C)).
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(3.10)
For simplicity, let hj be the function such that hj(!) =  j(x¯
p
i (!)) for any ! 2 ⌦.











[E (hj|C)]2, which means that E
 
(hj   E (hj|C))2 |C
 
= 0. Hence, E
 
(hj   E (hj|C))2
 
=
0, which implies that hj = E (hj|C). It means that the j-th component of xpi (·) is
C-measurable for any j 2 {1, . . . ,m}. Therefore, we can claim that for  -almost all
i 2 I, xpi = E (xpi |C) = ypi , and we are done.
Chapter4
Dynamic Directed Random Matching
4.1 Introduction
The economics literature is replete with models that assume independent random
matching among a continuum population of agents.1 Previous work (Du e and Sun
(2007) and Du e and Sun (2012)) provides a construction of discrete-time Markov
independent dynamical systems with random mutation, and with type changes in-
duced by partial or full bilateral random matching. It was assumed in this prior
work that when a given agent is matched, the paired agent is drawn uniformly from
the population of other agents to be matched. A consequence is that the probability
that the paired agent is of a given type is equal to the fraction of that type in the
matched population.
In reality and in a large part of the research literature, however, agents are
naturally motivated to focus their searches toward those types of counterparties
that o↵er greater gains from interaction, or toward those types that are less costly
to find. There has been no demonstration of a model of independent directed random
matching supporting the common appeal to a law of large numbers, by which the
realized quantity of matches of a given pair of types is supposed to be equal to the
1See, for example, Gale (1986a), Gale (1986b), McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991), Zame
(2007) in general equilibrium theory; Binmore and Samuelson (1999), Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner
(2001), Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009), Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Harrington (1998),
Takahashi (2010) in game theory; Diamond and Yellin (1990), Green and Zhou (2002), Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989), Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), Rupert, Schindler
and Wright (2001), Trejos and Wright (1995) in monetary economics; Diamond (1982), Hosios
(1990), Kiyotaki and Lagos (2007), Mortensen (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Rogerson
andWright (2005) in labor economics; and Du e, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), Du e, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2007), Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Weill (2007), Weill




Thus, it is valuable to provide rigorous foundations for independent random
matching that is “directed,” in the sense that the probability qkl that an agent of
type k is matched to an agent of type l can vary with the respective types k and
l, from some type space S. We first show, in Theorem 6, the existence of directed
random matching in which counterparty types are independent across agents. It
follows from the exact law of large numbers that the proportion of type-k agents
matched with type-l agents is almost surely pkqkl, where pk is the proportion of
type-k agents in the population. By allowing the matching probabilities {qkl}k,l2S
to depend on the underlying cross-sectional type distribution p, we also encompass
the “matching-function” approach that has frequently been applied in the labor
literature (for example, Petrongolo and C. Pissarides (2001)).
Random-matching models frequently allow for the random mutation of agent
types as in Du e, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007) and Du e, Gaˆrleanu, and Ped-
ersen (2005). Mutation is obvious in genetic applications. In various economic
settings, mutation involves random changes in preferences, productivity, or endow-
ments. We allow for independent random mutation, along the lines of previous work
(Du e and Sun (2007) and Du e and Sun (2012)).
The aggregate quantity pk qkl of matches of agents of type k to agents of type l
must of course be equal to the symmetric quantity plqlk. Moreover, we must haveP
l2S qkl  1, allowing for the event of no match. These restrictions imply that the
matching probabilities should in general depend on the underlying type distribu-
tion. Indeed, for some applications it is natural to allow the matching probabilities
{qkl}k,l2S to depend on the cross-sectional distribution p of types in a relatively
general way. Other than continuity, we impose no additional restrictions on this
dependence.
In some models, once two agents are matched, the impact of a match between
two agents on their post-match types is itself random as in Kiyotaki and Wright
(1993), Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
For example, the respective actions of the matched agents may result from mixed
strategies, and thus may lead to random match-induced type changes. We allow this
feature and extend it by allowing for correlated strategies, as suggested by Aumann
Aumann (1987).
In reality and in an extensive literature, once a pair of agents is matched, they
2In this context, independence is in general viewed as a behavioral assumption. That is, when
agents conduct searches without explicit coordination, it is reasonable to assume independence.
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may stay matched without immediate break-up of the partnership. Typical examples
include the relationships between employer and employee, or between agents that
take time to bargain over their terms of trade.3 In order to model this, we introduce
a per-period break-up probability ✓kl for matches between agents of types k and l.
We also allow for matches that persist for a deterministic amount of time, which
can depend on the types k and l of the matched agents.
Dynamic directed random matching with or without enduring partnerships is
motivated by many applications, including Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993)
in monetary theory, Andolfatto (1996), Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) and Hall
(2005) in labor economics, and Du e, Manso, and Malamud (2014) in financial
economics. In Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993), agents are more likely
to be matched to agents of their own type than to agents of other types, even
controlling for the quantities of the types. In Andolfatto (1996), Haan, Ramey and
Watson (2000) and Hall (2005), the matching functions are non-linear with respect
to the underlying populations of di↵erent types, and the employed workers may keep
their jobs for multiple periods. In Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), matching in
equilibrium can be non-steady-state. In Du e, Manso, and Malamud (2014), agents
in a financial market direct their searches based on the relative informativeness of
di↵erent types of trading counterparties. This is a small sample of the research that
has relied by assumption on the existence of a dynamic random matching model with
directed search probabilities or with non-linear matching functions. The results of
this chapter provide for the existence of such models.
All relevant parameters of our dynamic directed random matching model may
be time-dependent. For the special time-homogeneous case, we obtain a stationary
joint cross-sectional distribution of unmatched agent types and pairs of currently
matched types.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe
a static directed independent random matching model and present the correspond-
ing existence result. Section 4.3 defines a dynamical system with random mutation,
directed random matching, match-induced type changing. In order to present this
dynamical model in a relatively simple way, we postpone the treatment of endur-
ing partnerships to later in the chapter. This section includes results covering the
3See, for example, Andolfatto (1996), Cho and Matsui (2013), Diamond (1982), Flinn
(2006),Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), Hall (2005), Hosios (1990), Merz (1999), Merz (1995),
Mortensen (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (1985), Shimer (2005), Shi and
Wen (1999), Tsoy (2014), and Yashiv (2000).
4.2 Static Directed Random Matching 51
existence and exact law of large numbers for a dynamical system with Markov con-
ditional independence. In Section 4.4, we present brief examples of applications to
monetary economics that involve time-dependent parameters and directed match-
ing probabilities. In Section 4.5, we consider the extension of the dynamic directed
random matching to the case of enduring partnerships. We follow with an exam-
ple from the search-based literature of labor markets in which employment episodes
have random durations. Section 6 o↵ers some concluding remarks. All proofs are
given in Section 4.7.
The results in this chapter are based on Du e, Qiao and Sun (2014).
4.2 Static Directed Random Matching
This section begins with some mathematical preliminaries. Then a static model of
directed random matching is formally given in Subsection 4.2.2. Here, we present
the exact law of large numbers and the existence of independent directed random
matching. Finally, in Subsection 4.2.3, we show how to interpret our results so as to
provide rigorous probabilistic foundations for the notion of a “matching function”
that is commonly used in the search literature of labor economics.
4.2.1 Mathematical preliminaries
Let (⌦,F , P ) be a probability space. An element of ⌦ is a state of the world. A
measurable subset B of ⌦ (that is, an element of F) is an event, whose probability
is P (B). The agent space is an atomless probability space (I, I, ). An element of I
is an agent. The mass of some measurable subset A of agents is  (A). Because the
total mass of agents is 1, we can also treat  (A) as the fraction of the agents that
are in A. If one wishes, I can be taken to be the unit interval [0, 1], I an extension
of the Lebesgue  -algebra L, and   an extension of the Lebesgue measure. For a
function f on I ⇥ ⌦, and for (i,!) 2 I ⇥ ⌦, fi represents the function f(i, · ) on ⌦,
and f! the function f( · ,!) on I.
While a continuum of independent random variables, one for each of a large
population such as I, can be formalized as a mapping on ⌦⇥ I, such a function can
never be measurable with respect to the completion of the usual product  -algebra
I ⌦ F , except in the trivial case in which almost all of the random variables are
constants.4 As in Sun (2006), Du e and Sun (2007), and Du e and Sun (2012), we
shall therefore work with extensions of the usual product measure space that retain
4See, for example, Proposition 2.1 in Sun (2006).
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f(!, i) d (i) dP (!),
for any correspondingly measurable and integrable function f . A formal definition,
as in (Sun, 2006, Definition 2.2), is as follows.
Definition 12. A probability space (I⇥⌦,W , Q) extending the usual product space
(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⌦ F ,  ⌦ P ) is said to be a Fubini extension of this product space if, for
any real-valued Q-integrable function f on (I ⇥ ⌦,W),
(1) the two functions fi and f! are integrable, respectively, on (⌦,F , P ) for  -
almost all i 2 I, and on (I, I, ) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦.
(2)
R
⌦ fi dP and
R
I f! d  are integrable, respectively, on (I, I, ) and (⌦,F , P ),
with
R








I f! d ) dP .
To reflect the fact that the probability space (I⇥⌦,W , Q) has (I, I, ) and (⌦,F , P )
as its marginal spaces, as required by the Fubini property, it will be denoted by
(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ).
The Fubini extension could include a su ciently rich collection of measurable
sets to allow applications of the exact law of large numbers that we shall need. An
I ⇥ F -measurable function f will be called a “process,” each fi will be called a
random variable of this process, and each f! will be called a sample function of the
process.
As in Du e and Sun (2007), Du e and Sun (2012), and Sun (2006), we state the
following definition of essential pairwise independence using a complete separable
metric space X for the sake of generality. In particular, a finite space or a Euclidean
space is a complete separable metric space.
Definition 13. (Essential pairwise independence) A process f from I ⇥ ⌦ to a
complete separable metric space X is said to be essentially pairwise independent if
for  -almost all i 2 I, the random variables fi and fj are independent for  -almost
all j 2 I.
4.2.2 Static directed random matching
We follow the notation in Subsection 4.2.1. Let S = {1, 2, . . . , K} be a finite space
of agent types and ↵ : I ! S be an I-measurable type function, mapping individual
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agents to their types. For any k in S, we let pk =  ({i : ↵(i) = k}) denote
the fraction of agents of type k. We can view p = (pk)k2S as an element of the
space   of probability measures on S. Because (I, I, ) has no atoms, for any type
distribution p 2  , one can find an I-measurable type function with distribution p.
A function q : S ⇥ S ! R+ is a matching probability function for the type
distribution p if, for any k and l in S,
pk qkl = pl qlk,
X
r2S
qkr  1. (4.1)
The matching probability qkl specifies the probability that an agent of type k is
matched to an agent of type l. Thus, ⌘k = 1 
P
l2S qkl is the associated no-matching
probability for an agent of type k.
Definition 14. Let ↵, p, and q be given as above, and J a special type representing
no-matching.
(i) A full matching   is a one-to-one mapping from I onto I such that, for each
i 2 I,  (i) 6= i and  ( (i)) = i.
(ii) A (partial) matching  is a mapping from I to I[{J} such that for some subset
B of I, the restriction of  to B is a full matching on B, and I \B =   1({J}).
This means that agent i is matched with agent  (i) for i 2 B, whereas any
agent i not in B is unmatched, that is  (i) = J .
(iii) A random matching ⇡ is a mapping from I ⇥⌦ to I [ {J} such that (a) ⇡! is
a matching for each ! 2 ⌦; (b) after extending the type function ↵ to I [ {J}
so that ↵(J) = J , and letting g = ↵(⇡), the function g is measurable from
(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) to S [ {J}.
(iv) A random matching ⇡ from I⇥⌦ to I [{J} is “directed,” and has parameters
(p, q), if for  -almost every agent i of type k, P (gi = J) = ⌘k and P (gi = l) =
qkl.
(v) A random matching ⇡ is said to be independent if the type process g is essen-
tially pairwise independent.
For an agent i 2 I who is matched, the random variable gi = g(i, · ) is the type
of her matched partner. Part (iv) of the definition thus means that for  -almost
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every agent i of type k, her probability of being matched with a type-l agent is qkl,
while her no-matching probability is ⌘k.
The following result is a direct application of the exact law of large numbers in
Sun (2006). In particular, letting Ik = {i 2 I : ↵(i) = k}, the result follows from
Theorem 2.8 of Sun (2006) by working with the process gIk = g|Ik⇥⌦ on the rescaled
agent space Ik.
Proposition 5. Let ⇡ be an independent directed random matching with parame-
ters (p, q). Then, for P -almost every ! 2 ⌦, we have
(i) For k 2 S,  ({i 2 I : ↵(i) = k, g!(i) = J}) = pk⌘k.
(ii) For any (k, l) 2 S ⇥ S,  ({i : ↵(i) = k, g!(i) = l}) = pkqkl.
Let  be the probability measure on S⇥(S[{J}) defined by letting (k, l) = pkqkl
for any (k, l) 2 S ⇥ S and (k, J) = pk⌘k for k 2 S. Proposition 5 says that the
cross-sectional joint type distribution of (↵, g!) is  with probability one.
Theorem 6. For any type distribution p on S and any matching probability function
q for p, there exists a Fubini extension (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) on which is defined a
type function ↵ and an independent directed random matching ⇡ with parameters
(p, q).
The proof of Theorem 6 will be given in Subsection 4.7.1 for the case of a Loeb
measure space of agents via the method of nonstandard analysis.5 Since the unit
interval and the class of Lebesgue measurable sets with the Lebesgue measure pro-
vide the archetype for models of economies with a continuum of agents, the next
proposition shows that one can take an extension of the classical Lebesgue unit in-
terval as the agent space for the construction of an independent directed random
matching.
Proposition 6. For any type distribution p on S and any matching probability
function q for p, there exists a Fubini extension (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) such that:
1. The agent space (I, I, ) is an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval (L,L, ).
2. There is defined on the Fubini extension a type function ↵ and an independent
directed random matching ⇡ with parameters (p, q).
5A standard treatment of nonstandard analysis is given by the book Loeb and Wol↵ (2000).
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4.2.3 Matching functions
Proposition 5 and Theorem 6 also provide a rigorous probabilistic foundation for the
“matching-function” approach that is widely used in the literature of search-based
labor markets. Matching functions allow the probabilities of matching to be directed
and to depend on an endogenously determined cross-sectional distribution of types.
In models of search-based labor markets, it is typical to suppose that firms and
workers are characterized by their types. A commonly used modeling device in this
setting is a matching function mkl : [0, 1]⇥ [0, 1]! [0, 1] that specifies the quantity
of type-k agents that are matched with type-l agents, for any k and l in S. (See
Petrongolo and C. Pissarides (2001) for a survey of the matching-function approach.)
Clearly one must require that for any k and l in S and any p in  ,
mkl(pk, pl) = mlk(pl, pk),
X
r2S
mkr(pk, pr)  pk. (4.2)
Let qkl = mkl(pk, pl)/pk for pk 6= 0, and let qkl = 0 for pk = 0. Then the requirements
for a matching probability function are satisfied by q. By Theorem 6, there exists
an independent directed random matching ⇡ with parameters (p, q). It follows from
Proposition 5 that the cross-sectional joint type distribution of (↵, g!) is  with
probability one, where, for any k and l in S,
(k, l) = pkqkl = mkl(pk, pl).
That is, the mass of type-k agents that are matched with type-l agents is indeed
mkl(pk, pl) with probability one. This means that any matching function satisfying
Equation (4.2) can be realized by an independent directed random matching, almost
surely.6
A common parametric specification is the Cobb-Douglas matching function, for
which





for parameters ↵ and   in (0, 1), and a non-negative scaling parameter A. We empha-
size that for some parameters ↵,  , and A, the inequality Ap↵U p
 
V  min(pU , pU) may
6If one only considers the matching of two types of agents (say, types 1 and 2), then any nonneg-
ative matching function m(p1, p2) with m(p1, p2)  min(p1, p2) can be realized by an independent
directed random matching. One can simply take q1 2 = m(p1, p2)/p1 and q2 1 = m(p1, p2)/p2. For
more general matching functions, see Footnote 9.
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fail for some (pU , pV ) 2  . In that case, one can letm(pU , pV ) = min(Ap↵Up V , pU , pV ).
4.3 Dynamic Directed Random Matching
In this section we show how to construct a dynamical system that incorporates the
e↵ects of random mutation, directed random matching, and match-induced type
changes with time-dependent parameters. As in Section 4.2, we fix an atomless
probability space (I, I, ) representing the space of agents, a sample probability
space (⌦,F , P ), and a Fubini extension (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ).
We first define such a dynamical system in Subsection 4.3.1. The key condition
of Markov conditional independence is formulated in Subsection 4.3.2. Based on
that condition, we prove in Subsection 4.3.3 an exact law of large numbers for such
a dynamical system. The section ends with the existence of Markov conditionally
independent dynamic directed random matching.
4.3.1 Definition of dynamic directed random matching
As in Section 4.2, let S = {1, 2, . . . , K} be a finite set of types and let J be a special
type representing no-matching. We shall define a discrete-time dynamical system
D0 with the property that at each integer time period n   1, agents first experience
a random mutation and then random matching with directed probability. Finally,
any pair of matched agents are randomly assigned new types whose probabilities
may depend on the prior types of the two agents.
At period n   1, each agent of type k 2 S first experiences a random mutation,




kr = 1. At the
second step, every agent conducts a directed search for counterparties. In particular,
for each (k, l) 2 S⇥S, the directed matching probability is determined by a function
qnkl on the space of type distributions  , with the property that, for all k and l in
S, the function that maps the type distribution p 2   to pkqnkl(p) is continuous and
satisfies, for all p 2  ,
pk q
n





qnkr(p)  1. (4.3)
The intention is that, if the population type distribution in the current period is p,
then an agent of type k is matched to an agent of type l with probability qnkl(p).




kl(p) is the associated probability of no match. When
an agent of type k is matched at time n to an agent of type l, the agent of type
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kl(r) = 1. The
primitive model parameters are (b, q, ⌫).
Let ↵0 be the initial S-valued type process on the Fubini extension (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥
F , ⇥P ). For each time period n   1, the agents’ types after the random mutation
step are given by a process hn from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) to S. Then, a random
matching is described by a function ⇡n from I ⇥ ⌦ to I [ {J}. The end-of-period
types are given by a process ↵n from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) to S.
At period n, a type-k agent first mutates to an agent with type l with probability
bnkl. The post-mutation type function h
n satisfies
P (hni = l |↵n 1i = k) = bnkl. (4.4)
For the directed random matching step, let gn be an I ⇥ F -measurable function
defined by gn(i,!) = hn(⇡n(i,!),!), with the property that for any type k 2 S, for
 -almost every i and P -almost every ! 2 ⌦,
P (gni = l |hni = k, p¯n) = qnkl(p¯n(!)), (4.5)
where p¯n(!) =  (hn(!)) 1 is the post-mutation type distribution realized in state
!. The end-of-period agent type function ↵n satisfies, for  -almost every agent i,
P (↵ni = r |hni = k, gni = J) =  k(r) and P (↵ni = r |hni = k, gni = l) = ⌫nkl(r). (4.6)
Thus, we have inductively defined the properties of a dynamical system D0 incor-
porating the e↵ects of random mutation, directed random matching, and match-
induced type changes with given parameters (b, q, ⌫).
4.3.2 Markov conditional independence (MCI)
We now add independence conditions on the dynamical system D0, along the lines of
those in Du e and Sun (2007) and Du e and Sun (2012). The idea is that each of
the just-described steps (mutation, random matching, match-induced type changes)
are conditionally independent across almost all agents.
We say that the dynamical system D0 is Markov conditionally independent (MCI)
if, for  -almost every i and  -almost every j, for every period n   1, and for all
types k and l in S, the following four properties apply:
• Initial independence: ↵0i and ↵0j are independent.
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• Markov and independent mutation:
P (hni = k, h
n
j = l |↵0i , . . . ,↵n 1i ;↵0j , . . . ,↵n 1j ) = P (hni = k |↵n 1i )P (hnj = l |↵n 1l ).
• Markov and independent random matching:
P (gni = k, g
n
j = l |↵0i , . . . ,↵n 1i , hni ;↵0j , . . . ,↵n 1j , hnj ) = P (gni = k |hni )P (gnj = l |hnj ).
• Markov and independent matched-agent type changes:
P (↵ni = k,↵
n
j = l |↵0i , . . . ,↵n 1i , hni , gni ;↵0j , . . . ,↵n 1j , hnj , gnj )
= P (↵ni = k |hni , gni )P (↵nj = l |hnj , gnj ).
4.3.3 The exact law of large numbers for MCI dynamical systems




lk for k 2 S. We define a sequence  n of
mappings from   to   such that, for each p 2  ,










The following theorem presents an exact law of large numbers for the agent
type processes at the end of each period, and gives a recursive calculation for the
cross-sectional joint agent type distribution pn at the end of period n.
Theorem 7. A Markov conditionally independent dynamical system D0 with pa-
rameters (b, q, ⌫), for random mutation, directed random matching and match-
induced type changes, satisfies the following properties.
(1) For each time n   1, let pn(!) =  (↵n!) 1 be the realized cross-sectional type
distribution at the end of the period n. The expectation E(pn) is given by














(2) For  -almost every agent i, the type process {↵ni }1n=0 of agent i is a Markov
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(3) For  -almost every i and  -almost every j, the Markov chains {↵ni }1n=0 and
{↵nj }1n=0 are independent.
(4) For P -almost every state !, the cross-sectional type process {↵n!}1n=0 is a
Markov chain with transition matrix zn at time n  1.
(5) For P -almost every state !, at each time period n   1, pn(!) =  (↵n!) 1, and
the realized cross-sectional type distribution after random mutation  (hn!)
 1
is p¯n.
(6) If there is some fixed p¨0 2   that is the probability distribution of the initial
type ↵0i of agent i for  -almost every i, then the probability distribution ⇣ =
p0⌦1n=1 zn on S1 is equal to the sample-path distribution of the Markov chain
↵i = {↵ni }1n=0 for  -almost every agent i. For P -almost every state !, ⇣ is also
the cross-sectional distribution  (↵(!)) 1 of the sample paths of agents’ type
processes.
(7) Suppose that the parameters (b, q, ⌫) are time independent. Then there ex-
ists a type distribution p⇤ 2   such that p⇤ is a stationary distribution for
any Markov conditionally independent dynamical system D0 with parameters
(b, q, ⌫), in the sense that for every period n   0, the realized cross-sectional
type distribution pn at time n is p⇤ P -almost surely, and P (↵ni )
 1 = p⇤ for
 -almost every agent i. In addition, all of the relevant Markov chains are time
homogeneous with a constant transition matrix z1 having p⇤ as a fixed point.
4.3.4 Existence of MCI dynamic directed random matching
The following theorem provides for the existence of a Markov conditionally inde-
pendent (MCI) dynamical system with random mutation, random matching, and
match-induced type changes.
Theorem 8. For any primitive model parameters (b, q, ⌫) and for any type distribu-
tion p¨0 2  , there exists a Fubini extension (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) on which is defined a
dynamical system D0 with random mutation, random matching, match-induced type
changes, that is Markov conditionally independent with these parameters (b, q, ⌫),
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and with the initial type distribution p0 that is p¨0 with probability one. These prop-
erties can be achieved with an initial type process ↵0 that is deterministic, or i.i.d.
across agents.7
4.4 Example Applications in Monetary Economics
In this section, we illustrate directed dynamic random matching through three exam-
ples. These examples provide a mathematical foundation for the dynamic matching
models used in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and two follow-up papers in monetary
economics.
4.4.1 Kiyotaki-Wright: Model A
Our first example is Model A of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). Three indivisible goods
are labeled 1, 2, and 3. There is a continuum of agents of unit total mass. A given
type of agent consumes good k and can store one unit of good l, for some l 6= k.
This type is denoted (k, l). The economy is thus populated by agents of 6 distinct
types, so we take the type space S = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2)}. In
order to avoid confusion over di↵erences in terminology8 with Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), we say that an agent who consumes good k has “trait” k. As in Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989), there are equal proportions of agents with the three respective
traits.
In each period n, every agent randomly matches with some other agent. When
matched, two agents decide whether or not to trade. If there is no trade between
the matched pair, they keep their goods. If there is a trade, and if the agent who
consumes good k gets good k from the other, then that agent immediately consumes
good k and produces one unit of good k + 1 (modulo 3), so that his type becomes
(k, k+1) (modulo 3, as needed). If there is a trade and an agent with trait k gets good
l for l 6= k, then his type becomes (k, l). A stationary trading strategy in (Kiyotaki
and Wright, 1989, p. 931) is described by some ⌧ : {1, 2, 3}⇥ {1, 2, 3}! {0, 1} that
implies a trade, ⌧k(l, r) = 1, if a trait-k agent actually wants to trade good l for good
r, and results in no trade, ⌧k(l, r) = 0, otherwise. Thus ⌧ determines determines the
match-induced type changes.
7This means that the process ↵0 is essentially pairwise independent, and ↵0i has distribution p¨
0
for  -almost all i 2 I.
8In Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), agents have three types. However, the meaning of “type” in
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) is di↵erent from that in this chapter. Here we use “trait” to mean
their type.
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We can use our model of dynamic directed random matching to give a mathemat-
ical foundation for the matching model in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) by choosing
suitable time-independent parameters (b, q, ⌫) governing random mutation, random
matching and match-induced type changing. Let b(k1,l1)(k2,l2) =  k1(k2) l1(l2) be the
mutation probabilities, and q(k1,l1)(k2,l2)(p) = p(k2,l2) the matching probabilities for
p 2  . Because the consumption traits of agents do not change, the type of a
matched agent cannot change to a type with a di↵erent trait. Thus, for the type
changing probability ⌫ of an agent with trait k1, the probability for the target types
will concentrate on the two types (k1, k1 + 1) and (k1, k1 + 2), which means that we
only need to define the type changing probability for the target type (k1, k1 + 1).
Suppose that an agent i of type (k1, k1 + 1) is matched with an agent j of type
(k2, l2). For l2 = k1+1, there is no need to trade. When l2 = k1 and there is a trade,
agent i will consume good k1, produces a unit of good k1 + 1, and keeps the same
type (k1, k1+1) (which trivially holds for the no-trade case). When l2 = k1+2, the
probability ⌫(k1,k1+1)(k2,l2)(k1, k1 + 1) for agent i to her type is the probability of no
trade between agents i and j while the probability of having a trade between agents
i and j is ⌧k1(k1 + 1, l2)⌧k2(l2, k1 + 1). We therefore have
⌫(k1,k1+1)(k2,l2)(k1, k1 + 1) =
8<:1 if l2 6= k1 + 21  ⌧k1(k1 + 1, l2)⌧k2(l2, k1 + 1) if l2 = k1 + 2.
By similar arguments, we have
⌫(k1,k1+2)(k2,l2)(k1, k1 + 1) =
8<:0 if l2 = k1 + 2⌧k1(k1 + 2, l2)⌧k2(l2, k1 + 2) if l2 6= k1 + 2.
4.4.2 Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright
Our next example is from Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). The model is based
on the same primitives as those of Model A of Kiyotaki and Wright Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989), however Sections 3 and 6 of Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993)
consider strategies that vary with time.
Suppose that (s1(n), s2(n), s3(n)) is a time-dependent mixed strategy at period
n, where sk(n) is the probability that an agent with trait k trades good k + 1 for
k + 2. Based on (s1(n), s2(n), s3(n)), one can compute the probability P n(k1,k2)(k3)
that an agent with type (k1, k2) trades for good k3.
4.4 Example Applications in Monetary Economics 62
Viewed in terms of our model of dynamic directed random matching, the corre-




p(k2l2). As in Subsection 4.4.1, for an agent with trait k1, we only need to define the
type changing probability for the target type (k1, k1 + 1).
Suppose that an agent i of type (k1, k1 + 1) is matched with an agent j of type
(k2, l2). For cases with l2 = k1 or l2 = k1 + 1, the arguments used in Section 4.4.1
imply the type changing probability ⌫n(k1,k1+1)(k2,l2)(k1, k1+1) = 1. When l2 = k1+2,




Therefore, we can obtain, as in Section 4.4.1, that
⌫n(k1,k1+1)(k2,l2)(k1, k1 + 1) =
8<:1 if l2 6= k1 + 21  P n(k1,k1+1)(l2)P n(k2,l2)(k1 + 1) if l2 = k1 + 2.
Similarly,
⌫n(k1,k1+2)(k2,l2)(k1, k1 + 1) =
8<:0 if l2 = k1 + 2P n(k1,k1+2)(l2)P n(k2,l2)(k1 + 2) if l2 6= k1 + 2.
4.4.3 Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui
Our third example is from Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993). Here, agents
are divided into two groups. Agents are more likely to be matched to a counterparty
of their own group than to a counterparty of a di↵erent group.
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived agents of unit total
mass. Agents are from two regions, Home and Foreign. Let p 2 (0, 1) be the size
of Home population. There are K   3 kinds of indivisible commodities. Within
each region, there are equal proportions of agents with the K respective traits. An
agent with trait k derives utility only from consumption of commodity k. After he
consumes commodity k, he is able to produce one and only one unit of commodity
k + 1 (mod K) costlessly, and can also store up to one unit of his production good
costlessly. He can neither produce nor store other types of goods.
In addition to the commodities described above, there are two distinguishable
fiat monies, objects with zero intrinsic worth, which we call the Home currency and
the Foreign currency. Each currency is indivisible and can be stored costlessly in
amounts of up to one unit by any agent, provided that the agent does not carry
his production good or the other currency. This implies that, at any date, the
4.4 Example Applications in Monetary Economics 63
inventory of each agent consists of one unit of the Home currency, one unit of the
Foreign currency, or one unit of his production good, but does not include more
than one of these objects in total at any one time.
For some   2 (0, 1), in each period n, a Home agent is matched to a Home agent
with probability p, and is matched to a Foreign agent with probability  (1   p).
The probability with which he is not matched is thus (1    )(1   p). Similarly,
a Foreign agent is matched to a Home agent with probability  p, is matched to a
Foreign agent with probability (1  p), and is unmatched with probability (1   )p.
The type space S is the set of ordered tuples of the form (a, b, c), where a 2
{H,F}, b 2 {1, . . . , K}, and c 2 {g, h, f}. Here, H represents Home, F represents
Foreign, g represents good, h represents Home currency, and f represents Foreign
currency.
An agent chooses a trading strategy to maximize his expected discounted utility,
taking as given the strategies of other agents and the distribution of inventories. In
Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993), Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui focused
on pure strategies that depend only on an agent’s nationality and the objects that he
and his counterparty have as inventories. Thus, the Home agent’s trading strategy
can be described simply as
⌧Hab =
8<:1 if he agrees to trade object a for object b0 otherwise,
where a and b are in {g, h, f}. The Foreign agent’s trading strategy can similarly
be described as
⌧Fab =
8<:1 if he agrees to trade object a for object b0 otherwise.
For example, ⌧Hgf = 0 means that a Home agent does not agree to trade his production
good for the Foreign currency, while ⌧Fhg = 1 means that a Foreign agent agrees to
trade the Home currency for his consumption good.
We can apply our model of dynamic directed random matching with immedi-
ate break-up to give a mathematical foundation for the matching model in Mat-
suyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993) by choosing suitable time-independent param-
eters (b, q, ⌫) governing random mutation, random matching, and match-induced
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type changing. To this end, we take mutation probabilities
b(a1,b1,c1)(a2,b2,c2) =  a1(a2) b1(b2) c1(c2).
The directed search probabilities are given by
q(a1,b1,c1)(a2,b2,c2)(p) =
8<:p(a2,b2,c2) if a1 = a2  · p(a2,b2,c2) if a1 6= a2,
for a cross-sectional agent type distribution p 2  . Because the nationality and
consumption traits of agents do not change, a matched agent cannot change to a
type with a di↵erent nationality or trait. Thus, for the type changing probability ⌫ of
an agent with nationality a1 and trait b1, search is directed to the three counterparty
types (a1, b1, g), (a1, b1, f) and (a1, b1, h).
Suppose that agent i is of type (a1, b1, g) and is matched with agent j who
has type (a2, b2, c2). The probability that agent i changes type to (a1, b1, h) is
⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h). We note that the good carried by an agent of type (a1, b1, g)
must be b1 + 1. For b2 6= b1 + 1 (mod K), the good that agent i carries is not the
consumption good of agent j, which means that there is no trade, so the proba-
bility ⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h) is 0. When c2 6= h, agent i cannot get the Home
currency from j, so ⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h) is also 0. When b2 = b1+1 and c2 = h,
⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h) is the probability that agent i trades with an agent with
the type of agent j, which is ⌧a1gh · ⌧a2hg . Therefore, we have
⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h) =
8<:⌧a1gh · ⌧a2hg if b2 ⌘ b1 + 1 (mod K) and c2 = h0 otherwise.
The following type-change probabilities can be obtained by similar arguments:
⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, f) =
8<:⌧a1gf · ⌧a2fg if b2 ⌘ b1 + 1 (mod K) and c2 = f0 otherwise;
⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, g) = 1  ⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h)  ⌫(a1,b1,g)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, f);
⌫(a1,b1,h)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, g) =
8<:⌧a1hg · ⌧a2gh if b2 ⌘ b1   1 (mod K) and c2 = g0 otherwise;
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⌫(a1,b1,h)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, f) =
8<:⌧a1hf · ⌧a2fh c2 = f0 otherwise;
⌫(a1,b1,h)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h) = 1  ⌫(a1,b1,h)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, g)  ⌫(a1,b1,h)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, f);
⌫(a1,b1,f)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, g) =
8<:⌧a1fg · ⌧a2gf if b2 ⌘ b1   1 (mod K) and c2 = g0 otherwise;
⌫(a1,b1,f)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h) =
8<:⌧a1fh · ⌧a2hf if c2 = h0 otherwise;
⌫(a1,b1,f)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, f) = 1  ⌫(a1,b1,f)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, h)  ⌫(a1,b1,f)(a2,b2,c2)(a1, b1, g).
4.5 Dynamic Directed Random Matching with Enduring
Partnerships
In this section we extend the dynamic directed random matching model in Section
4.3 to allow for enduring partnerships and for correlated type changes of matched
agents. Unlike the more basic model of Section 4.3, in order to capture the e↵ect
of enduring partnerships we now must consider the separate treatments of existing
matched pairs of agents and newly formed matched pairs of agents.
We first define such a dynamical system in Subsection 4.5.1. The key condition
of Markov conditional independence is formulated in Subsection 4.5.2. Based on
that condition, Subsection 4.5.3 presents an exact law of large numbers for such
a dynamical system. Subsection 4.5.4 provides results covering the existence of
Markov conditionally independent dynamical system with directed randommatching
and with partnerships that have randomly time breakups. In Subsection 4.5.5, we
consider the alternative case of fixed-term partnerships, that is, with pairings of
agents that stay together for a type-dependent deterministic number of periods. In
the final subsection, we illustrate the random break-up of partnerships through an
example drawn from labor economics.
Theorem 7 in Section 4.3 is a special case of Theorem 9 and Proposition 7 in
Subsection 4.5.3, while Theorem 10 in Subsection 4.5.4 extends Theorem 8 in Section
4.3. Hence the proofs of Theorems 7 and 8 are omitted. We prove all the results
stated in this section in Section 4.7.
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As in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we fix an atomless probability space (I, I, ) rep-
resenting the space of agents, a sample probability space (⌦,F , P ), and a Fubini
extension (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ). We will show that all of our results can be obtained
for an agent space that is a Loeb measure space as constructed in nonstandard
analysis, or is an extension of the classical Lebesgue unit interval. This section has
self-contained notation. In particular, some of the notation used in this section may
have a meaning that di↵ers from its usage in Section 4.3.
4.5.1 Definition of dynamic directed random matching with enduring
partnerships
As in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, let S = {1, 2, . . . , K} be a finite set of types and let
J be a special type representing no-matching. The “extended type” space is Sˆ =
S ⇥ (S [ {J}). An agent with an extended type of the form (k, l) has underlying
type k 2 S and is currently matched to another agent of type l in S. If the agent’s
extended type is instead of the form (k, J), then the agent is “unmatched.” The
space  ˆ of extended type distributions is the set of probability distributions pˆ on Sˆ
satisfying pˆ(k, l) = pˆ(l, k) for all k and l in S.
Each time period is divided into three steps: mutation, random matching, match-
induced type changing with break-up. We now introduce the primitive parameters
governing each of these steps.
At the first (mutation) step of time period n   1, each agent of type k 2 S
experiences a random mutation, becoming an agent of type l with a given probability






At the second step, any currently unmatched agent conducts a directed search
for counterparties. For each (k, l) 2 S ⇥ S, let qnkl be a function on  ˆ into R+ with
the property that for all k and l in S, the function pˆkJq
n
kl( pˆ ) is continuous in pˆ 2  ˆ
and satisfies, for any pˆ in  ˆ,
pˆkJ q
n





qnkr(pˆ)  1. (4.7)
Whenever the underlying extended type distribution is pˆ, the probability that an
unmatched agent of type k is matched to an unmatched agent of type l is qnkl(pˆ).
9
9Let ' be any continuous function from  ˆ to itself. Assume that (1) for any k, l 2 S, 'kl(pˆ)  
pˆkl; (2) for any pˆ 2  ˆ, '(pˆ) and pˆ have the same marginal measure on S, that is, for any k 2 S,P
r2S[{J} 'kr(pˆ) =
P
r2S[{J} pˆkr. For any k, l 2 S, let qkl(pˆ) = ('kl(pˆ)  pˆkl) /pˆkJ if pˆkJ > 0 and
4.5 Dynamic Directed Random Matching with Enduring Partnerships 67




kl(pˆ) is the no-matching probability for an unmatched
agent of type k.
At the third step, each currently matched pair of agents of respective types k
and l (including those who have just been paired at the matching step) breaks up




If a matched pair of agents of respective types k and l stays in their partnership, they
become a pair of agents of types r and s, respectively, with a specified probability
 nkl(r, s), whereX
r,s2S
 nkl(r, s) = 1 and  
n
kl(r, s) =  
n
lk(s, r) (4.9)
for any k, l, r, s 2 S. The second identity is merely a labeling symmetry condition.
If a matched pair of agents of respective types k and l breaks up, the agent of type
k becomes an agent of type r with probability &nkl(r), whereX
r2S
&nkl(r) = 1. (4.10)
We now give an inductive definition of the properties defining a dynamical system
D for the behavior of a continuum population of agents experiencing, at each time
period: random mutations, matchings, and match-induced type changes with break-
up. We later state conditions under which such a system exists. The state of the
dynamical system D at the end of each integer period n   0 is defined by a pair
⇧n = (↵n, ⇡n) consisting of:
• An agent type function ↵n : I ⇥⌦! S that is I ⇥F -measurable. The corre-
sponding end-of-period type of agent i is ↵n(i) 2 S. For technical convenience,
we always augment the agent and type spaces by including the element J , with
qkl(pˆ) = 0 if pˆkJ = 0. Then, the function q satisfies the continuity condition as well as Equation
(4.7) as required for a matching probability function; and any matching probability function can
be obtained this way. For the special case that all the matched agents break up at the end of
each period, we only need to consider continuous functions from   to  ˆ. Let   be any such
continuous function with the property that for any p 2  , '(p) has marginal measure p on S,
i.e., for any k 2 S, Pl2S[{J} 'kl(p) = pk. For any k, l 2 S, let qkl(p) =  kl(p)/pk if pk > 0 and
qkl(p) = 0 if pk = 0. Then, the function q satisfies the continuity condition as well as Equation
(4.3) as required for a matching probability function; and any matching probability function for
the particular setting can be obtained this way.
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↵n(J) = J (that is, ↵n(J,!) = J for all ! 2 ⌦).
• A random matching ⇡n : I ⇥⌦! I [ {J}, describing the end-of-period agent
⇡n(i) to whom agent i is currently matched, if agent i is currently matched. If
agent i is not matched, then ⇡n(i) = J . The associated partner-type function
gn : I ⇥⌦! S [ J provides the type gn(i) = ↵n(⇡n(i)) of the agent to whom
i is matched, if i is matched, and otherwise specifies gn(i) = J . As a matter
of definition, we require that gn is I ⇥ F -measurable.
We take the initial condition ⇧0 = (↵0, ⇡0) of D as given. The initial condition
may, if desired, be deterministic (constant across ⌦). The joint cross-sectional ex-
tended type distribution pˆn at the end of period n is  ( n) 1. That is, pˆn(k, l) is
the fraction of the population at the end of period n that has type k and is matched
to an agent of type l. Likewise, pˆn(k, J) is the fraction of the population that is of
type k and is not matched.
For the purpose of the inductive definition of the dynamical system D, we suppose
that ⇧n 1 = (↵n 1, ⇡n 1) has been defined for some n   1, and define ⇧n = (↵n, ⇡n)
as follows.
Mutation. The post-mutation type function ↵¯n is I ⇥F -measurable, and satis-
fies, for any k1, k2, l1, and l2 in S, for any r 2 S [ {J}, and for  -almost-every agent
i,
P (↵¯ni = k2, g¯
n
i = l2 |↵n 1i = k1, gn 1i = l1) = bnk1k2bnl1l2 (4.11)
P (↵¯ni = k2, g¯
n
i = r |↵n 1i = k1, gn 1i = J) = bnk1k2 J(r). (4.12)
Equation (4.11) means that a paired agent and her partner mutate independently.
The post-mutation partner-type function g¯n is defined by g¯n(i,!) = ↵¯n(⇡n 1(i,!),!),
for any ! 2 ⌦. We assume that g¯n is I ⇥ F -measurable. The post-mutation
extended-type function is  ¯n = (↵¯n, g¯n). The post-mutation extended type distri-
bution that is realized in state ! 2 ⌦ is pˇn(!) =     ¯n!  1.
Matching. Let ⇡¯n : I ⇥ ⌦! I [ {J} be a random matching with the following
properties.
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(i) For each state ! 2 ⌦, let A! = {i : ⇡n 1(i,!) 6= J} be the set of agents who
are matched. For P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, we take
⇡¯n!(i) = ⇡
n 1
! (i) for i 2 A!, (4.13)
meaning that those agents who were already matched at the end of period
n 1 remain matched (to the same partner) at this step, which implies that the
post-matching partner-type function g¯n, defined by g¯n(i,!) = ↵¯n(⇡¯n(i,!),!),
satisfies
P (g¯ni = r | ↵¯ni = k, g¯ni = l) =  l(r), (4.14)
for any k and l in S and any r 2 S [ {J}, where  c(d) is zero if c 6= d and is
one if c = d.
(ii) g¯n is I ⇥ F -measurable.
(iii) Given the post-mutation extended type distribution pˇn, an unmatched agent of
type k is matched to a unmatched agent of type l with conditional probability
qnkl(pˇ
n), in that, for  -almost every agent i and P -almost every !,
P (g¯ni = l | ↵¯ni = k, g¯ni = J, pˇn) = qnkl(pˇn(!)), (4.15)
which also implies that
P (g¯ni = J | ↵¯ni = k, g¯ni = J, pˇn) = ⌘nk (pˇn(!)). (4.16)





Type changes of matched agents with break-up. This step determines
an end-of-period random matching ⇡n, an I ⇥ F -measurable agent type function
↵n, and an I ⇥ F -measurable partner-type function gn so that we have gn(i,!) =
↵n(⇡n(i,!),!) for all (i,!) 2 I ⇥⌦, and so that, for  -almost every agent i and for
any k1, k2, l1, l2 2 S and r 2 S [ {J},
⇡n(i) =
8<:⇡¯n(i), if gn(i) 6= JJ, if gn(i) = J, (4.17)
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P (↵ni = l1, g
n
i = r | ↵¯ni = k1, g¯ni = J) =  k1(l1)  J(r), (4.18)
P (↵ni = l1, g
n
i = l2 | ↵¯ni = k1, g¯ni = k2) = (1  ✓nk1k2) nk1k2(l1, l2), (4.19)
P (↵ni = l1, g
n
i = J | ↵¯ni = k1, g¯ni = k2) = ✓nk1k2&nk1k2(l1). (4.20)
Equations (4.17) and (4.18) mean that unmatched agents stay unmatched with-
out changing types, while Equations (4.19) and (4.20) specify the type changing
probabilities for a pair of matched agents who stay together or break up. The
extended-type function at the end of the period is  n = (↵n, gn).
Thus, we have inductively defined the properties of a dynamical system D =
(⇧n)1n=1 incorporating the e↵ects of random mutation, directed random matching,
and match-induced type changes with break-up, consistent with given parameters
(b, q, ✓,  , &). The initial condition ⇧0 of D is unrestricted. We next turn to the key
Markovian independence properties for such a system, and then to the exact law of
large numbers and existence of a dynamical system with these properties.
4.5.2 Markov conditional independence
We now add independence conditions on the dynamical system D = (⇧n)1n=0, along
the lines of those in Du e and Sun (2007), Du e and Sun (2012), and Section 4.3.
The idea is that each of the just-described steps (mutation, random matching, and
match-induced type changes with break-up) are conditionally independent across
almost all agents. In the following definition, we will refer to objects, such as the
intermediate-step extended type functions  ¯n and  ¯n, that were constructed in the
previous sub-section.
We say that the dynamical system D is Markov conditionally independent (MCI)
if, for  -almost every i and  -almost every j, for every period n   1, and for all
k1, k2 2 S, and l1, l2 2 S [ {J}, the following five properties apply:
• Initial independence:  0i and  0j are independent.
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• Markov and independent mutation:
P
 
 ¯ni = (k1, l1),  ¯
n
j = (k2, l2)
   ( ti)n 1t=0 , ( tj)n 1t=0  
= P
 
 ¯ni = (k1, l1)
    n 1i  P   ¯nj = (k1, l1)     n 1j   . (4.21)
• Markov and independent random matching:
P
⇣
 ¯ni = (k1, l1),  ¯
n
j = (k2, l2)
    ¯ni ,  ¯nj , ( ti)n 1t=0 , ( tj)n 1t=0 ⌘
= P
⇣
 ¯ni = (k1, l1)
    ¯ni ⌘P ⇣ ¯nj = (k2, l2)     ¯nj ⌘ . (4.22)
• Markov and independent matched-agent type changes with break-up:
P
⇣
 ni = (k1, l1),  
n
j = (k2, l2)
    ¯ni ,  ¯nj , ( ti)n 1t=0 , ( tj)n 1t=0 ⌘
= P
⇣




 nj = (k2, l2) |  ¯nj
⌘
. (4.23)
4.5.3 The exact law of large numbers for MCI dynamical systems with
enduring partnerships








































The following theorem, which extends Theorem 4.3.3, presents an exact law of
large numbers for the joint agent-partner type processes at the end of each period.
The result also provides a recursive calculation of the cross-sectional joint agent-
partner type distribution pˆn at the end of period n.
Theorem 9. Let D be a dynamical system with random mutation, random match-
ing, and match-induced type changes with break-up whose parameters are (b, q, ✓,  , &).
If D is Markov conditionally independent, then:
(1) For each time period n   1, the expected cross-sectional type distribution p˜n =
E(pˇn) after the mutation step and E(pˆn) at the end of the period are given by,

















and by E(pˆn) =  n(E(pˆn 1)).
(2) For  -almost every agent i, the extended-type process { ni }1n=0 is a Markov







































ll1(1  ✓nk1l1) nk1l1(k0, l0). (4.24)
(3) For  -almost every i and  -almost every j, the Markov chains { ni }1n=0 and
{ nj }1n=0 are independent.
(4) For P -almost every ! 2 ⌦, the cross-sectional extended-type process { n!}1n=0
is a Markov chain10 with transition matrix zn at time n  1.
(5) For P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, at each time period n   1, the realized cross-sectional
type distribution after random mutation  ( ¯n!)
 1 is equal to its expectation
p˜n, and the realized cross-sectional type distribution at the end of the period
n, pˆn(!) =  ( n!)
 1, is equal to its expectation E(pˆn).
(6) If there is some fixed p¨0 2  ˆ that is the probability distribution of the initial
extended type  0i of agent i for  -almost every i, then for  -almost every i
the Markov chain  i = { ni }1n=0 has the sample-path probability distribution
⇠ = p¨0 ⌦1n=1 zn on the space Sˆ1. Moreover, in this case, ⇠ =  ( !) 1 for
P -almost every !. That is, for any subset A =
Q1
n=0An ⇢ Sˆ1 of sample
paths, the probability ⇠(A) of the event
{ i 2 A} = { 0i 2 A0,  1i 2 A1, . . .}
is equal, for P -almost every ! 2 ⌦, to the fraction  ({i :  i(!) 2 A}) of agents
whose extended type process has a sample path in A in state !.
10For a given sample realization ! 2 ⌦, { n!}1n=0 is defined on the agent space (I, I, ), which is
a probability space itself. Thus, { n!}1n=0 can be viewed as a discrete-time process.
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For the time-homogenous case, in which the parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &) do not de-
pend on the time period n   1), the following proposition shows the existence of a
stationary extended type distribution.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &) are time homogeneous.
Then there exists an extended-type distribution pˆ⇤ 2  ˆ that is a stationary distri-
bution for any MCI dynamical system D with parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &), in the sense
that:
(1) For every n   0, the realized cross-sectional extended-type distribution pˆn at
time n is pˆ⇤ P -almost surely;
(2) All of the relevant Markov chains in Theorem 9 are time homogeneous with a
constant transition matrix z1 having pˆ⇤ as a fixed point;
(3) If the initial extended type process  0 is i.i.d. across agents, then, for  -
almost every i, the extended type distribution of agent i at any period n   0
is P ( ni )
 1 = pˆ⇤.
4.5.4 Existence of MCI dynamic directed random matching with endur-
ing partnerships
The following theorem provides for the existence of a Markov conditionally inde-
pendent (MCI) dynamical system with random mutation, random matching, and
match-induced type changes with break-up. Theorem 8 is a special case.
Theorem 10. For any primitive model parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &) and for any extended
type distribution p¨0 2  ˆ, there exists a Fubini extension (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) on
which is defined a dynamical system D = (⇧n)1n=0 with random mutation, ran-
dom matching, and match-induced type changes with break-up, that is Markov
conditionally independent with these parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &), and with the initial
extended type distribution pˆ0 being p¨0 with probability one. These properties can
be achieved with an initial condition ⇧0 that is deterministic, or alternatively with
an initial extended type  0 that is i.i.d. across agents.11
In the next proposition, we show that the agent space (I, I, ) in Theorem 10
can be an extension of the classical Lebesgue unit interval (L,L, ). That is, we can
take I = L = [0, 1] with a  -algebra I that contains the Lebesgue  -algebra L, and
so that the restriction of   to L is the Lebesgue measure  .
11This means that the process  0 is essentially pairwise independent, and that  0i has distribution
p¨0 for  -almost every agent i.
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Proposition 8. Fixing any model parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &) and any initial cross-
sectional extended type distribution p¨0 2  ˆ, there exists a Fubini extension (I ⇥
⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) such that:
(1) The agent space (I, I, ) is an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval (L,L, ).
(2) There is defined on the Fubini extension a dynamical system D = (⇧n)1n=0 that
is Markov conditionally independent with the parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &), where
the initial extended type distribution pˆ0 is p¨0 with probability one.
(3) These properties can be achieved with an initial condition ⇧0 that is deter-
ministic, or alternatively with an initial extended type process  0 that is i.i.d.
across agents.
4.5.5 Dynamic directed random matching with fixed-duration partner-
ships
In this subsection, we consider dynamic directed random matching with fixed-
duration partnerships. For notational simplicity, we assume that the parameters
of the model are time-homogeneous. The results extend in the obvious way to
parameters that depend on the time period n, as in previous sections.
Let S = {1, 2, . . . , K} be the agent type space. The random mutation of un-
matched agents is parameterized by probabilities (bkl) satisfying the properties spec-
ified in Section 3.
Once two agents with types k and l are matched, they stay together for a deter-
ministic number Tkl of periods, where Tkl is a non-negative integer with Tkl = Tlk for
any k and l in S. After a type-k agent has remained matched with a type-l agent
for exactly Tkl periods, the type-k agent changes her type to type r with probability
⌫kl(r). We require that for any types k, l, and r in S,
P
r2S ⌫kl(r) = 1.
We can embed these fixed-duration partnerships within the framework of dy-
namic directed random matching already established in Section 4.5, by augmenting
the type space with the vintage of an agent’s partnership. This will allow us to
immediately apply the characterization and existence results of Section 4.5 to this
new setting.
For this, let T = maxk,l2S Tkl and let S˜ = S⇥{0, 1, . . . , T} denote the augmented
type space, with a typical element kt = (k, t) corresponding to an agent that is
currently of type k 2 S and has been in a partnership with the same agent for
t periods. In particular, an agent of type k 2 S that is unmatched, or has just
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become matched or broken up a partnership has the augmented type k0 = (k, 0).
We can arrange for those agents who have reached their maximum partnership
vintage to exit their partnerships by specifying the break-up probabilities ✓ for
the augmented type space S˜ accordingly, that is, by breaking up with probability
✓kt lt = 1 whenever t = Tkl, and with probability ✓kt lt = 0 whenever t 6= Tkl. For
purely formal notational reasons, we specify that ✓ktls = 0 whenever t 6= s.
In order to extend the random mutation parameters to the augmented type space
S˜, we can specify, for any augmented types kt and ls,
b˜ktls =
8<:bkl  0(s) if t = 0 k(l)  t(s) if 1  t  T.
In order to exploit the directed random matching framework of Section 4.5, we
define the space M of probability distributions on S˜⇥ (S˜ [ {J}), with some µ in M
determining the fraction µktls of the population that has the augmented type kt and
is currently in a partnership with an agent of augmented type ls. Similarly, µkt,J
is the fraction of the population that is of augmented type kt and is not currently
matched. Of course, we will always have µktls = 0 if s 6= t, and we can only have
µktJ > 0 if t = 0.
For each (kt, ls) 2 S˜ ⇥ S˜, let qktls be a function on M into R+ that is defined as
follows. If t > 0 or s > 0, then qktls(µ) = 0. The function that maps µ to µk0J qk0l0(µ)
is continuous and satisfies
µk0J qk0l0(µ) = µl0J ql0k0(µ) and
X
r02S˜
qk0r0(µ)  1. (4.25)
Thus, the probability that an unmatched agent of type k is matched to an unmatched
agent of type l is qk0l0(µ). This allows for applications in which directed search
is endogenous, and an agent may choose a search strategy that can depend quite
generally on the cross-sectional distribution of agent types, including the distribution
of partnership vintages.
The parameters governing the type changes of matched agents are now specified







 k1(l1) k2(l2) if t1 = t2 = t+ 1  Tk1k2
 k1(l1) k2(l2) if t = Tk1k2 , t1 = t2 = 0
0 otherwise,





⌫k1k2(l1) if t = Tk1k2 and t1 = 0
 k1(l1) if 0  t  Tk1k2   1 and t1 = t
0 otherwise.
For Tk1k2 + 1  t  T , we let  kt1kt2(lt11 , lt22 ) =  k1(l1) k2(l2) and &kt1kt2(lt11 ) =  k1(l1).








(lt11 ) =  k1(l1).
With these specifications for the parameters (b˜, q, ✓,  , &) associated with the aug-
mented type space S˜, we can directly invoke Theorem 9, Theorem 10, Proposition 8,
and Proposition 7, for the exact law of large numbers, the existence of Markov con-
ditionally independent dynamical system, existence with extended-Lebesgue agent
space, and stationarity, respectively.
4.5.6 Matching in labor markets with multi-period employment episodes
This example comes from Andolfatto (1996). Section 1 of Andolfatto (1996) consid-
ers a discrete-time labor-market-search model. The agents are workers and firms.
Each firm has a single job position. Section 2 of Andolfatto (1996) works with sta-
tionary distributions. We can use the model of dynamic directed random matching
with enduring partnership developed in this section to capture the search process
leading to Equation (1) of Andolfatto (1996) in the stationary setting.
The agent type space is S = {E,U,A, V,D}. Here, E and U represent respec-
tively employed workers and unemployed workers while A, V and D represent active,
vacant and dormant jobs respectively. Dormant job positions are neither matched
with a worker nor immediately open. The proportion of agents that are workers is
w > 0.
At the beginning of each period, each vacant firm may mutate to a dormant job
and each dormant job may mutate to a vacant job. Let pˇUJ and pˇV J be the respective
proportions of unemployed workers and vacant firms after the mutation step. In the
stationary setting, the quantityM(pˇV J , e · pˇUJ ) of new job matches in a given period
is governed by a continuous aggregate matching function M : [0, 1] ⇥ R+ ! [0, 1]
that incorporates the search e↵ort e applied by each worker seeking employment
with M(pˇV J , e · pˇUJ )  min{pˇV J , pˇUJ}.12 Job-worker pairs that have existed for at
least one period are assumed to break up with probability ✓¯ in each period. Newly
12The mass of workers is assumed to be one in Andolfatto (1996). Since the matching function in
Andolfatto (1996) is assumed to have constant returns to scale, one can re-scale the total worker-
firm population to be one with a proportion w of agents being workers.
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formed pairs cannot break up in the current period. When a job-worker pair keeps
the partnership, their current types (A,E) do not change. On the other hand, if
they break up, the job becomes vacant while the worker becomes unemployed.
Equation (1) in Andolfatto (1996) in the stationary setting is
E⇤ = (1  ✓¯)E⇤ +M(V ⇤, e · (w   E⇤)), (4.26)
where E⇤ and V ⇤ are the respective fractions of employed workers and vacant jobs
in the particular case.13
Viewed in terms of our model, the corresponding time-independent parameters
are given as follows. Vacant and dormant firms could mutate to each other while




1 w E⇤ if k = V or D and l = D
V ⇤
1 w E⇤ if k = V or D and l = V
 k(l) otherwise.
Matching could only happen between unemployed workers and vacant jobs. The
following defines the matching probabilities, For any k, l 2 S, define
qkl(pˇ) =
8>>><>>>:
M(pˇV J , e·pˇUJ )
pˇUJ
if (k, l) = (U, V ) and pˇUJ > 0
M(pˇV J , e·pˇUJ )
pˇV J
if (k, l) = (V, U) and pˇUJ > 0
0 otherwise.
Next, we consider the step of type changing with break-up. For any k, l, r, s 2 S,
we have
✓kl =
8<:✓¯ if (k, l) = (E,A) or (A,E)0 otherwise; (4.27)
 kl(r, s) =
8>>><>>>:
 E(r) A(s) if k = U and l = V
 A(r) E(s) if k = V and l = U
 k(r) l(s) otherwise;
(4.28)
13See (P60) on page 120 of Andolfatto (1996) for the steady state equation with the Cobb-Douglas
matching function.
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&kl(r) =
8>>><>>>:
 U(r) if k = E and l = A
 V (r) if k = A and l = E
 k(r) otherwise.
(4.29)
Equation (4.27) means that an employed worker has probability ✓¯ to lose her job.
When the agents are newly matched in the period, the worker-firm pair changes the
types from (U, V ) to (E,A). For those paired agents who are matched in a previous
period, they do not change types if they stay together; the worker-firm pair changes
types from (E,A) to (U, V ) if they break up. Equations (4.28) and (4.29) express
those ideas.
Taking the equilibrium search e↵ort e as given, Theorem 9 and Proposition 7
imply that any stationary type distribution satisfies
pˆ⇤
EA
=  (pˆ⇤)EA . (4.30)
We take a stationary type distribution pˆ⇤ corresponding to the given fractions of
employed workers and vacant jobs E⇤ and V ⇤ as in Equation (4.26), which means
that pˆ⇤
EA
= E⇤ and pˆ⇤
V J
= V ⇤. By the formulas above the statement of Theorem 9,
we obtain that
 EA(pˆ




= w   pˆ⇤
EA
= w   E⇤,
p˜V J = pˆ
⇤
V J






bV V + (1  w   pˆ⇤EA   pˆ⇤V J )bDV = V ⇤.
Substituting the above terms into Equation (4.30), we derive
E⇤ = pˆ⇤
EA
= (1  ✓¯)E⇤ +M (V ⇤, e · (w   E⇤)) .
Thus the stationary distribution of employed workers and vacant jobs as considered
in Andolfatto (1996) can be derived from our model of dynamic directed random
matching with enduring partnership with appropriate parameters.
4.6 Concluding Discussion
Previous results on the existence and law of large numbers for independent random
matching, such as those of Du e and Sun (2007) and Du e and Sun (2012), were
limited by the assumption that the partner of a matched agent is drawn uniformly
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from the population of agents to be matched. A key purpose of this chapter is to
allow for popular applications in which agents “direct” their searches, so as to obtain
relatively higher per-capita matching probabilities with specific types of counterpar-
ties. This also provides the first rigorous probabilistic foundation for the notion
of a “matching function” that is commonly used in the search literature of labor
economics.
A second objective of this chapter is to allow for random matching with enduring
partnerships. The durations of these partnerships can be random or deterministic,
and can be type dependent. To our knowledge, earlier mathematical models provid-
ing foundations for random matching presume that partnerships break up immedi-
ately after matching. This is obviously crucial for search-based labor-market search
models in which there are episodes of employment (a match between a worker and
a firm) followed by separation.
Finally, in contrast to the independence of type changes of paired agents that
was considered in prior work such as Du e and Sun (2007) and Du e and Sun
(2012), we allow here for match-induced type changes that may be independent or
correlated.
The main results characterize, and prove existence of, the dynamical system
for the agent cross-sectional type process as a Markov chain with explicitly stated
transition matrices. In many applications, the explicitly known and deterministic
nature of the cross-sectional distribution of agents’ types makes the setting su -
ciently simple for a calculation of each agent’s optimal behavior. In this setting, the
probability distribution of almost every agent’s type evolves over time in precisely
the same manner as that of the cross-sectional type distribution (almost surely).
We also show that existence applies to settings in which the agent space is a
hyperfinite Loeb counting probability space or an extension of the Lebesgue unit
interval.
The results provide a mathematical foundation that had not existed for many
previously studied search-based models of labor markets, money, and financial mar-
kets.
4.7 Proofs
The main existence results in this chapter are Theorems 6 and 10, which are proved
in Subsections 4.7.1 and 4.7.3 respectively. The proofs of Theorem 9 and Propo-
sition 7 will be given in Subsection 4.7.2. Subsection 4.7.4 presents the proofs of
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Propositions 6 and 8.
In Subsections 4.7.1 and 4.7.3, nonstandard analysis is used extensively. The
reader is referred to the first three chapters of Loeb and Wol↵ (2000) for more
details. In particular, the space of agents used in those two subsections will be
based on a hyperfinite Loeb counting probability space (I, I, ) that is the Loeb
space (see Loeb (1975) and Loeb and Wol↵ (2000)) of internal probability space
(I, I0, 0), where I = {1, . . . , Mˆ}, Mˆ is an unlimited hyperfinite integer in ⇤N1, I0
its internal power set, and  0(A) = |A|/|I| for any A 2 I0 (i.e.,  0 is the internal
counting probability measure on I).
We shall also need to work with some hyperfinite internal probability space as
the sample space in Subsections 4.7.1 and 4.7.3. A general hyperfinite internal
probability space is an ordered triple (⇥,A0, ⌧0), where ⇥ = {#1,#2, . . . ,# } for
some unlimited hyperfinite natural number  , A0 is the internal power set on ⇥,
and ⌧0(B) =
P
1j ,#j2B ⌧0({#j}) for any B 2 A0. When the weights ⌧0({#j}), 1 
j    are all infinitesimals, (⇥,A0, ⌧0) is said to be atomless, and its Loeb space
(⇥,A, ⌧), as a standard probability space, is atomless in the usual sense. Keisler’s
Fubini Theorem (see (Loeb and Wol↵, 2000, p. 162)) shows that the Loeb space
(I⇥⇥, I⇥A, ⇥⌧) of the internal product probability space (I⇥⇥, I0⌦A0, 0⌦⌧0)
is a Fubini extension.
4.7.1 Proof of Theorem 6
As mentioned in the beginning of Section 4.7, let I = {1, . . . , Mˆ} be a hyperfinite
set with Mˆ an unlimited hyperfinite integer in ⇤N1, I0 the internal power set on
I,  0 the internal counting probability measure on I0. The corresponding Loeb
counting probability space (I, I, ) will be our space of agents. In the setting of
directed random matching as in Theorem 6, all agents are initially unmatched.
On the other hand, when one considers dynamic directed random matching with
enduring partnership as in Theorem 10, only the unmatched agents will conduct
directed random searches for counterparties while those existing paired agents will
not participate in the search process. The following lemma will be used to prove
both Theorems 6 and 10.
Lemma 8. As above, let (I, I0, 0) be the hyperfinite internal counting probability
space with its Loeb space (I, I, ). Then, there exists a hyperfinite internal set ⌦
with its internal power set F0 such that for any initial internal type function ↵0 from
I to S and initial internal partial matching ⇡0 from I to I [ {J} with g0 = ↵0   ⇡0
internal extended type distribution ⇢ˆ =  0 (↵0, g0)
 1, and for any internal matching
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probability function q from S⇥S to ⇤R+ with
P
r2S qkr  1 and ⇢ˆkJqkl ' ⇢ˆlJqlk (i.e.,
⇢ˆkJqkl   ⇢ˆlJqlk is an infinitesimal) for any k, l 2 S, there exists an internal random
matching ⇡ from I⇥⌦ to I [{J} and an internal probability measure P0 on (⌦,F0)
with the following properties.
(i) Let H = {i : ⇡0(i) 6= J}. Then P0 ({! 2 ⌦ : ⇡!(i) = ⇡0(i) for any i 2 H}) =
1.
(ii) Let g be the internal mapping from I ⇥ ⌦ to S [ {J}, defined by g(i,!) =
↵0(⇡(i,!)) for any (i,!) 2 I ⇥ ⌦. Then, for any k, l 2 S, P0(gi = l) ' qkl for
 -almost every agent i 2 I satisfying ↵0(i) = k and ⇡0(i) = J .
(iii) Denote the corresponding Loeb probability spaces of the internal probability
spaces (⌦,F0, P0) and (I ⇥ ⌦, I0 ⌦ F0, 0 ⌦ P0) respectively by (⌦,F , P ) and
(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ). The mapping g is an essentially pairwise independent
process from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) to S.
To reflect their dependence on (↵0, ⇡0, q), ⇡ and P0 will also be denoted by
⇡(↵0,⇡0,q) and P(↵0,⇡0,q).
Proof. For each k 2 S, let ⌘k = 1 
P
r2S qkr, and Ik = {i 2 I : ↵0(i) = k, ⇡0(i) = J}.
For each agent i 2 Ik, define a probability ⇣i on S [ {J} such that ⇣i(l) = qkl for
l 2 S and ⇣i(J) = ⌘k. For each agent i 2 I such that ⇡0(i) 6= J , define a probability
⇣i on S [ {J} such that ⇣i(l) =  J(l) for l 2 S [ {J}. Let ⌦0 = (S [ {J})I be
the internal set of all the internal functions from I to S [ {J}, and µ0 the internal
product probability measure ⇧i2I⇣i on (⌦0,A0).
Let ⌦1 = {A1 ⇥ · · ·⇥ AK2 : Ak ✓ I and Ak is internal, where 1  k  K2}. For
each !0 2 ⌦0, k, l 2 S, let A¯!0kl = {i 2 Ik : !0(i) = l}, and B¯!0k = {i 2 Ik : !0(i) =
J}. For k, l 2 S with k 6= l, let
C!0kl = {A : A ✓ A¯!0kl , A is internal and |A| = min{|A¯!0kl |, |A¯!0lk |}}.
For k 2 S, let C!0kk =
 
A¯!0kk\{i} : i 2 A¯!0kk
 























. Let B!0 = [Kk=1B!0k . Define
an internal probability measure µ1 on ⌦0⇥⌦1 by letting µ1(!0, A) = µ0(!0)⇥µ!0(A)
for !0 2 ⌦0 and A 2 ⌦1, where µ!0 is the internal counting probability on C!0 , and
µ!0(A) = 0 for A /2 C!0 . Note that we also use ! to represent a singleton set {!}.
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Fix any !0 2 ⌦0 and A!0 2 C!0 . For each k 2 S, let ⌦!0,A!0kk be the internal set of
all the internal full matchings on A!0kk, and µ
!0,A!0
kk the internal counting probability
measure on ⌦!0,A
!0
kk . For k, l 2 S with k < l, let ⌦!0,A
!0
kl be the internal set of all the
internal bijections from A!0kl to A
!0
lk , and µ
!0,A!0
kl the internal counting probability
on A!0kl . Let ⌦2 be the internal set of all the internal partial matching from I to
I [ {J}, and ⌦!0,A!02 the set of   2 ⌦2, with
(i) the restriction  |H = ⇡0|H , where H = {i : ⇡0(i) 6= J};
(ii) {i 2 Ik :  (i) = J} = B!0k for each k 2 S;
(iii) the restriction  |A!0kk 2 ⌦
!0,A!0
kk for k 2 S;
(iv) for k, l 2 S with k < l,  |A!0kl 2 ⌦
!0,A!0
kl .
Define an internal probability measure µ!0,A
!0
2 on ⌦2 such that







(ii)   /2 ⌦!0,A!02 , µ!0,A
!0
2 ( ) = 0.
Define an internal probability measure P0 on ⌦ = ⌦0⇥⌦1⇥⌦2 with the internal
power set F0 by letting
P0 ((!0, F,!2)) =
8<:µ1(!0, F )⇥ µ!0,F2 (!2) if F 2 C!00 otherwise.
For (i,!) 2 I ⇥ ⌦, let ⇡(i, (!0, F,!2)) = !2(i), and g(i,!) = ↵0(⇡(i,!),!). De-
note the corresponding Loeb probability spaces of the internal probability spaces
(⌦,F0, P0) and (I ⇥ ⌦, I0 ⌦ F0, 0 ⌦ P0) respectively by (⌦,F , P ) and (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥
F , ⇥P ). Since ⇡ is an internal function from I⇥⌦ to I[{J}, it is I⇥F -measurable.
Denote the internal set
n
(!0, F,!2) 2 ⌦ : !0 2 ⌦0, F 2 C!0 , !2 2 ⌦!0,F2
o
by ⌦ˆ.




= 1. By its construction, it is
clear that ⇡ is a random matching as in Definition 14 (iii) and satisfies part (i) of
the lemma. It remains to prove parts (ii) and (iii) of the lemma.
Define an internal process f from I⇥⌦ to S[{J} such that for any (i,!) 2 I⇥⌦,
f(i,!) =
8<:!0(i) if ⇡0(i) = J↵0(⇡0(i)) if ⇡0(i) 6= J.
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It is clear that if ↵0(i) = k and ⇡0(i) = J , then P (fi = J) =  ⌘k and P (fi = l) =  qkl,
where  x is the standard part of a bounded hyperreal number x 2 ⇤R. It is also
obvious that for i 6= j in I, fi and fj are independent random variables on the sample
space (⌦,F , P ). The exact law of large number as in Theorem 2.8 in Sun (2006))
implies that for P -almost all ! = (!0, F,!2) 2 ⌦,  ({↵0(i) = k, ⇡0(i) = J,!0(i) =
l}) =  ⇢ˆkJ ·  qkl holds for any k, l 2 S, and  ({↵0(i) = k, ⇡0(i) = J,!0(i) = J}) =
 ⇢ˆkJ ·  ⌘k, which means that
|A¯!0kl |
Mˆ

















Fix any ! = (!0, F,!2) 2 ⌦ˆ \ ⌦˜; then F = A!0 for some A!0 2 C!0 and




























. For any i 2 Ik, i 2 A!0kl if and only if
⇡(!0, A!0 ,!2) = !2(i) 2 A!0lk ; and i 2 B!0k if and only if ⇡(!0, A!0 ,!2) = !2(i) = J .
Hence, for the fixed ! = (!0, A!0 ,!2), and for any k, l 2 S, we can obtain that
if i 2 A!0kl ✓ A¯!0kl , f(i,!) = !0(i) = l = ↵0(!2(i)) = g(i,!); if i 2 B¯!0k ✓ B!0k ,
f(i,!) = !0(i) = J = ↵0(!2(i)) = g(i,!). For any i 2 I\([k2SIk) which means
⇡0(i) 6= J , we can obtain that f(i,!) = ↵0(⇡0(i)) = ↵0(⇡(i,!)) = g(i,!). It is
clear that the set {i 2 I : f(i,!) 6= g(i,!)} is a subset of Sl2S  A¯!0kl \ A!0kl  , which
has  -measure zero by Equation (4.32).




= 1, we know that for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦,
  (i 2 I : f(i,!) = g(i,!)) = 1.
Since (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) is a Fubini extension, the Fubini property implies that for
 -almost all i 2 I, g(i,!) is equal to f(i,!) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. Hence g satisfies
part (ii) of the lemma. Let I˜ be an I-measurable set with  (I˜) = 1 such that for
any i 2 I˜, gi(!) = fi(!) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. Therefore, by the construction of f ,
we know that the collection of random variables {gi}i2I˜ is mutually independent in
the sense that any finitely many random variables from that collection are mutually
independent. This also implies part (iii) of the lemma.
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Proof of Theorem 6: We follow Lemma 8. Let ↵0 be an internal type function
from I to S such that  0 ({↵0(i) = k}) ' pk for any k 2 S.14 Let ⇡0(i) = J for
any i 2 I. Given that matching probability function q from S ⇥ S to R+ withP
r2S qkr  1 and pkqkl = plqlk for all k, l 2 S, the condition ⇢ˆkJqkl ' ⇢ˆlJqlk in the
statement of Lemma 8 is obviously satisfied. It is clear that the random matching ⇡
and the probability measure P constructed in Lemma 8 satisfies all the conditions
in Theorem 6. Let ↵ be ↵0. Then, ↵ and ⇡, which are defined on a Fubini extension
(I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ), are a type function and an independent directed random
matching with respective parameters p and q.
4.7.2 Proofs of Theorem 9 and Proposition 7
Before proving Theorem 9, we need to prove a few lemmas. To prove that the
agents’ extended type processes are essentially pairwise independent in Lemma 10
below, we need the following elementary lemma, which is Lemma 5 in Du e and
Sun (2012).
Lemma 9. Let  m be a random variable from (⌦,F , P ) to a finite space Am, for
m = 1, 2, 3, 4. If the random variables  3 and  4 are independent, and if, for all
a1 2 A1 and a2 2 A2,
P ( 1 = a1, 2 = a2 |  3, 4) = P ( 1 = a1 |  3)P ( 2 = a2 |  4), (4.33)
then the two pairs of random variables ( 1, 3) and ( 2, 4) are independent.
The following lemma is useful for applying the exact law of large numbers for
discrete time processes in Theorem 2.16 of Sun (2006) to our setting.
Lemma 10. Assume that the dynamical system D is Markov conditionally inde-
pendent. Then, the discrete time processes { ni }1n=0, i 2 I, are essentially pairwise
independent. In addition, for each fixed n   1, the random variables  ¯ni , i 2 I
( ¯ni , i 2 I) are also essentially pairwise independent.
Proof. Let E be the set of all (i, j) 2 I ⇥ I such that Equations (4.21), (4.22) and
(4.23) hold for all n   1. Then, by grouping countably many null sets together, we
obtain that for  -almost all i 2 I,  -almost all j 2 I, (i, j) 2 E, i.e., for  -almost
all i 2 I,  (Ei) =  ({j 2 I : (i, j) 2 E}) = 1.
14For any given p 2  , the atomless property of  0 implies the existence of such an ↵0.
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We can use induction to prove that for any fixed (i, j) 2 E, ( 0i , . . . ,  ni ) and
( 0j , . . . ,  
n
j ) are independent for n   0, so are the pairs  ¯ni and  ¯nj ,  ¯ni and  ¯nj
for n   1. The case of n = 0 is simply the assumption of initial independence in
Subsection 4.5.2. Suppose that it is true for the case n   1, i.e., ( 0i , . . . ,  n 1i )
and ( 0j , . . . ,  
n 1







 ¯n 1j . Then, the Markov conditional independence condition and Lemma 9 im-




i ) and ( 
0




j ) are independent, so are the pairs






i ) and ( 
0






j ), and ( 
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j ). Hence, the random vectors ( 
0
i , . . . ,  
n
i ) and ( 
0
j , . . . ,  
n
j )
are independent for all n   0, which means that { ni }1n=0 and { nj }1n=0 are inde-
pendent. It is also clear that for each n   1, the random variables  ¯ni and  ¯nj are
independent, so are  ¯ni and  ¯
n
j . The desired result follows.
The following lemma shows how to compute the expected cross-sectional type
distributions E(pˆn) and E(pˇn).
Lemma 11. The following hold:
1. For each n   1, E(pˆn) =  n(E(pˆn 1)).
2. For each n   1, the expected cross-sectional type distribution p˜n = E(pˇn) im-















Proof. Fix any k, l 2 S. Equations (4.11) and (4.12) imply respectively that for any
k1, l1 2 S,
P
 
 ¯ni = (k, J) |  n 1i = (k1, l1)
 
= 0, and P
 
 ¯ni = (k, l) |  n 1i = (k1, J)
 
= 0.(4.34)
The Fubini property as in Definition 12 will be used extensively in the computations
below. We shall illustrate its usage in Equation (4.35). It then follows from the























 ¯ni = (k, l),  
n 1









































 ¯ni = (k, J),  
n 1

































By Lemma 10,  ¯n is essentially pairwise independent process. The exact law of
large numbers in Corollary 2.9 of Sun (2006) implies that pˇn(!) = E(pˇn) = p˜n for
P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. Combining with Equations (4.15) and (4.16), we can obtain
that for any l 2 S,
P (g¯ni = l | ↵¯ni = k, g¯ni = J) = qnkl (p˜n) , and P (g¯ni = J | ↵¯ni = k, g¯ni = J) = ⌘nk (p˜n) .
(4.37)











 ni = (k, l),  ¯
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 ¯ni = (k, J)
 
d (i)
= p˜nkl + q
n
kl (p˜
n) p˜nkJ . (4.39)











n) (1  ✓nk1l1) nk1l1(k, l).(4.40)
Similarly, Equations (4.18) and (4.20) imply the second and third identities while










 ni = (k, J),  ¯
n









 ni = (k, J),  ¯
n
































































By combining Equations (4.35), (4.36),(4.40) and (4.41), we obtain that E(pˆn) =
 n(E(pˆn 1)).
The following lemma shows the Markov property of the agents’ extended type
processes.
Lemma 12. Suppose the dynamical system D is Markov conditional independent.
Then, for  -almost all i 2 I, the extended type process for agent i, { ni }1n=0, is a
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Markov chain with transition matrix zn at time n  1.
Proof. Fix n   1, by summing over all the (k2, l2) 2 S˜ in Equation (4.21), we obtain
that for  -almost all i 2 I,
P
 




 ¯ni = (k1, l1) |  n 1i
 
. (4.42)
By grouping countably many null sets together, we know that for  -almost all i 2 I,
Equation (4.42) holds for all n   1.
Similarly, Equations (4.22) and (4.23) imply that for  -almost all i 2 I,
P
⇣













 ni = (k1, l1) |  ¯ni
⌘
hold for all n   1. A simple computation shows that for  -almost all i 2 I,
P ( ni = (k1, l1) |  0i , . . . ,  n 1i ) = P ( ni = (k1, l1) |  n 1i )
for all a1 2 S, r1 2 S [ {J} and n   1. Hence, for  -almost all i 2 I, agent i’s
extended type process { ni }1n=0 is a Markov chain.













l0l1(1  ✓nk1l1) nk1l1(k, l)E(pˆn 1k0l0 ),
Since the transition probabilities zn(k0l0)(kl) and z
n
(k0J)(kl) from time n   1 to time n















which follow the corresponding formulas in Equation (4.24). Similarly, by combining































Since the transition probabilities zn(k0l0)(kJ) and z
n
(k0J)(kJ) from time n   1 to time n


























which follow the corresponding formulas in Equation (4.24).
Now, for each n   1, we view each  n as a random variable on I ⇥ ⌦. Then
{ n}1n=0 is a discrete-time stochastic process.
Lemma 13. Assume that the dynamical system D is Markov conditionally inde-
pendent. Then, { n}1n=0 is also a Markov chain with transition matrix zn at time
n  1.
Proof. We can compute the transition matrix of { n}1n=0 at time n   1 by using
Lemma 12 and the Fubini property. Fix any k1, k2 2 S and any l1, l2 2 S [ {J}. We
have









n 1 = (k1, l1)) d (i)
= zn(k1l1)(k2l2) · ( ⇥ P )( n 1 = (k1, l1)), (4.43)
which implies that ( ⇥ P )( n = (k2, l2) |  n 1 = (k1, l1)) = zn(k1l1)(k2l2).
Next, for any n   1, and for any (a0, . . . , an 2) 2 (S ⇥ (S [ {J}))n 1, we have
( ⇥ P )
 







( 0i , . . . ,  
n 2
i ) = (a
0, . . . , an 2),  n 1i = (k1, l1),  
n












( 0i , . . . ,  
n 2
i ) = (a
0, . . . , an 2),  n 1i = (k1, l1)
 
d (i)
= zn(k1l1)(k2l2) · ( ⇥ P )(( 0, . . . ,  n 2) = (a0, . . . , an 2),  n 1 = (k1, l1)), (4.44)
which implies that
( ⇥ P )( n = (k2, l2) | ( 0, . . . ,  n 2) = (a0, . . . , an 2),  n 1 = (k1, l1)) = zn(k1l1)(k2l2).
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Hence the discrete-time process { n}1n=0 is indeed a Markov chain with transition
matrix zn at time n  1.
Proof of Theorem 9: Properties (1), (2), and (3) of the theorem are shown in
Lemmas 11, 12, and 10 respectively.
By the exact law of large numbers for discrete time processes in Theorem 2.16
of Sun (2006), we know that for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, ( 0!, . . . ,  n!) and ( 0, . . . ,  n)
(viewed as random vectors) have the same distribution for all n   1. Since, as noted
in Lemma 13, { n}1n=0 is a Markov chain with transition matrix zn at time n   1,
so is { n!}1n=0 for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. Thus property (4) is shown.
Since the processes  ¯n and  n are essentially pairwise independent as shown in
Lemma 10, the exact law of large numbers in Corollary 2.9 of Sun (2006) implies that
at time period n, for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, the realized cross-sectional distribution
after the random mutation, pˇn(!) =  ( ¯n!)
 1 is the expected cross-sectional distri-
bution E(pˇn), and the realized cross-sectional distribution at the end of period n,
pˆn(!) =  ( n!)
 1 is the expected cross-sectional distribution E(pˆn). Thus, property
(5) is shown.
Assume that there exists p¨0 2  ˆ such that P ( 0i ) 1 = p¨0 holds for  -almost
every i 2 I. The exact law of large numbers in Corollary 2.9 of Sun (2006) implies
that p¨0 = E(pˆ0). For  -almost all i 2 I, since the transition matrix of { ni }1n=1 is
{zn}1n=1, the Markov chains { ni }1n=0 induce the same distribution on Sˆ1 as ⇠. For
P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, the Markov chains { n!}1n=0 induce the same distribution on Sˆ1
as ⇠. Thus, property (6) is shown.
Proof of Proposition 7: Given that the parameters (b, q, ✓,  , &) are time inde-
pendent, the mapping  n from  ˆ to  ˆ in Subsection 4.5.3 is time independent,
and will simply be denoted by  . By the continuity assumption in the sentence
above Equation (4.7), pˆkJq
n
kl( pˆ ) is continuous in pˆ 2  ˆ for any k, l 2 S. For any




rk1 is continuous in pˆ 2  ˆ, we can also obtain that
p˜k1J q
n
k1l1(p˜) is continuous in pˆ 2  ˆ. Therefore,   is a continuous function from  ˆ
to itself. By Brower’s Fixed Point Theorem,   has a fixed point pˆ⇤. In this case,
E(pˆn) = pˆ⇤, zn = z1 for all n   1. Hence the Markov chains { ni }1n=0 for  -almost
all i 2 I, { n}1n=0, { n!}1n=0 for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦ are time-homogeneous.
If the initial extended type process  0 is i.i.d., then the extended type distribution
of agent i at time n = 0 is P ( 0i )
 1 = pˆ⇤ for  -almost every i 2 I. By (6) of
Theorem 9, for any n   1,  ni induce the same distribution on Sˆ for  -almost all
i 2 I. Therefore, for any n   1, P ( ni ) 1 = pˆ⇤ for  -almost all i 2 I.
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4.7.3 Proof of Theorem 10
What we need to do is to construct sequences of internal transition probabilities,
internal type functions, and internal random matchings. Since we need to consider
random mutation, random matching and random type changing with break-up at
each time period, three internal measurable spaces with internal transition proba-
bilities will be constructed at each time period.
Let T0 be the hyperfinite discrete time line {n}Mn=0 and (I, I0, 0) be the agent
space, where I = {1, . . . , Mˆ}, I0 is the internal power set on I,  0 is the internal
counting probability measure on I0, M and Mˆ are unlimited hyperfinite numbers in
⇤N1. We transfer the sequences of numbers bn, ✓n,  n, &n, n 2 N to the nonstandard
universe to obtain bn, ✓n,  n, &n, n 2 ⇤N. The transfer of the sequence of functions
qn, n 2 N to the nonstandard universe is denoted by ⇤qn, n 2 ⇤N. Then, for any
k, l 2 S, ⇤qnkl is an internal function from ⇤ ˆ to ⇤[0, 1]. Let qˆnkl(⇢ˆ) = (⇤qnkl)(⇢ˆ) and




kl(⇢ˆ) for any k, l 2 S and ⇢ˆ 2 ⇤ ˆ. Note that an object with an
upper left star means the transfer of a standard object to the nonstandard universe.
We shall first consider the case of an initial condition ⇧0 that is deterministic.
Let {Akl}(k,l)2S˜ be an internal partition of I such that |Akl|Mˆ ' p¨kl for any k 2 S and
l 2 S [ {J}, and |Akl| = |Alk| and |Akk| are even for any k, l 2 S. Let ↵0 be an




be an internal partial matching from I to I [ {J} such that ⇡0(i) = J on Sk2S AkJ ,
and the restriction ⇡0|Akl is an internal bijection from Akl to Alk for any k, l 2 S.
Let g0(i) = ↵0(⇡0(i)). It is clear that  0({i : ↵0(i) = k, g0(i) = l}) ' p¨0kl for any
k 2 S and l 2 S [ {J}.
Suppose that the construction for the dynamical system D has been done up to
time period n   1 2 ⇤N. That is, {(⌦m,Fm, Qm)}3n 3m=1 and {↵l, ⇡l}n 1l=0 have been
constructed, where each ⌦m is a hyperfinite internal set with its internal power set
Fm, Qm an internal transition probability from ⌦m 1 to (⌦m,Fm), ↵l an internal
type function from I⇥⌦3l 1 to the type space S, and ⇡l an internal random matching
from I⇥⌦3l to I [{J}.15 Here, ⌦m =Qmj=1⌦j, and {!j}mj=1 will also be denoted by
!m when there is no confusion. Denote the internal product transition probability
Q1⌦Q2⌦ · · ·⌦Qm by Qm, and ⌦mj=1Fj by Fm (which is simply the internal power
set on ⌦m). Then, Qm is the internal product of the internal transition probability
Qm with the internal probability measure Qm 1.
We shall now consider the constructions for time n. We first work with the
15To handle the deterministic case at the initial step with l = 0 (3l   1 =  1 and 3l = 0), one
can let ⌦0 = ⌦ 1 be a singleton set.
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random mutation step. Let ⌦3n 2 = SI (the space of all internal functions from
I to S) with its internal power set F3n 2. For each i 2 I, !3n 3 2 ⌦3n 3, if
↵n 1(i,!3n 3) = k, define a probability measure  !3n 3i on S by letting  
!3n 3
i (l) = b
n
kl
for each l 2 S. Define an internal probability measure Q!3n 33n 2 on (SI ,F3n 2) to be




i . Let ↵¯
n :
 
I ⇥Q3n 2m=1 ⌦m  ! S be such
that ↵¯n (i,!3n 2) = !3n 2(i). Let g¯n :
 












be the internal cross-sectional extended type dis-
tribution after random mutation.
Next, we consider the step of directed random matching. Let (⌦3n 1,F3n 1) =
(⌦¯, F¯), where (⌦¯, F¯) is the measurable space constructed in the proof of Lemma 8.
For any given !3n 2 2 ⌦3n 2, the type function is ↵¯n!3n 2( · ) while the partial match-
















Lemma 8. Let ⇡¯n :
 













Now, we consider the final step of random type changing with break-up for
matched agents. Let ⌦3n = (S ⇥ {0, 1})I with its internal power set F3n, where 0
represents “unmatched” and 1 represents “paired”; each point !3n = (!13n,!
2
3n) 2
⌦3n is an internal function from I to S ⇥ {0, 1}. Define a new type function
↵n : (I ⇥ ⌦3n) ! S by letting ↵n(i,!3n) = !13n(i). Fix !3n 1 2 ⌦3n 1. For
each i 2 I, (1) if ⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) = J (i is not paired after the matching step at
time n), let ⌧!
3n 1
i be the probability measure on the type space S ⇥ {0, 1} that
gives probability one to the type (↵¯n(i,!3n 2), 0) and zero for the rest; (2) if
⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) 6= J (i is paired after the matching step at time n), ↵¯n(i,!3n 2) = k,
⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) = j and ↵¯n(j,!3n 2) = l, define a probability measure ⌧!3n 1ij on








0) for k0, l0 2 S, and zero for the rest.
Let An!3n 1 = {(i, j) 2 I ⇥ I : i < j, ⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) = j} and Bn!3n 1 = {i 2 I :
⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) = J}. Define an internal probability measure Q!3n 13n on (S ⇥ {0, 1})I
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8<:J if ⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) = J or !23n(i) = 0 or !23n(⇡¯n(i,!3n 1)) = 0⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) otherwise.
and gn(i,!3n) = ↵n(⇡n(i,!3n),!3n). It is clear that ⇡n is a random matching and
Equation (4.17) holds.
Keep repeating the construction. We can then construct a hyperfinite sequence
of internal transition probabilities {(⌦m,Fm, Qm)}3Mm=1 and a hyperfinite sequence of
internal type functions and internal random matchings {(↵n, ⇡n)}Mn=0.
Let (I ⇥ ⌦3M , I0 ⌦ F3M , 0 ⌦ Q3M) be the internal product probability space
of (I, I0, 0) and (⌦3M ,F3M , Q3M). Denote the Loeb spaces of (⌦3M ,F3M , Q3M)
and the internal product (I ⇥ ⌦3M , I0 ⌦ F3M , 0 ⌦ Q3M) by (⌦3M ,F , P ) and (I ⇥
⌦3M , I ⇥ F ,  ⇥ P ) respectively. For simplicity, let ⌦3M be denoted by ⌦, Q3M be
denoted by P0.
In the following, we will often work with functions or sets that are measurable
in (⌦m,Fm, Qm) or its Loeb space for some m  3M , which may be viewed as
functions or sets based on (⌦3M ,F3M , Q3M) or its Loeb space by allowing for dummy
components for the tail part. We can thus continue to use P to denote the Loeb
measure generated by Qm for convenience. Since all the type functions, random
matchings and the partners’ type functions are internal in the relevant hyperfinite
settings, they are all I ⇥ F -measurable when viewed as functions on I ⇥ ⌦.
For n = 0, the initial independence condition in the definition of Markov con-
ditional independence in Subsection 4.5.2 is trivially satisfied. Suppose that the
Markov conditional independence are satisfied up to period n   1 2 N. It remains
to check the Markov conditional independence for period n.








1, . . . , n  1 in S˜. For any agents i and j with i 6= j, we can obtain that
P
 
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n















































D3n 3ij = {!3n 3 :  t(i,!3t) = (kt1, lt1),  t(j,!3t) = (kt2, lt2), t = 1, . . . , n  1},
D3n 3ij = {!3n 3 : ⇡n 1(i,!3n 3) 6= j,  t(i,!3t) = (kt1, lt1),  t(j,!3t) = (kt2, lt2), t = 1, . . . , n  1},
D
3n 3
ij = {!3n 3 : ⇡n 1(i,!3n 3) = j,  t(i,!3t) = (kt1, lt1),  t(j,!3t) = (kt2, lt2), t = 1, . . . , n  1}.
Fix any agent i 2 I. It is clear that D3n 3ij \ D3n 3ij0 = ; for di↵erent j and j0.
Then there are at most countably many j 2 I such that P (D3n 3ij ) > 0. Let
F 3n 3i = {j 2 I : j 6= i, P (D3n 3ij ) = 0}; then  (F 3n 3i ) = 1. Fix any j 2 F 3n 3i . The
probability for agents i and j to be partners is zero at the end of period n 1. When
agents i and j are not partners, their random extended types will be independent
by the construction of Q!
3n 3
3n 2 . Hence, we can obtain that
P
 
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n

































































ls if l, s 2 S
bnkr if l = s = J
0 otherwise.
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Thus, for  -almost all agent j 2 I,
P
 
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n












Note that for any i 2 I,
























3n 3(!3n 3) ' P (E3n 3i )B3n 2kn 11 ln 11 (a1, r1),
where E3n 3i = {!3n 3 :  n 1(i,!3n 3) = (kn 11 , ln 11 )}. Then, we have
P ( ¯ni = (a1, r1) |  n 1i = (kn 11 , ln 11 )) = B3n 2kn 11 ln 11 (a1, r1). (4.46)
Hence, Equations (4.11) and (4.12) in the definition of dynamical system are satis-
fied. By Equation (4.45), we can obtain for each i 2 I, and for  -almost all j 2 I,
P
 
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n












Hence, Equation (4.21) in the definition of Markov conditional independence is sat-
isfied.
For the random matching step in period n, fix any (a1, r1), (a2, r2) in S ⇥ S






2) in S˜ for t = 1, . . . , n   1. Fix any !3n 2 2 ⌦3n 2. Let
A!
3n 3













for any i 2 A!3n 3
⌘
= 1,
which implies that Equation (4.13) holds.
Lemma 9 and Equation (4.47) imply that the extended type process  ¯n is es-
sentially pairwise independent. It follows from the exact law of large numbers in
Corollary 2.9 of Sun (2006) that for P -almost all !3n 2 2 ⌦3n 2,
⇢ˇn(!3n 2) ' pˇn(!3n 2) =     ¯n!3n 2  1 = E  pˇn  !3n 2   = p˜n ' E (⇢ˇn) . (4.48)
Then Equation (4.15) is equivalent to P (g¯ni = l | ↵¯ni = k, g¯ni = J) = qnkl (p˜n) . Since
paired agents do not match in this step, their extended types will not change.
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Thus, to verify Equation (4.22), we only need to prove
P
⇣
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n



















 ¯nj = (a2, r2) |  ¯nj = (a2, J)
⌘
.




i = (k, J))d (i) = 0, then P ( ¯
n
i = (k, J)) = 0 for
 -almost all agent i 2 I, which means that Equation (4.22) automatically holds. It




n) ' p˜na1Jqna1r1 (p˜n)
for P -almost all !3n 2 2 ⌦3n 2. Suppose p˜na1J > 0 and p˜na2J > 0. Hence, we can
obtain that for P -almost all !3n 2 2 ⌦3n 2, qˆna1r1(⇢ˇn) ' qna1r1 (p˜n), and qˆna2r2(⇢ˇn) '
qna2r2 (p˜
n).















2), t = 1, . . . , n  1
⌘































































D3n 2 = {(!3n 2, i, j) :  ¯n(i,!3n 2) = (a1, J),  ¯n(j,!3n 2) = (a2, J),
 t(i,!3t) = (kt1, l
t
1),  
t(j,!3t) = (kt2, l
t
2), t = 1, . . . , n  1},
D3n 2ij is the (i, j)-section of D
3n 2, and 1D3n 2ij is the indicator function of the set
1D3n 2ij in ⌦
3n 2. By Lemma 8 (iii), it is clear that for  -almost all i 2 I, for  -almost
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g¯n(i,!3n 1) = r1, g¯n(j,!3n 1) = r2
  ' qˆna1r1  ⇢ˇn(!3n 2)  qˆna2r2  ⇢ˇn(!3n 2)  .
Hence, the last term of Equation (4.49) is equal to an infinitesimal. Therefore, the




 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n
















for  -almost all j 2 I.
For i 2 I, let E3n 2i = {!3n 2 :  ¯n(i,!3n 2) = (a1, J)}. We can obtain that for
 -almost all i 2 I, and for any !3n 2 2 E3n 2i ,
P
⇣
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n















n(i,!3n 1) = r1) ' qˆna1r1 (⇢ˇn(!3n 2)). Hence, we can obtain that for
 -almost all i 2 I,
P
⇣
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n



















dQ3n 2(!3n 2) ' P (E3n 2i )qna1r1 (p˜n) .
Therefore, we have for  -almost all i 2 I,
P
⇣




Since pˇn(!3n 2) ' p˜n for P -almost all !3n 2 2 ⌦3n 2, Equation (4.51) implies Equa-
tion (4.15). Combining Equations (4.50) and (4.51) together, we have
P
⇣
 ¯ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n


























Hence, Equation (4.22) in the definition of Markov conditional independence is sat-
isfied.











 ni = (a1, r1),  
n
j = (a2, r2),  ¯
n
i = (x1, y1),  ¯
n




















 n(i,!3n) = (a1, r1),  










 n(i,!3n) = (a1, r1),  












 n(i,!3n) = (a1, r1),  




D3n 1ij = {!3n 1 :  ¯ni = (x1, y1),  ¯nj = (x2, y2),
 t(i,!3t) = (kt1, l
t
1),  
t(j,!3t) = (kt2, l
t
2), t = 1, . . . , n  1},
D3n 1ij = {!3n 1 : ⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) 6= j,  ¯ni = (x1, y1),  ¯nj = (x2, y2),
 t(i,!3t) = (kt1, l
t
1),  
t(j,!3t) = (kt2, l
t
2), t = 1, . . . , n  1},
D
3n 1
ij = {!3n 1 : ⇡¯n(i,!3n 1) = j,  ¯ni = (x1, y1),  ¯nj = (x2, y2),
 t(i,!3t) = (kt1, l
t
1),  
t(j,!3t) = (kt2, l
t
2), t = 1, . . . , n  1}.
Fix any agent i 2 I. It is clear that D3n 1ij \ D3n 1ij0 = ; for di↵erent j and
j0. Then there are at most countably many j 2 I such that P (D3n 1ij ) > 0. Let
F 3n 1i = {j 2 I : j 6= i, P (D3n 1ij ) = 0}; then  (F 3n 1i ) = 1. Next, fix any j 2 F 3n 1i .
The probability for agents i and j to be partners is zero at the matching step in
period n. When agents i and j are not partners, their random extended types will
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be independent by the construction of Q!
3n 1
3n . Hence, we can obtain that
P
⇣
 ni = (a1, r1),  
n
j = (a2, r2),  ¯
n
i = (x1, y1),  ¯
n




















 n(i,!3n) = (a1, r1),  


























' P (D3n 1ij )B3nx1y1(a1, r1)B3nx2y2(a2, r2),
where
B3nkl (r, s) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  ✓nkl) nkl(r, s) if l, s 2 S
✓nkl&
n
kl(r) if l 2 S and s = J
 k(r) J(s) if l = J.
Therefore, for any i 2 I, and for  -almost all j 2 I,
P
⇣
 ni = (a1, r1),  
n
















Note that for any agent i 2 I,
P ( ni = (a1, r1),  ¯
n














3n 3(!3n 3) ' P (E3n 1j )B3nx1y1(a1, r1),
where E3n 1i = {!3n 1 :  ¯n(i,!3n 1) = (x1, y1)}, which implies that P ( ni =
(a1, r1) |  ¯ni = (x1, y1)) = B3nx1y1(a1, r1). Hence, Equations (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20) in
the definition of the dynamical system D are satisfied. By Equation (4.52), we can
obtain for each i 2 I, and for  -almost all j 2 I,
P
⇣
 ni = (a1, r1),  
n























Hence, Equation (4.23) in the definition of Markov conditional independence is sat-
isfied.
In summary, we have shown the validity of Equations (4.11) to (4.20), and (4.21)
to (4.23). Hence D is a dynamical system with the Markov conditional independence
property, where the initial condition ⇧0 is deterministic.
Finally, we consider the case that the initial extended type process  0 is i.i.d.
across agents. We shall use the construction for the case of deterministic initial
condition. We choose n =  1 to be the initial period so that we can have some
flexibility in choosing the parameters in period 0. Assume that at n =  1, all agents
have type 1, and no agents are matched. Namely, the initial type function is ↵ 1 ⌘ 1







k. For the parameters in period 0, let
b0kr =













if pˆkJ 6= 0, p¨0k 6= 0 and p¨0l 6= 0
0 otherwise,
 0kl(k
0, l0) =  k(k0) l(l0), &0kl(k
0) =  k(k0) and ✓0kl = 0 for any k, k
0, l, l0 2 S. Following
the construction for the case of deterministic initial condition, there exists a Fubini
extension (I⇥⌦, I⇥F , ⇥P ) on which is defined a dynamical system D = (⇧n)1n= 1
that is Markov conditionally independent with the parameters (bn, qn,  n, ✓n)1n=0.
By Lemma 11, p˜0kl =  J(l)p¨
0
















Therefore, for  -almost all i 2 I,
P ( 0i = (k, l)) = P ( 
0
i = (k, l) |   1i = (1, J))P (  1i = (1, J)) = z0(1J)(kl) = p¨0kl
for any k 2 S, l 2 S [ {J}. Part (3) of Theorem 9 implies the essential pairwise
independence of  0. Thus, we can simply start the dynamical system D from time
zero instead of time  1 so that we can have an i.i.d. initial extended type process
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 0.
4.7.4 Proofs of Propositions 6 and 8
In this subsection, the unit interval [0, 1] will have a di↵erent notation in a di↵erent
context. Recall that (L,L, ) is the Lebesgue unit interval, where   is the Lebesgue
measure defined on the Lebesgue  -algebra L. We shall prove Proposition 8 first.
The proof of Proposition 6 then follows easily.
Note that the agent space used in the proof of Theorem 10 is a hyperfinite Loeb
counting probability space. Using the usual ultrapower construction as in Loeb and
Wol↵ (2000), the hyperfinite index set of agents can be viewed as an equivalence
class of a sequence of finite sets with elements in natural numbers, and thus this
index set of agents has the external cardinality of the continuum. The purpose of
Proposition 8 is to show that one can find some extension of the Lebesgue unit
interval as the agent space so that the associated version of Theorem 10 still holds.
Fix a Fubini extension (Iˆ ⇥ ⌦, Iˆ ⇥ F ,  ˆ ⇥ P ) as constructed in the proof of
Theorem 10. Following Appendix A of Sun and Zhang (2009) and Appendix B in
Du e and Sun (2012), we can state the following lemma.16
Lemma 14. There exists a Fubini extension (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ) such that:
(1) The agent space (I, I, ) is an extension of the Lebesgue unit interval (L,L, ).
(2) There exists a surjective mapping ' from I to Iˆ such that ' 1(ˆi) has the
cardinality of the continuum for any iˆ 2 Iˆ and ' is measure preserving, in the
sense that for any A 2 Iˆ, ' 1(A) is measurable in I with  [' 1(A)] =  ˆ(A).
(3) Let   be the mapping (', Id⌦) from I ⇥ ⌦ to Iˆ ⇥ ⌦, that is,  (i,!) =
(', Id⌦)(i,!) = ('(i),!) for any (i,!) 2 I ⇥⌦. Then   is measure preserving
from (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥F , ⇥ P ) to (Iˆ ⇥ ⌦, Iˆ ⇥F ,  ˆ⇥ P ) in the sense that for any
V 2 Iˆ⇥F ,   1(V ) is measurable in I⇥F with ( ⇥P )[  1(V )] = ( ˆ⇥P )(V ).
Denote the MCI dynamical system with parameters (b, q,  , &, ✓) and a deter-
ministic initial condition, as constructed in proof of Theorem 10 by Dˆ. For that
dynamical system, we add a hat to the relevant type processes, matching functions,
and partners’ type processes. We shall follow the proof of Theorem 4 in Du e and
Sun (2012).
16Parts (2) and (3) of Lemma 14 are taken from Lemma 11 in Du e and Sun (2012).
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Proof of Proposition 8: Based on the dynamical system Dˆ on the Fubini extension
(Iˆ ⇥ ⌦, Iˆ ⇥ F ,  ˆ⇥ P ), we shall now define, inductively, a new dynamical system D
on the Fubini extension (I ⇥ ⌦, I ⇥ F , ⇥ P ).
For any iˆ, iˆ0 2 Iˆ with iˆ 6= iˆ0, let ⇥iˆ,ˆi0 be a bijection from ' 1(ˆi) to ' 1(ˆi0), and
⇥iˆ
0 ,ˆi be the inverse mapping of ⇥iˆ,ˆi
0
. This is possible since both ' 1(ˆi) and ' 1(ˆi0)
have cardinality of the continuum.
Let ↵0 be the mapping ↵ˆ0(') from I to S,
⇡0(i) =
(
J if ⇡ˆ0('(i)) = J
⇥'(i), ⇡ˆ
0('(i))(i) if ⇡ˆ0('(i)) 6= J ,
and g0(i) = ↵0 (⇡0(i)) = gˆ0('(i)). By the measure preserving property of ' in
Lemma 14, we know that  0 = (↵0, g0) is I-measurable type function with distribu-
tion pˆ0 on S ⇥ (S [ {J}).
For each time period n   1, let ↵¯n and ↵n be the respective mappings ˆ¯↵n( )
and ↵ˆn( ) from I ⇥⌦ to S. Define mappings ⇡¯n, and ⇡n from I ⇥⌦ to I such that
for each (i,!) 2 I ⇥ ⌦,
⇡¯n(i,!) =
(
J if ˆ¯⇡n!('(i)) = J
⇥'(i), ˆ¯⇡
n
!('(i))(i) if ˆ¯⇡n!('(i)) 6= J ,
⇡n(i,!) =
(
J if ⇡ˆn!('(i)) = J
⇥'(i), ⇡ˆ
n
!('(i))(i) if ⇡ˆn!('(i)) 6= J .
When ⇡n!('(i)) 6= J , ⇡n! defines a full matching on ' 1(Hˆn!), where Hˆn! = Iˆ   {i :
⇡ˆ!(i)n = J}, which implies that ⇡n!(i) 6= i. Hence, ⇡n is a well-defined mapping
from I ⇥ ⌦ to I [ {J}. ⇡¯n is also well-defined for the same reason.
Since   is measure-preserving and ˆ¯↵n and ↵ˆn are measurable mappings from
(Iˆ ⇥ ⌦, Iˆ ⇥ F ,  ˆ ⇥ P ) to S. By the definitions of ↵¯n and ↵n, it is obvious that for








Next, we consider the property of ⇡¯n and ⇡n. Fix any ! 2 ⌦. Let Hn! = I   {i :
⇡ni = J}; then Hn! = ' 1(Hˆn!). Pick any i 2 Hn! and denote ⇡n!(i) by j. Then,
'(i) 2 Hˆn! . The definition of ⇡n implies that j = ⇥'(i), ⇡ˆn!('(i))(i). Since ⇥'(i), ⇡ˆn!('(i))





by the definition of '. Thus, j = ⇥'(i), '(j)(i). Since the inverse of ⇥'(i), '(j) is
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⇥'(j), '(i), we know that ⇥'(j), '(i)(j) = i. By the full matching property of ⇡ˆn!,
'(j) 6= '(i), '(j) 2 Hˆn! and ⇡ˆn!('(j)) = '(i). Hence, we have j 6= i, and
⇡n!(j) = ⇥
'(j), ⇡ˆn!('(j))(j) = ⇥'(j), '(i)(j) = i.
This means that the composition of ⇡n! with itself on H
n
! is the identity mapping on
Hn! , which also implies that ⇡
n
! is a bijection on H
n
! . Therefore ⇡
n
! is a full matching
on Hn! = I   {i : ⇡ni = i}.
We define gn : I ⇥ ⌦ ! S [ {J} by gn(i,!) = ↵n(⇡n(i,!),!). As noted in
the above paragraph, for any fixed ! 2 ⌦, '(⇡n!(i)) = ⇡ˆn!('(i)) for i 2 Hn! . When
i /2 Hn! , we have '(i) /2 Hˆn! , and ⇡n!(i) = J , ⇡ˆn!('(i)) = J . Therefore, '(⇡n!(i)) =
⇡ˆn!('(i)) for any i 2 I. Then,
gn(i,!) = ↵ˆn('(⇡n(i,!)),!) = ↵ˆn(⇡ˆn('(i),!),!) = gˆn('(i),!) = gˆn( )(i,!).
We can prove that g¯n(i,!) = ˆ¯gn( )(i,!) and g¯n(i,!) = ˆ¯gn( )(i,!) in the same way.
Hence, the measure-preserving property of   implies that gn is I ⇥ F -measurable.
The previous three identities on the partners’ processes also mean that for any i 2 I,
gni (·) = gˆn'(i)(·), g¯ni (·) = ˆ¯gn'(i)(·), g¯ni (·) = ˆ¯gn'(i)(·).
Since ↵¯n = ˆ¯↵n( ) and g¯n(i,!) = ˆ¯gn( )(i,!), Equation (4.11) implies that for  -
almost all i 2 I,
P (↵¯ni = k2, g¯
n
i = l2 |↵n 1i = k1, gn 1i = l1)
= P ( ˆ¯↵n'(i) = k2, ˆ¯g
n




Similarly, we can obtain that for  -almost all i 2 I,
P (↵¯ni = k2, g¯
n
i = r |↵n 1i = k1, gn 1i = J) = bnk1k2 J(r),
P (g¯ni = l | ↵¯ni = k, g¯ni = J, pˇn) = qnkl(pˇn(!)),
P (↵ni = l1, g
n
i = r | ↵¯ni = k1, g¯ni = J) =  k1(l1)  J(r),
P (↵ni = l1, g
n
i = J | ↵¯ni = k1, g¯ni = k2) = ✓nk1k2&nk1k2(l1),
P (↵ni = l1, g
n
i = l2 | ↵¯ni = k1, g¯ni = k2) = (1  ✓nk1k2) nk1k2(l1, l2).
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Therefore, D is a dynamical system with random mutation, directed random match-
ing and type changing with break-up and with the parameters (p0, b, q,  , &, ✓).
It remains to check the Markov conditional independence for D. Since the dy-
namical system Dˆ is Markov conditionally independent, for each n   1, there is a set
Iˆ 0 2 Iˆ with  ˆ(Iˆ 0) = 1, and for each iˆ 2 Iˆ 0, there exists a set Eˆiˆ 2 Iˆ with  ˆ(Eˆiˆ) = 1,
with Equations (4.21) to (4.23) being satisfied for any iˆ 2 Iˆ 0 and any jˆ 2 Eˆiˆ. Let
I 0 = ' 1(Iˆ 0). For any i 2 I 0, let Ei = ' 1(Eˆ '(i)). Since ' is measure-preserving,
 (I 0) =  (Ei) = 1. Fix any i 2 I 0, and any j 2 Ei. Denote '(i) by iˆ and '(j) by
jˆ. Then, it is obvious that iˆ 2 Iˆ 0 and jˆ 2 Eˆiˆ. Therefore Equations (4.21) to (4.23)
are satisfied for any i0 2 I 0 and any j0 2 Ei0 . Therefore the dynamical system D is
Markov conditionally independent.
By using exactly the same proof as in the end of the proof of Theorem 10, we
can have an i.i.d. (instead of deterministic) initial extended type process  0 in the
statement of this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6: In the proof of Proposition 8, take the initial type
distribution pˆ0kl = pk J(l). Assume that there is no genuine random mutation.
Then, it is clear that p˜0kl = pk J(l) for any k 2 S. Consider the random matching
⇡1 in period one.
Fix an agent i with ↵0(i) = k, then P (↵¯1i = k) = 1, P (g¯
1
i = l) = qkl and
P (g¯1i = J) = ⌘k. Similarly, Equation (4.22) implies that the process g¯
1 is essentially
pairwise independent. By taking the type function ↵ to be ↵0, the matching function
⇡ to be ⇡¯1, and the associated process g to be g¯1, the proposition holds.
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